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ENGLISH SUMMARY
The question “how to become a good engineer?” is complicated because being agood engineer has many meanings and there are thus different approaches as to howto bring about the necessary changes in practice. The “scientific” or academicapproach emphasizes the importance of establishing a closer relationship betweenengineering and science. The “economic” or technical approach stresses the need tostrengthen the economic efficiency of engineering activity. My approach toanswering this question is inspired by the perception that engineering is a form ofsocially responsible practice. These three meanings of engineering can be expressedby a closed loop that indicates the interactions of the cultural elements.
In chapter 1 I discuss these three elements. Theories of engineering refer to thephilosophical and methodological thinking that is reflected in engineering practices.The civil society refers both to the sources of theories and a space where engineersmanifest the human meaning of engineering. Engineers are practitioners. Therefore,they are often positioned in an organization – the black-box in this diagram. It isindicated that the evolution of engineering for sustainability requires a circulationof this loop. This circulation can be manifested by different types of activities. Inthis thesis engineering design as an activity is focused on because it is regarded asthe most important element of engineering. In order to study this activity somesociological and anthropological methods are used, specifically interviewssupplemented with a participant observation in a nuclear power engineeringcompany.
The research question in this PhD study is also a specific question, in the sense thatthe meaning of being a good engineer may have its Chinese characteristics,considering its cultural uniqueness. Therefore, in chapter 2, I describe the Chinesecharacteristic of engineering in terms of a pro-science and technology economicminded culture. Its features are extensively expressed by its environmental politicsand attitudes toward nuclear power development.
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In chapter 3, the influence of this broader culture to the shaping of an organizationalculture is established through a historical review of the path of growth of CGN –China General Nuclear Power Group – its structure of the company, itsmanagement, and its engineering procedures.
In chapter 4 an example of how CGN engineers work in this organization culture toimprove engineering design is presented. Through these findings of a participantobservation, it seemed that individuals’ pursuits of becoming good engineers haveconflicts with the dominant culture. In this respect, the approach to answer theresearch question in this thesis has to take into account engineers’ personalexperiences.
Five CGN’s engineers were invited to take part in the interviews in which theirpersonal stories on their career development are recorded. Their views about how toimprove engineering design and their personal perceptions on the relationship oftheir career to the notion of sustainable development are presented in chapter 5.
The conclusion of this thesis is based on the finding that CGN engineers tend todivide their lives with work, due to the culture filtering effects of the organization.The consequence is that it makes the evolution of engineering for a sustainabledevelopment of the society extremely difficult. Regarding to the theoreticalframework of this thesis, it breaks the circulation of the loop as it can be expressedby the following diagram:
In the conclusions of the thesis I contend that in order to become a good engineer inChina there needs to be opportunities to achieve a balanced self-development of thethree meanings of engineering in one person, in the sense that engineers need tolearn from the society and contribute to the society in a more direct manner.Perhaps what they can do now is to start by making reflections on their ownexperiences.
VDANSK RESUME
Spørgsmålet “hvordan dannes en god ingeniør? er kompliceret, da der er mangeforskellige meninger om dette og tilgange til forandring af praksis. Den“videnskabelige” eller akademiske tilgang argumenterer for en stærkere relationimellem ingeniørvidenskab og naturvidenskab. Den “økonomiske” eller teknisketilgang understreger nødvendigheden af at styrke den økonomiske effektivitet afingeniørens praksis. Min tilgang til spørgsmålet er baseret på en opfattelse afingeniørens praksis som social ansvarlig. De tre meningsdannelser, som på hver sinmåde forholder sig til ingeniørens praksis, kan betragtes som et lukket kredsløb,som indbefatter kulturelle dimensioner.
I kapitel 1 behandles de tre elementer, som indgår i det skitserede kredsløb. Teorierom ingeniørpraksis, som refererer til den filosofiske og metodiske tænkning iforståelsen af ingeniørpraksis. Civilsamfundet, som både refererer til et teoretiskgrundlag og til et rum, hvori ingeniøren kan manifestere sig som meningsgivende.Ingeniøren er en praktiker. Derfor er ingeniører ofte positioneret i en organisation –den “sorte boks” i diagrammet. Udviklingen af ingeniører for bæredygtighedkræver en gennemgang af det viste loop. Der kan indgå forskellig aktiviteter i detteloop. I denne afhandling er der fokus på designaktiviteter, da design er et væsentligtelement i ingeniørens praksis. Med henblik på at studere denne aktivitet anvendessociologiske og antropologiske metoder, mere specifikt uføres interviews suppleretmed deltagerobservation i en ingeniørvirksomhed, der arbejder inden for atomkraft.
Forskningsspørgsmålet i dette Ph.d. studie er afgrænset på den måde, atmeningsdannelsen omkring god ingeniørpraksis, er behandlet i en kinesisk kontekstog dermed er under indflydelse af kinesisk kultur. I kapitel 2 vil læseren derforblive introduceret til den kinesiske tilgang til ingeniørpraksis, som en pro-videnskabelig og tekno-økonomisk kultur. Dette er intensivt behandlet i relation tilmiljøpolitikken samt specifikt i forhold til holdningen til atomkraft.
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I kapitel 3 bliver den bredere kulturelle indflydelse relateret tilorganisationskulturelt niveau ved en historisk analyse af China General NuclearPower Group (CGN), der indbefatter et blik på organisationsstrukturen, ledelsen ogprocedurerne for ingeniørpraksis.
I kapitel 4 gives der et eksempel på, hvordan CGN ingeniører arbejder indenfor denetablerede organisationskultur for at forbedre designprocessen. Veddeltagerobservation fremgår det, at den enkelte ingeniørs bestræbelse for at blive engod ingeniør ikke nødvendigvis er i overensstemmelse med den dominerende kultur.Derfor betragtes det som væsentligt at tage ingeniørernes personlige erfaringer medI adresseringen af spørgsmålet.
Fem CGN ingeniører blev derfor inviteret til interviews for at dele deres personligehistorier relateret til deres karriereforløb. Resultatet af analyse af disse ingeniørersholdning til hvordan designprocesserne kan forbedres, samt deres opfattelser afrelationen imellem deres karriereforløb og bæredygtighed, bliver præsenteret ikapitel 5.
Konklusionen af denne afhandling baserer sig på resultaterne af analysen af CGNingeniørernes praksis, og viser en tendens til, at de opdeler deres arbejdsliv, så denorganisationskulturelle påvirkning filtreres. Dette besværliggør udviklingen afingeniørpraksis mod bæredygtighed betydeligt. På det teoretiske plan giver denempiriske undersøgelse anledning til at ændre den teoretiske ramme, da der somvist sker et brud i gennemløbet af det skitserede loop.
Til sidst konkluderes det, at for at blive en god ingeniør i Kina, skal der væremuligheder for personlig udvikling, der balancerer de tre tilgange til ingeniørpraksis,så de er mulige at rumme i en og samme person. Således skal ingeniørerne havemulighed for at lære af deres samfundsmæssige interaktion og bidrage til densamfundsmæssige udviklingen på en mere direkte måde. Måske er det første skridtpå vejen, at ingeniørerne begynder at reflekterer over deres personlige erfaringer.
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INTRODUCTION
so give me reason to prove me wrongto wash this memory cleanlet the floods cross the distance in your eyesgive me reason to fill this holeconnect the space betweenlet it be enough to reach the truth that liesacross this new divide (Linkin Park - New Divide)
“Problem?”
“What Problem?”
This is a common conversation in our normal lives when we ask someone about asolution to a perceived problem but the respondent doesn’t see it as a problem. Eventhough we might get an answer from the respondent, the understanding of it dependson our own reflections.
In this thesis, I try to discuss some problems and propose some solutions to themwhich are encountered by Chinese engineers in a real life engineering company.Admittedly, clarifying what is the problem seems to be more difficult than findinganswers. Being a Chinese engineer myself, it took me about 10 years to reach astage that I am now able to identify some of our problems and present them in a waythat readers might feel that what I say makes some sense. To a large extent, my PhDresearch started from my experiences and observations or perhaps reflections on thereal life engineering practices in China.
I was educated to be a chemical engineer through a 4 year bachelor’s program, in2003, in Nanjing University of Technology (NJUT) in China. With that degree I wasnot satisfied because I felt that the degree from NJUT could not bring me a highenough level of prestige. Therefore, I did not think the result corresponded to myefforts. I ascribed this feeling to NJUT’s low ranking among the more than 1000Chinese Universities. According to the newest Chinese university rankingannounced by the People’s Daily, my university placed somewhere between the 60thand the 70th.1 Only the natural science disciplines in my university were scored with
1 Chinese University Ranking in 2015,http://edu.people.com.cn/n/2015/0602/c1053-27092223.html, (Accessed, November 12, 2015)[In Chinese]
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an A while others were given Bs and Cs. But in another university ranking publishedby another agency which differentiated university ranking into specific disciplinesthat would help high school graduates’ applications to universities after thecompetitive gaokao – the yearly national university entrance examination – theschool of chemical engineering in NJUT was placed top 32 in China. My teachers inmy school, perhaps not in the entire university, might be happy to see thisunbalanced ranking because that meant the school of chemical engineeringcontributed too much to the general ranking of NJUT. For me, I could not be happywhen I was graduated because even though in the job market, especially in thechemical industry sector, employers did appreciate the school ranking while in theacademic world general ranking was more appreciated. Ironically, at that time, I wasa person who wanted to become an academic researcher because, in my view, thattitle represented a good engineer or perhaps a real decent engineer. However, wasthat my fault? Did it mean that I was not smart and hardworking enough to be agood engineer? Looking into the history of my university, I calmed myself downbecause I realized that it was not my fault but it did have a reason.
NJUT claimed that it has a history of more than 100 years which can be traced to theearly modernization period of my home country. When the nationalists took power,the nation decided to build two new modern universities in its capital Nanjing. Onewas called the national Jinling University and the other named the national CentralUniversity. Both of these universities together with their elderly peers such as thePeking University and the Tsinghua University served as the foundations of China’smodern higher education before the socialist new China.
In the 1950s, when the socialists established a new China, education reform began totake place. In this round of reform, the national Jinling University and CentralUniversity were broken-up. The chemical engineering and applied chemistrydepartments in these two universities were separated and then combined to form achemical technology college. From my perspective, in a realistic sense, that was theorigin of my university. Later in the 1980s a new round of higher education reformchanged the name of the college into a university – Nanjing University of ChemicalEngineering – because college was standardized to refer to those higher educationinstitutes which can only grant associate degrees while in universities bachelors,masters, and doctoral degrees can be pursued. As I can remember, up till the secondyear in my undergraduate education, my university was still called NanjingUniversity of Chemical Engineering with everything taught related to the chemicalindustry. There was a rumor before NJUT changed to its current status, saying thatour university was going to return to Nanjing University (another derivative of thenationalists’ Jinling and Central). That was a piece of good news for all of us
2 Chemical Engineering School Ranking 2014-2015,http://www.gaokao.com/e/20140411/5347b74a978e7.shtml, (Accessed, November 12, 2015)[In Chinese]
A BOOK OF CHANGES IN ENGINEERING
XIV
because all of a sudden our ranking would be more appreciated both for practicaland research oriented students.
However, things did not happen as we wished. The commercialization of highereducation in China started from the late 1990s triggered the university’s ambition toexpand its scope and scale rather than a relatively narrow minded interest inpursuing academic prestige. The result was that our university “acquired” a civilengineering college in Nanjing and shaped itself into a new comprehensiveengineering university. That was my first struggle with prestige and my future.
I would not consider my concern with prestige to be an instinct. Rather, I tend tothink that it was something that was nurtured or imparted. I remember quite clearlymy first lecture in the university was about. It was given by Professor Shi Jun –academician of both the Chinese Academy of Science and the Academy ofEngineering, a big fish in the Chinese pool of chemical engineers. He was certainlymore than 80 years old by then, a PhD from MIT. He was one of the first a fewChinese students who studied in the top American engineering university when hewas young in the 1930s. He told us about the history of chemical engineering andhis successful time at MIT. According to him, chemical engineering as a disciplinewas in fact shaped at MIT. In that respect, he became one of the first chemicalengineers in a global sense. Since USA is the leading country in technologydevelopment, and MIT is the best engineering university in that country his logicwas that he was supposed to be the best chemical engineer in China. That was thereason why he became a professor when he was 26 in the National CentralUniversity.
What I learned from this lecture was quite clear and vivid. In the world ofengineering there was no place for No.2. I must be No. 1.
In retrospect, I understand that I was not convinced by him, or more precisely, I wasnot able to convince myself that what Professor Shi Jun taught me was absolutelytrue. I gradually sensed some conflicts between my trust in technology and myhobbies.
My childhood was influenced by my father who is an experienced draftsman andmechanical engineer. It might be the reason that he wanted me to learn some moreart instead of the hardcore physics, he sent me to an extra-curriculum paintingcourse when I was a primary school pupil. In the weekends, pupils like me wenttogether to the places of interest near Nanjing to sketch and learn how to paintnatural landscapes on paper. The eastern suburb of Nanjing was where we used togo. Therefore, I was quite familiar with that area, and I loved that place because itgave me a precious time to escape from the numerous school tasks.
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In the third year of my undergraduate education we were required to have aninternship in a fertilizer factory. By that year we had learned almost all the corecourses of chemical engineering such as advanced mathematics, organic andinorganic chemistry, engineering physics, physical chemistry, thermodynamics,analytical chemistry, unit operation, digital control, computer programing etc. Theaim of the internship was to get some empirical knowledge of how these theoriesand methods were used in real life chemical plants. At the end of the internship wewere asked to draw a flow chart and a set of engineering graphs to depict itsmanufacturing process. It was not a problem that I accomplished these official tasks,but I happened to encounter another problem which was not closely related to myformal engineering education.
The factory was situated in the eastern suburb of Nanjing, near an old temple whichhad a history of more than one thousand years. I used to know that plant when I wasa child. Occasionally, when I was painting in the small hills or in the temple triedmy best to depict its sculptures and buildings, I could smell some strange odor fromsomewhere. My mother, a chemical analyst, once told me that it was from thatnitrogenous fertilizer plant. As an engineering student, I finally had a chance to takea close look at that plant and confirmed that my mother’s diagnosis was correct. Iquestioned about the leakage of ammonia in its manufacturing process in my mind,not openly. I got a strong sense that this plant could not fit in to its surroundingnatural environment at all. But it had already been there for decades. Consequently,the only critique that I could have was to its technology, dirty technology in myopinion.
This emotional antipathy to that chemical plant influenced my choices of theoptional courses later in the second half of the third year and the first half of thefourth year. I took environmental technology, advanced thermodynamics andkinetics, to learn about the best technologies to be able to design a cleaner and moreefficient chemical plant – petroleum chemical to be precise – in the future. At thattime, I thought good chemical technologies referred to a cleaner process with lessleakage and hazardous wastes and more efficient usage of raw materials. Therefore,a good engineer should be the one who can master such designs. I wanted to be anengineer of that kind.
In order to learn the most advanced technology, I decided to study abroad for mypost-graduate education. This kind of a blurry decision can be traced back to somesort of a Chinese engineering tradition and the examples of my predecessors such asProfessor Shi Jun – “learning from the West”. My strategy of sending out myapplications to foreign universities was bifurcated. But honestly, I should admit thatthe idea of pursuing prestige played an important role in my choices of applications.I made two serious applications with one application to the Master’s program ofenvironmental management in Aalborg University (AAU) and the other to the 5 year
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PhD program of chemical engineering in the National University of Singapore(NUS).
The reason for me to apply for AAU is that Denmark is 100% a Western country,especially famous for its environmental protection. Another reason for that was thatAAU encouraged students from various backgrounds to apply for its environmentalmanagement program. It was hard to imagine such a loose and comfortablerequirement on undergraduate disciplines be carried out in China. If I were going toapply for a similar program in China, I was certain to face a rigid screening of myundergraduate major. Perhaps, I could not be accepted because of my chemicalengineering background.
My application to NUS was due to the fact that I got a strong recommendation fromour dean – an academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, a student of ShiJun – who once served as a visiting scholar in NUS. Besides, more importantly,NUS’s chemical engineering program has a strong cooperation with MIT.Independently, NUS is a top Asian university, certainly ahead of Tsinghua which isthe best Chinese engineering university. What could I expect more? I did expectmore than this because I applied specifically to its process optimization researchgroup. In that project, I was expected to learn how to simulate chemical reactionprocesses via computer programing which I thought represented the future ofchemical engineering. My justification for the vision derived from my observationof my father. My father switched from manual drafting to computer graphics andachieved some success in his career in the 1990s, so why should I not move a stepfurther? In addition to that, I was a good FORTRAN programmer and to make amore precise simulation would fulfill my ambition of creating a better technologicalprocess.
It seemed that either successful application would achieve my goal of becoming agood engineer. Ironically, the real world taught me a lesson that my design for myfuture was just too optimistic. The fact was that I never received a letter of rejectionfrom the NUS after the interview in Shanghai which indicated that some professorsin NUS were interested in me as I was told. What I got was a letter of notificationsaying that my application to NUS was deferred and asked me if I wanted to waituntil they made a decision. The official reason for deferring my application was notmy fault as they wrote in the letter. It was in my mind rather a social problem thathad struck me.
In the spring of 2003, the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome(SARS) in Asia originated from China had a tremendous impact on our daily lives.It was an environmental health problem due to the human infection of a virus fromwild animals. The exposure came from eating them, as it was later proved byChinese doctors and medical scientists. The disease spread throughout Asia.Domestically, in China, university students were grounded to the campus.
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Internationally, Chinese travelers were not welcomed by its Asian neighbors duringthat time. I never predicted or even imagined that this incident would have itsrepercussions on my plans of studying abroad. But the letter from NUS clearlyindicated this consequence.
I could not wait. Therefore, I thought I had lost an opportunity. I was depressed andalmost wanted to give up in the days when I was protected by my university fromthe disease by restricting my mobility. The only belief that gave me some hope ofcarrying on was a Taoist saying which can be literally translated into English as “Aloss, no bad thing”3. This saying at that time implied to me like a calling from theheaven – in the Taoist interpretation – “young man you have to be patient and goodthings will happen and how can you know that what would happen will be no betterthan what you have lost?”. Later things happened as I wished, thus it proved therelevance of Chinese ancient wisdom with a vivid example which happened to me.
I was very lucky that Denmark, and AAU accepted me and granted me a visa. Wasthat a coincidence? With such an experience was it implied that my life should bedevoted to dealing with environmental and health problems? However, I was trainedto be a chemical engineer who seems to have fewer obligations to this task.
Culture shock was tough but the most interesting and impressive experience that Igained in AAU as a master student and now as a PhD. The most direct culture shockthat I encountered in AAU was its mode of education – PBL and group work. Incontrast to book learning and individual written exams which corresponded toroughly 90% of my higher education in China, the AAU model of education, basedon collective learning and pragmatic knowledge making, pushed me to change myold habits. Before I went to AAU, I thought I was academically well prepared tofollow its courses, but cross-disciplinary learning was more difficult than I imagined.I needed to keep learning new terminologies and new methods of carrying outresearch when I entered into a new course. This pushed me to jump outside the box– my chemical engineering background. What made this learning socially moredifficult was that it was not an individual mind changing process but atransformation immersed in a group. I had to work with my group members – noneof them are chemical engineers – and I did not want to be different. In retrospect, allthese challenges could not even be counted as problems until I came to my biggestproblem in the second semester of my study in AAU.
This problem had become my “life project” unintentionally, and the old man –Professor Andrew Jamison – who brought it up became my supervisor ever since.He dragged me into the theory and philosophy of science and technology whilefirmly convincing me that I was still an engineer. How could this be realistic? Thatwas my biggest problem. Later, I knew from his books that he might have
3
塞翁失马，焉知非福。《淮南子·人间训》
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experienced similar problems through his participation and academic interpretationsof the environmental movements in the 1970s. Intellectually he was a renegade fromthe hardcore science – theoretical physics – to the history and philosophy of scienceand technology. In my experience of working with him, we perhaps never discussedthe real contents of any type of science or technology, what we discussed largelywas about what he called the cultural dimension of science and technology. Themore I worked together with him, the more I felt that a great divide appeared in frontof me – as Bruno Latour (1993) described the natural and the social divide. On onehand, I sensed that the causes of environmental problems together with theirsolutions might be better interpreted in social terms because technical fixes might bethe origins of other lurking problems. On the other hand, I gradually felt that theidentity of an engineer was slipping away from me. In order to find a solution to thisproblem, I adopted an escape strategy. I wanted to reshape myself to be an engineerturned sociologist. In fact, I wanted to give up my engineering identity altogether.But I couldn’t. It was not only that Professor Jamison opposed my decision bytelling me that I was still too young, but also that all my applications to thesociology schools for a PhD study failed in 2005, the year I graduated from themaster’s program. Before I left Denmark, I had a talk with Jamison. He tried toconvince me that I would be better off to continue with my engineering career and itlooked as if AAU would also support that because I got a Master of Science degreein Engineering which I thought could not be the case in China. I thanked him andAAU but I did not ask the deeper question that confused me: you changed me intohalf an engineer and an amateur social historian of science and technology whichwas quite interesting but so what? Could I make a living with that?
I left AAU in 2005 with this confusion, but I quickly forgot about it. I needed to finda job to be independent. It only took me a few days to get a job which many of mypeers in China would think was very exciting. I was employed by Jiangsu ForeignTrade Corporation (JSFT) which was a state-owned enterprise run by the provincialgovernment. In the first few months of this job, I was sent to the business school ofNanjing University to receive some training in international commerce and finance.It was just mathematics, not a difficult task for me. My first real job in that companywas to act as an engineer for one of its overseas investment projects. It was anindustrial park project in India. I was asked to work with a civil engineering designinstitute to make a blue-print for this industrial park and I was also involved in theadvertisement activities to attract Chinese manufactures to establish new plants inthis industrial park to be built for them. But later I found the real intentions behindthis project, the real “design”. On the surface, it was a project to help Chinesemanufacturers to establish their production facilities in India but in fact it was aproject that would reduce JSFT’s cost of business expansion. JSFT had a longhistory of importing iron ore from India to support the great demand of that rawmaterial from China’s booming steel industry. Therefore, JSFT always wanted tohave its own port and a more direct connection to the mining sites in that country. Ifan industrial park can be built there, a port can be included and its development
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investment can be indirectly reimbursed by the rentals paid by those smallermanufactures that just intended to use some limited piece of land in a shorter periodof time. In addition to that, building an industrial park instead of a straightforwardintention of building a port would gain more support from Indian local government.What’s more important was that such a big project would attract long-term lowinterest loans from the Chinese government owned banks. After realizing this fact, itmade me feel disappointed because compared to my financing colleagues, my taskof studying Indian industrial development regulations seemed to be very superficial.
Another relatively concrete engineering task that I worked on for JSFT was a projectof investment in the Philippines for a nickel mining site. This project taught me avivid lesson of how environmental concerns were misused for the purpose ofbusiness. Nickel ore is a much more expensive raw material than iron ore especiallytaking into consideration its chemical processing. The current commonly usedchemical enrichment process to produce pure nickel was from its sulfide but eventhough that kind of ore has higher nickel content, its existence in the earth is too rarecompared to its oxide. But Chinese engineers developed a way to use the moreabundant nickel oxide to make not pure nickel but a nickel iron alloy which can stillbe used to produce stainless steel. At the beginning this technology seemed to bemore environmentally friendly because less sulfide waste would be produced. Butthe real question is that it might not be the case because in order to get the sameamount of nickel more coke will be used to burn the nickel oxide ores – normalrocks and red earth – into ashes so that the metallic content can be further enriched.In fact, in most situations it is a more environmentally dangerous technology. In theyears from 2006 to 2008 when the price of pure nickel in the London metalexchange market reached its historical peak any cost to get more nickel from theearth seemed to be worth the cost.
In 2007, I was first sent to the Chinese plants to gain some superficial knowledgeabout the manufacturing process and then directly sent to a mining site in thePhilippines. This time, I was not only an engineer but a project manager. I was incharge of the negotiation between JSFT and a local landlord who had already soldthe earth from his mountain to Chinese and Japanese buyers. My task was quiteclear. I needed to justify whether that earth would be lucrative if we shipped it to theChinese port. I witnessed how the miners used ancient technology to make diesels tofill their excavators on site which could be harmful for their health and theenvironment. Together with the landlord I met the mayor and even talked a little bitabout environmental protection which is certainly not the major topic. I knew, inthat situation the only useful engineering knowledge at hand was analyticalchemistry. No matter what we had talked and discussed, my argument to JSFTshould be constructed on some sheer scientific basis, a report of the content of nickelfrom a trustworthy machine.
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After all those years, I did not find the answer to my question which had emerged in2005, and what made it even worse was that I seemed to be more distant from myinitial aim of becoming a good engineer than when I left China for Denmark. Iwanted to change jobs because I felt that my role in JSFT was to serve economicinterests, and that “engineer” was just a title, and the substantial work that I haddone was in fact what a merchant would do. Even though I did not know how to be agood engineer yet, I did know why I was getting away from it. The first reason wasthat the company was in fact a pure money making operation, and the second reasoncould be that as an engineer I was used as an instrument. To change this situation Ineeded to perform some original design of an instrument but not acting like one.That was one reason for me to leave that company.
In late 2008, I got an offer from China Nuclear Power Engineering Company(CNPEC) in Shenzhen. I accepted this offer with a condition that I raised to thecompany saying that I would not work and live on the construction sites. I had justgotten married. Therefore, I became an engineer who worked mainly in the officewith occasional short term travel to the site. In general, I should appreciate CNPECfor this opportunity because it gave me a sense of “safety”4 that I wanted at that time.This sense of “safety” derived from several aspects. Economically, CGN (ChinaGeneral Nuclear Power Group, the mother company of CNPEC) as a companyowned by the central government has much stronger financial power to ensure astable income. In 2008 when the financial crisis originating from Wall Street hitChina, JSFT as a trader was heavily influenced. But CGN seemed to benefit fromthat crisis. In this respect, stability became an advantage. Professionally, in anengineering company like this, it seemed that my engineering degree would be moreappreciated. Thirdly, in terms of prestige, I was about to work for its Taishan EPRproject, one of the newest types of nuclear power plants and the biggest in terms ofcapacity in the world. I felt honored to be a part of this contemporary engineeringfeat in China.
Honestly, I did think about nuclear power as a risky technology, but I was convincedby the anonymous interviewer who later became my boss when I suddenly saw himwelcome me to my desk on the first day of my arrival that I had no chance of beingexposed to radioactive substances in my work. Besides, he gave me a first lesson onthe intrinsic safety of nuclear power plants. In the interview, the longer the time hespent on this lecture, the higher the chance I thought that I might be offered. Being a
4 The Chinese translations for safety and security are the same 安全 . Oxford Advanced
Learner's English-Chinese Dictionary (Eighth edition) published by the Commercial Press inChina and the Oxford University Press in UK. (2014) In nuclear power engineering safety orsafe is widely used both in Chinese and in English, so in this thesis, in order to represent thevocabularies of Chinese nuclear power engineers I use safe to replace secure in someoccasions.
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chemical engineer and a young business-man, in 2008, I thought I learned a “truth”of life: everything is risky, so why not take this risk?
Between 2009 and 2011, I almost forgot the question that had occupied me for years.Perhaps it was due to the fact that I finally found my way of becoming an engineerin a prestigious company in China, or it could be the change of my social identitythat I became a father. Everything went well, and the booming development ofChinese nuclear power seemed like it could not be interrupted. Every day, I wasbrain-washed by the benefits that we could get from this technology, and personally,I might be a benefactor as well. I did not even want to criticize nuclear powertechnology. If somebody asked me about the problem of nuclear power, I wouldanswer him or her with “what problem”. But nobody asked me such questionsduring that period of time.
This happy hour did not last long. The Fukushima accident changed a lot of things.My old friends began to ask me safety questions about our nuclear power plants, andour central government stopped granting construction permissions to new plants.Some senior engineers in our company who had experienced the cold winter ofnuclear power in the 1990s in China began to worry about their safe retirement. Thiskind of pessimistic anticipation influenced me because I had just began to beaccustomed to a stable life and felt reluctant to make any changes. But I got afeeling that perhaps it was time to be prepared to change again. One evident changethat I experienced in late 2011 and early 2012 was that I was not that fully loadedwith work as before.
It was in these circumstances that I started to think about the old question again. Ifirst would like to provide an answer by myself, based on my own experience;therefore, I tried to write a novel in English. I sent the first half of the novel toProfessor Jamison because I thought he was the one who might understand me andgive me some comments. I always thought of him as the person who taught me – anengineer – to criticize technology from a social perspective which seemed to bequite ironic. But as long as he was the one who brought it up, he might also be theone to work it out. For that reason, I met him in Copenhagen in spring 2012 on aSunday, in my free time before a meeting with AREVA NP in Paris. We only had ashort meeting, because I had booked a return flight to Paris a few hours later.
Our conversation was, to some extent, beyond my expectations, because it was inthat 2 hours talk he transformed my “life project” into a PhD project, a part-timePhD project in Aalborg University. He suggested to me to read his writing abouthybrid imagination – a concept that he had recently developed. At that time, I feltlike I was very close to a “truth”, and I decided to carry on. Another suggestiongiven by him strengthened my decision in that it made me think such a research wasmethodologically feasible. I remember he said: “try to make your memory acollective memory not something solely about yourself.”
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In the meantime, the company seemed to be more anxious than I was. For me it wasjust a possibility of changing jobs. But for the company, it was a matter of life anddeath. In 2012 rumors began to be heard by Chinese engineers from the colleaguesemployed by AREVA NP saying that AREVA was facing extreme difficulties in itsOL3 EPR project in Finland. Nuclear power developments in its home country –USA – were also not clear at all. The Westinghouse AP1000 units were only built inChina, but the US government was not in a hurry to put them into real constructionon its own land. Privately, we had a lot of doubts about this situation. Behind theseguesses a common point of departure was a worry about the future of nuclear power.
The company could not and would not oppose nuclear power, but it also had to thinkabout how to make a living for its employees. Therefore, the company started aprogram in the name of a reform to get some business other than nuclear powerbecause the company leaders thought engineering was a universal capability. Aslong as we can make nuclear power plants which are deemed technologically morecomplicated, it is highly likely that we can make other machines and constructions.A lot of engineers supported this judgement for various reasons; therefore, on onehand a new round of engineering capacity building programs or campaigns weretriggered in this company since 2012. On the other hand, the marketing developmentdepartment began to search for new opportunities for the survival of this companyinstead of waiting for an order of constructing new nuclear power plants.
I took this opportunity to get a closer observation of my colleagues on what theythink a good engineer can be. I focused not only on their opinions but also on theirexperiences on which their opinions were based. I tried to immerse my personalstories into these collective stories, to be a participatory observer instead of a pureaudience. As such I hoped my initial problem of becoming a good engineer could beanswered, not through limited personal reflections on my past but from storytellingof some collective experiences.
In this thesis I do not try to theorize our stories, or generalize from them withstatistical confidence, so that the engineering readers can learn from my “successfulpast”. Rather I reflect on our memories and by doing so I mean to help my readers tounderstand that our living experiences count.
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CHAPTER 1. THEORIES ANDMETHODS
The title of this thesis is “A Book of Changes in Engineering: On becoming a goodengineer in China”. Therefore, the research question is how to become goodengineers. However, from my experiences and observations, I recognize that thefocus of this question may vary from time to time in one person and in differentindividuals. This gives me a reason why I indicate the study of it shall be focusedon changes. But a change of what? and how? In this chapter, I try to answer the“what” question by presenting my literature study in section 1. I postpone the“how” question to the following chapters by giving some examples.
In section 2 of this chapter, I write about the methodologies used in this PhDresearch, and in section 3 the process of this research is illustrated to demonstratehow the chosen research methods were adopted.
1.1. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT ENGINEERING ANDENGINEERS
To answer the question of what needs to be changed, I think, we need to addressissues both inside and outside the engineering world. Firstly, we need to understandwhat kind of jobs engineers are performing. In other words, this aspect refers towhat engineering is about. Secondly, it is important to look into engineers’ practices,so that we might understand the concretization of different perceptions ofengineering in real life engineering practices in a company or particularly in aproject. Thirdly, we also need to identify what are the relationships betweenengineering and other human activities or we need to depict the interactions ofengineers with other members in the society. As such we might point out somethingthat needs to be changed from the perspectives that derived outside the engineeringworld.
These three aspects cover a wide range of academic studies about engineering andits practitioners; for example, the philosophy of science and technology, thesociology of science and technology and technology management and innovationstudies. In all these fields, it is hard for me to distinguish what views derived frominside and what emerged from outside the engineering world. On top of that, it isalso difficult to interpret engineering practices without a combination of the threeaspects, for example engineering design. The engineering design process resemblesdifferent perceptions of engineering and the evolution of the traditional designapproach to the innovative design approach incorporates more social elements intoit. Therefore, instead of using the inside and outside demarcation as the logic of
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analysis, I would rather adopt a combination approach by responding directly to thequestions raised by both academics and engineers. Such an approach ofcombination was inspired by Newberry (2009) as he put it:
“that engineering is an activity that ought to be studied and understood,in no small part because of its critical role in the creation of moderntechnology, technology which we know has transformational power forboth the natural and social structures of our world. But engineering isnot some external agent exerting its influence from the outside. It isendogenous to the world upon which it acts. It is an emergent processthat coevolves with, and is inseparable from its medium.” (Newberry,2009, p.33)
At the end of this section I try to “translate” academic questions with real lifeengineering vocabularies used in the company where my observation wasperformed, as such a connection between theory and practice might be established.
The following seven questions appeared to be the common concerns of both theacademic studies and CGN engineers:
1. What distinguishes engineers from technicians?2. What are the relationships between engineering and science?3. What are the different meanings of engineering?4. What are engineering designs and their processes?5. Why did engineering become a “weak profession”?6. What are the national characteristics of engineering?7. What is the relationship between culture and engineering?
1.1.1. WHAT DISTINGUISHES ENGINEERS FROM TECHNICIANS?
What are the differences between engineers and craftsmen? Are the well-educatedworkers on the shop-floor who make or fix machines engineers? Is a nuclear powerplant operator in the main control room an engineer? These questions are oftendiscussed among engineering professionals for a pragmatic reason – the division oflabor. Even though we know that the making of technical artifacts served as thetheme of engineering in which people who design, produce, and operate them areall involved, different roles among them are also quite evident. Due to a negativeperception of the phrase “division of labor” which is the basis of scientificmanagement in which humans are treated like machines (Mumford, 1970) it seemedthat such questions are often answered in a more philosophical sense. Consideringthat the making of the knowledge on how to make technical artifacts and the
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physical works of manufacturing or constructing them are two different types ofpractices, the practitioners can be differentiated. As Kores (2012) put it:
“The definition suggests that the making of a technical artefact involvestwo steps, one involving mental and the other physical activity, and thatthese steps may be performed independently of each other and maytherefore be separated in time. Each step has its own success criterion;the first mental step is successful if it produces a largely correct designand the following physical step is successful if it comes up with aphysical object that is a largely correct execution of that design.” (Kores,2012, p. 128)
Accepting this distinction between the mental and physical processes in the makingof technical artifacts and appreciating the mental process of a higher value thedistinction of engineers among their subordinates can be briefed as the following:
“Design is perceived as a key differentiating activity that separates theengineer from the engineering technologist.” (Murphy et al., 2015, p.41)
My understanding of the above quotation is that engineers are those who performengineering designs while the rest of the participants in the making of artifacts arenot engineers as they are defined by Murphy et al. (2015). In this respect, to be agood engineer can be interpreted as to improve his or her designs. Thus,engineering design becomes the major topic of this thesis.
From a socio-historical perspective, the shaping of the contemporary engineeringidentities such as the emphasis on knowledge making rather than the manual inputto build them held its root in the industrial revolution in the 1800s in the West. Inthat period of time, professional engineers began to stand out from their processors– craftsmen. This transformation as Hård and Jamison (2005) depicted was largelydue to the assimilation of scientific knowledge:
“By means of systematic experimentation, for instance, craftsmen – incooperation with men of science and not seldom supported by the state –could make the traditional techniques of energy production, mining andmetallurgy, and manufacturing and agriculture more efficient. With thehelp of mathematical reasoning, new kinds of regulation andmanagement could be developed, and mechanical models could providemuch greater degree of precision and possibilities for control overnormal processes of primary and secondary production.” (Hård andJamison, 2005, p. 53)
This transformation of knowledge based production of technical artifacts has notstopped. As Hård and Jamison (2005) put it:
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“The industrial transformation did not end, of course, with the turn ofthe century. In many respects, its discourses, institutions, and practicesare still very much alive in the early twenty-first century. On thediscursive level, the language of science-based progress still dominatescontemporary thought … …” (Hård and Jamison, 2005, p. 53)
What we have witnessed today is perhaps an even more science based engineeringthan ever before, in the sense that after the transformation from craftsmen toengineers it might be a time that engineers turned themselves to be men of sciencein the recent decades of technoscience. As Jamison et al. (2011) put it:
“At the same time as the computer revolution was taking place, otherdevelopments in science and technology, especially in molecularbiology and genetics, were bringing the worlds of scientific theory intomore intimate contact with engineering and technological development.Genetic engineering and the other so-called biotechnologies were amongthe first ‘technosciences’ that would emerge in the coming decades. Bymixing previously separated fields of knowledge into new combinations,these fields challenged both the traditional identities of scientists andengineers but also the traditional ways in which they were educated.”(Jamison et al., 2011)
In these circumstances, it seemed quite convincing that contemporary engineeringdesign is more and more relied on the abstraction and idealization of real lifeobjects to established scientific models. (Pedersen, 2015) But a question emerged:are engineering and science the same? If they are the same, why the studies of theengineering design methodologies become an independent area from scientificresearch methodologies? With these considerations, the second question listed inthis chapter seemed to be quite important for the understanding of engineering andengineers.
1.1.2. WHAT ARE THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ENGINEERINGAND SCIENCE?
Science and technology are interrelated knowledge. Looking at the object of thescientific and technological studies, non-humans appeared to be the commondomain on which both science and technology are targeted. However, the subjectswho make such knowledge are common as well, humans. Taking these commonpractitioners of knowledge making into consideration, both of these types ofknowledge can be interpreted as social constructs. (Pinch and Bijker, 1984)
Due to the fact that science is normally considered as the discovery of natural world,and technology is regarded as the making of artifacts, a question emerged. Istechnology a derivative of science or its application?
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A positive answer to this question can be found in the interpretation of the socialstatus of engineers. As Christensen et al. (2009) put it:
“Intellectually engineering has been subordinated to science. Sociallyengineering practice has been subordinated to a managerial agendadriven by the market.” (Christensen et al., 2009, p. 14)
Perceiving the core engineering practice – design – as an individual mind process,the notion that engineering stands at the lower level of science become moreevident, as Kroes (2012) put it:
“Engineering design is the process of devising a system, component, orprocess to meet desired needs. It is a decision-making process (ofteniterative), in which the basic science and mathematics and engineeringsciences are applied to convert resources optimally to meet a statedobjective. Among the fundamental elements of the design process arethe establishment of objectives and criteria, synthesis, analysis,construction, testing and evaluation.” (Kroes, 2012, p. 131)
These quotations not only provide some seemingly definitive answers to thequestion regarding to the relationships of science and technology but also point outthe relationships of science technology with the society. According to these theories,humans learn to make technical artifacts by using natural resources. Therefore, it isa prerequisite that before making them it is necessary to know the physical andchemical properties of the natural resources to be used. Knowing such propertieshappened to be the tasks of science. In this respect, science became the prerequisiteof engineering. An implication of this reasoning is the division of human and non-human, the subject and the object but the falsification of this divide may lead toanother interpretation of the relationships between science and technology andperhaps the relationships among science technology and the society.
Bruno Latour is the one who questioned the divide of subjects and objects, natureand culture. According to him the so called objects of scientific and technologicalknowledge is not pure objects but some Quasi-objects, as he put it:
“Society is neither that strong nor that weak; objects are neither thatweak nor that strong. The double positions of objects and society had tobe entirely rethought. … …Linking the two poles of nature and societyby as many arrows and feedback loops as one wishes does not relocatethe quasi-objects or quasi-subjects that I want to takeaccount. … …Quasi-objects are in between and below the two poles, atthe very place around which dualism and dialectics had turned endlesslywithout being able to come to terms with them. … … Quasi-objects aremuch more social, much more fabricated, much more collective than the
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‘hard’ parts of nature, but they are in no way the arbitrary receptacles ofa full-fledged society. On the other hand, they are much more real, non-human objective than those shapeless screens on which society – forunknown reasons – needed to be projected.” (Latour, 1993, p.55)
Latour’s theory of science and technology left two implications. On one hand, heindicated a combination of science and technology, such as Jamison’s identificationof “technosciences”. On the other hand, it also implied that science and technologyshall not be studied without an incorporation of their intrinsic social elements. As Iunderstood, the social construction of science and technology, and Newberry’sstudy about engineering are in line with this perception. This kind of a “hybrid”perception of science technology and the society may lead to another perception ofengineering as Jamison portrayed:
“This third kind of engineering takes place in very different contexts orsocial locations than the other two, often in what are characterized associal and cultural movements rather than in established or formalizedinstitutions and organizations. Understanding these contexts ofengineering brings out the ambivalence, or mixed meanings of scienceand technology in human history, and the ways in which engineering hasoften had to be carried out at the ‘grass-roots’ in informal and temporarypublic spaces, in order to provide alternatives to the dominantapproaches.” (Jamison, 2009, p. 59)
What can be read from this quotation is that science and technology may bedifferent, but they can all be used as means to solve problems. Since it is hard todiagnose whether a problem is purely natural or social, engineers’ direct responsesto the problem may mobilize all kinds of knowledge. What seemed to be evident tome is that according to Jamison, a hierarchy does not necessarily exist betweenscience and technology.
Discussing the relationships of science and technology and their dynamics with thesociety, three different meanings of engineering become clear, in the sense thatengineering might have its scientific meaning, its commercial meaning and itsbroader social meaning5. In the following sections, I will elaborate what thesemeanings refer to and how they influenced the most important engineering practice– engineering design.
1.1.3. WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF ENGINEERING?
Jamison et al. (2011) has portrayed three contemporary orientations of channelingengineering practices through an overview of each of its historical origins. The
5 In the later sections and chapters I name it human meaning.
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
29
dominant approach of guiding engineering is a hubristic commercialization strategywhich focuses on technological innovations. In contrast, a residual strategy whichseems to reject commercialization can still be seen, namely, a professionalizationapproach which tries to defend the scientific nature of engineering. But, Jamisonwould not think that these two strategies represent the future of engineering. For hethought, following either of these two ways, engineering might deviate from itsauthentic destination of enhancing human life6 in the sense that engineers may losemany opportunities if they are not thinking challenges as opportunities. Therefore,Jamison searched for a third way of engineering neither in the world ofcommercialization nor professionalization but somewhere in the middle. His idealtype of engineers can be termed as green engineers with hybrid imaginations whichcan be elaborated as:
“A hybrid imagination can be defined as the combination of a scientific-technical problem solving competence with an understanding of theproblems that needed to be solved. It is a mixing of scientific knowledgeand technical skills with what might be termed cultural empathy, that is,an interest in reflecting on the cultural implications of science andtechnology in general and one’s own contribution as a scientist orengineering in particular. A hybrid imagination involves recognizing thelimits to what we as a species and as individuals can do, both physicallimits and constraints imposed by ‘reality’ as well as those stemmingfrom our own individual limits of capabilities and knowledge.” (Jamison,2013, p. 17)
In fact, Jamison is not the only one to raise questions to the commercial andprofessional strategies of engineering. Newberry (2015) questioned the pursuit ofefficiency in engineering, as he put it:
“Efficiency has to do with avoiding unnecessary time and effort, withnot being wasteful, with getting things done in a clever and intelligentway, and with saving energy. But these commonplaces notwithstanding,efficiency is an elusive concept.” (Newberry, 2015, p. 201)
Despite of the diverse definitions of efficiency in the engineering world, real lifepractice to achieve it can often be ironic in the sense that in order to reach otherengineering goals such as safety and multiple utility, the fundamental concepts ofefficiency such as the optimal consumption of natural resources can be sacrificed.As a result, efficiency becomes a constraint that needed to be conquered andengineers like to conquer limits.
6 For Dewey, engineering is ultimately and properly subordinate to the enhancement of lifeand the qualitative enlargement of human experience. (Christensen, et al. 2015, p.xxii)
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Pedersen (2015) questioned the over-abstraction of engineering model making.
“This work requires comprehensive abstraction and idealization, and, asa consequence of that, advanced mathematical and physical theories areonly valid in highly abstract and isolated systems. Consequently, thesetheories are far away from the concrete contexts that engineering designis about.” (Pedersen, 2015 p. 179)
The gap between scientific theories which are only valid in isolated and purifiedsystems and engineering concretization of ideas in reality leads to a deepepistemological question of engineering design – how far are we close to reality ifwe are going to construct man-made objects on our idealization which is in fact faraway from reality? As far as I am concerned, this epistemological problem leads totwo real life engineering problems. On one hand, it indicated the reason why somany sites’ problems still occur when the complete set of design documents havealready been issued. On the other hand, the dependence of abstraction in sciencehas been appropriated by engineers to communicate with the society. Perhaps it isdue to the convenience of abstracting society to economic models and predictions,to reduce humans to economic legal persons, that the commercialization ofengineering is so dominantly adopted by engineers. From the point of view of thesocial construction of technology, it might be sufficient to argue that it is enoughbecause enhancing human life can be interpreted as fulfilling our needs materially.
To some extent, the scientific and commercial meaning of engineering can becompatible with each other, provided that society is manifested as the market. Whatdifferentiate the social meaning of engineering in a broader sense to the commercialmeaning is that the notion of civil society contains much less economic featuresthan the market. However, according to Jamison (2009) it happened to be the siteon which many engineering practices were carried out. In order to differentiate thisbroader social meaning of engineering to its commercial abbreviation, I call it thehuman meaning of engineering in this thesis. The intention of doing so is thatengineers shall also be counted as a member of the civil society as they areindicated by Jamison. As a consequence of incorporating engineers into the civilsociety, what I mean the communication between engineers and the society indicatemore meaning than just a promoting of their products to the clients.
1.1.4. WHAT ARE ENGINEERING DESIGNS AND THEIR PROCESSES?
According to the quotation of Kroes (2012) in section 1.1.2 of this thesis,engineering design is a process. But what kind of a process is it? The traditionalengineering design methodology tends to think it as a production process based onscientific knowledge and reasoning. The social approach considered it as aconsensus reaching social interaction within a design organization. The innovativeapproach described it as a R&D process of making novel technical products.
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
31
Underneath these diversified interpretations of engineering design and its processes,the influence of the different perceptions of engineering discussed in the previoussection seems to be obvious.
The traditional school of engineering design studies represented by the Paul andBeitz’s Systematic Design (2007) did not distinguish the engineering design of anartifact and a socio-technical system. Although in the later version of Paul andBeitz’s publication they did advice engineers to pay more attention to customers’demands, their system of engineering design is still a simplified model of real lifedesign to which equals a production of a set of manufacturing documents. Thissimplification makes their methodology consistent with the project managementcustoms of modern engineering which in fact addresses a scientific managementphilosophy. The advantage of this simplification is that their methods can be widelyadopted for both the design of an artifact and a socio-technical system, becauseengineering design is treated as purely a scientific reasoning matter in whichtechnology is independent from its social settings.
Bucciarelli (1996) questioned this over simplification of the iteratively linearprocess of engineering design by postulating that real life engineering design shouldbe considered as an ad-hoc social process. What Bucciarelli found through hisparticipant observation from American engineering companies were thatinteractions between different engineering disciplines – object worlds in his originalwords – permeated the entire design process and it seemed that the sequence ofevents and activities could never be predicted. Bucciarelli did reveal the internalcommunication inside the design organization but he did not address enough theexternal communications of engineers with the society. As Vermass (2015) pointedout:
“This propagated multidisciplinarity goes beyond the multidisciplinarityin design as analyzed by Louis Bucciarelli (1996)”. (Vermass, 2015,p.154)
This meant that the socialization of engineers in Bucciarelli’s findings was stillrestricted to the engineering world and it also implied that if externalcommunications were about to carry out perhaps a new “object world” needed to berecruited – social scientists.
A new school of engineering design methods can be termed as innovative designswhich were inspired by the commercially successful stories of ICT technologies.This type of engineering design practice is based on a prediction of needs.Compared to the traditional school and Bucciarelli’s perception of object worlds,this innovative designer driven design extend its process from solely providing aproduct solution to a need formulation. As such, on one hand, it is difficult tosegment engineering design into linear phases as conceptual design, embodiment
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design and detailed design; on the other hand, some traditionally non-engineeringdisciplines are incorporated in the design process. According to Vermass (2015):
“Due to the development of design methodology, engineers are thusnowadays sharing the control over design with other agents bycollaborating with those agents in formulating needs and designproblems, and in finding their solutions. In fact, in current methods theagents involved in design practices are not called engineers but havelabels like ‘product designer’, ‘industrial designer’, or simply ‘designer’.Engineering is no longer the only discipline involved in current design,and may in a grimmer scenario actually end up being confined to onlyparticular parts of design.” (Vermass, 2015, p. 155)
In a rigid sense, it might be a waste of time to discuss whether the society expresseda need – an intention – first or the customers were intrigued by designers’ novelideas. What matters in this type of design is in fact its commercial viability.Consequently, a fear of engineers losing their identity appeared. As Vermass (2015)said:
“Yet engineers also have to share this position with designers fromdisciplines other than engineering, and engineers may even lose theirnew role… … Engineers will in that case be forced back into theirassistant role and become suppliers of technical solutions to otherdesigners.” (Vermass, 2015, p. 147)
In addition to some consensus with Vermass, I have some other interpretations onhis findings. First, I am convinced by his notion that external communication withthe society do exist in real life engineering designs even for the more traditionalengineering projects such as the nuclear power7. Secondly, in this process, socialscientists, legal professionals, and people from other disciplines do involve. Butthirdly, I am not convinced by his static views on the identity of engineers becausein real life people can and may change. In my observation, I witnessed numbers ofengineers turned managers, business developers. Therefore, instead of sticking tothe traditional definition of engineers, is that possible that we think engineering is infact an elastic, changing and quite adaptive profession? Anyway, in the dominantcommercial environment, it might be true that becoming an engineer turnedbusiness planner or developer or even a hybrid of these two domains couldrepresent a successful orientation. But, what other types of transformations,adaptations, and hybridizations – in summery changes – can engineers take?
7 The preliminary construction application and the environmental impact assessment andtheir public hearing can be deemed as a form of external communication in the case ofnuclear power engineering.
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With these questions, I noticed a missing position in the design methodologies inthe sense that the human meaning of engineering seemed to have no influence onthe development of engineering design methodology. The reason for this missingtheory is – as Jamison (2009) put it:
“This meaning has been given far less attention than the other two, dueperhaps to its intrinsic diversity and variety, as well as to what might becalled its ‘situatedness’ or particularity; it is hard to aggregate ortheorize about these forms of engineering, but they are nonetheless ofcentral importance for many areas of human existence, particularly inrelation to education and health care and environmental protection.”(Jamison, 2009, p. 51)
For these reasons, I cannot depict the process of a human centric engineering designor even to define what a human centric engineering design is. However, what I aminspired by this interpretation of the human meaning of engineering is that thehuman meaning of engineering might be reflected more evidently in certaindiscourses such as the environmental discourse or sustainable development. On topof that, these discourses normally contain some critical thinking of science andtechnology which I found extremely lacking inside the engineering world from myobservations. It might be ironic to ask engineers to criticize their own work, as ifthey were criticizing themselves. But this irony seems not to be the fundamentalreason for engineers’ reluctance to express this meaning of engineering in practice.What seems to be the reason is the impression of engineering as a “weak profession”which indicates less social power. In this respect, the cultural or social critique ofscience and technology seems to be remote from engineering professionals;however, it should not be the case. This impression needs to be changed especiallyfor engineers themselves. In the following section let me first describe how thisimpression was shaped.
1.1.5. WHY DID ENGINEERING BECOME A “WEAK PROFESSION”?
Based on the American experiences, compared to other professions, engineeringseemed to be a less unified occupation. This perception of engineering can bereflected in three aspects. First, it seemed that on one hand engineers do all kinds ofjobs related to the construction and making of material objects anonymously. Onthe other hand, the end-users of certain technologies even do not know who madethem. For example, in nuclear power engineering even if the customers know whichcompany build the nuclear power plant, the technology itself was not entitled bycertain engineers personally. This induced a public perception that engineers areeverywhere because it is difficult for the outsiders to give an expression of whatexactly they are doing even regardless of the concealment of technical knowledge.Newberry (2015) wrote it:
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“When surveyed, people often correctly associate engineers with theproduction of certain iconic technologies – such as vehicles, bridges,spacecraft, computers, and electronics. But those same surveys indicatethat people do not know much about what engineers actually do.”(Newberry, 2015, p. 11)
Secondly, within the professional world of engineering, different objects worldsshaped different types of engineering work. In plain words, a chemical engineer iscertainly different from an electrical engineer in that chemical engineers lived andworked in the world of molecules while electrical engineers deal with electrons.This indicated different objects of design and methods of working. Therefore,pragmatically, it is hard to formulate a general discipline at the appropriate level ofabstraction, a formal set of qualifications and ideals and obligations for all thepractitioners even for the same technical system such as nuclear power engineering.Newberry (2015) had made the following statement:
“In short, a profession comprises practitioners of a discipline having aformal, shared set of qualifications, ideals and obligations. Butengineering’s status as a profession is complicated. Much of thatcomplication is due to the staggering diversity of engineering disciplinesand occupations.” (Newberry, 2015, p. 12)
Thirdly, in respect to career development, the higher the ranking of an engineer inan organization – normally within an engineering company – the less concretetechnical tasks the engineer tends to be assigned in his daily routines. On thecontrary, non-technical contents – for instance business and management matters –consume a greater proportion of his or her energy and time. In that sense, engineersthemselves are often confused with the demarcation of the technical and non-technical tasks. Newberry (2015) discovered the following phenomenon:
“The low level engineer will certainly be cognizant of the importance ofbudgets, deadlines, and other business objectives, but will typicallyengage them only in fairly abstract ways. The technical issues, on theother hand, are very concrete for that engineer.” (Newberry, 2015, p. 14)
All these features of engineering practices give engineers an illusion that they arealways doing what they are told to do. Therefore, it made them reluctant to bereflective intellectually and socially of the technology they have been made becausetheir roles seem to be instrumental and consequently, their minds becameinstrumentally pragmatic. Newberry (2015) summarized his findings as such:
“Earlier we mentioned that engineers are sometimes accused of beingunreflective with respect to the broader implications of their work. Itshould be no wonder that people who are constantly engaged in thesolution of concrete, particular, and finite problems, and who habituate
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themselves to solution methods that discretize and simplify thoseproblems, are not as a rule always and instinctively cognizant of themore abstract and potentially generalized effects of those solutions.”(Newberry, 2015, p. 20)
The instrumental roles of engineers had another socially imbedded origin, in that,unlike lawyers and medical doctors who are mostly self-employed, at least in theUnited States, engineers are typically employed by private companies. As Downeyet al. (2015) stated:
“that engineers in the U.S. are mostly not self-employed professionals,in contrast with physicians and lawyers, but employees of larger firmsthat benefit from engineering fragmentation. The individual engineer istypically not an autonomous or consulting engineer but one whoseprofessional identity is defined in terms of the economic interests ofprivate industry.” (Downey, et al. 2015, p. 83)
In this respect, it might be true that improving our technical knowledge might be anactivity for the benefit of all human beings in general. But in real life practices suchactivities are often more directly related to the interests of engineers’ employers. Itlooked as if the companies which provide engineers with chances of making aliving but also at the same time restrict them from interacting with the society inwhich they also belong to. Historically, the transformation of civil men intoorganizational men had long been identified by American social philosophers likeLewis Mumford (1970).
Although, it seemed that there had been a long lasting tradition to counter thistransformation, engineers’ appearance in these activities seemed to be invisible. Onone hand, engineers felt that they were socially less powered; on the other hand,dealing with social problems might not be in the realm of their expertise.
In fact studying the social identities and roles or more bluntly social status ofengineers has become a core issue in the ethics of engineering throughout the world.According to Mitcham et al. (2015), after the 1970s, the American approach ofengineering ethics was quite influential. It might indicate that why theabovementioned views about engineers’ positions in society, in companies servedas to some extent a common sense among engineers throughout the world. Butadmittedly, engineering work is often quite specific. This might lead to someregional characteristics of engineering and various interpretations of engineers’social identities.
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1.1.6. WHAT ARE THE NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OFENGINEERING?
In this thesis, the national characteristics of engineering referred to the differentperceptions of engineers’ social status in society in different countries. According toDowney et al. (2015) and Mitcham et al. (2015) the establishment andtransformation of engineers’ social status in some industrialized countries reliedheavily on its social history.
In America, the professionalization of engineering can be seen as a long lastingstruggle of engineers to achieve professional unity and autonomy. (Downey et al.,2015 and Mitcham et al., 2015)
“The engineering profession in the United States has been a world leaderin promoting engineering ethics code development and associatededucational activities. But this leadership has grown out of a long, andcontinuing, struggle and desire for professional unity and autonomy.”(Downey et al., 2015, p. 85)
The introspection of what engineers did in the Second World War by reiteratingprofessional work shall be subject to the service of humanity respect to humandignity represented the contemporary motif of German engineering identity.(Downey et al., 2015 and Mitcham et al., 2015) As Downey et al. (2015) put it:
“To include an explicit commitment to humanity as a whole constituteda self-criticism by German engineers, who previously had understoodthemselves as advancing civilization by serving Germany.” (Downey etal., 2015, p. 92)
In France, engineers had long been deemed as social planners. Engineers bear asocial responsibility of bringing rational order to the society through soundmathematical principles and hence they enjoyed elite status in society. As it waswritten in Downey et al. (2015):
“For French engineers, demonstrating the ability, commitment, anddiscipline to become proficient in the mathematical foundations ofengineering is to demonstrate that one has the moral character andreliability to warrant the trust of the Republic.” (Downey et al., 2015, p.90)
The earliest industrialized country in Asia, Japan, had established its own identityof engineers in society that combined the Western concept of individualism and thetraditional Eastern minds of organizational attachment. As it was written in Downeyet al. (2015):
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“To understand the distinctive features of engineering ethics in Japan, itis important to appreciate the role of harmony plays for Japaneseengineers in both domestic and international professional relations.”(Downey et al., 2015, p. 85)
The role of harmony mentioned in this quotation referred to the relationshipbetween individuals and organizations. And in the Japanese culture, harmony canbe achieved by hard-work which often indicates a sacrifice of individual ambitions.This notion of hard-work8, from my view, might be understood more easily by itsAsian neighbors.
For China, I would consider that due to the fact that modern science and technologyare largely considered as learnings from the West that transplanted in the Chinesesoil, Chinese engineers might have learned something more than just pureknowledge from where science and technology originated. Traces of all theseconcerns about engineers’ social status in relation to self-development appeared inthe Chinese engineering community. In addition to that, I tend to think that it is notthe state-of-the-art of the current Chinese engineers’ identity that has some nationalcharacteristics but its process of transformation differentiates the development ofscience and technology in China to other nations.9 It is also believed that through aninterpretation of the historical transformations, contemporary Chinese engineeringpractices and perhaps its future orientations can be better understood.
1.1.7. WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CULTURE ANDENGINEERING?
“The state of culture is a state of interaction of many factors, the chief ofwhich are law and politics, industry and commerce, science andtechnology, the arts of expression and communication, and of morals, orthe values men prize and the ways in which they evaluate them; andfinally, though indirectly, the system of general ideas used by men tojustify and to criticize the fundamental conditions under which they live,their social philosophy.” (Dewey, 1939, p.23)
According to Dewey, culture is a set of relations. Since science and technology is apart of the culture, it seems to be quite obvious that culture would have a stronginfluence on engineering. It also seems to me that Dewey’s definition of culture isquite elastic in the sense that it did not distinguish whether science and technology
8 In Japanese society generally, hardship is considered one pathway to mature selfhood.Edurance and perseverance are among the most frequently cited virtues in Japanese Society.(Downey et al. 2015 p. 85)
9 Specified in detail in the later chapters.
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is treated as knowledge or as a social institution. Similar to that, laws, politics,industry, and commerce shared the same feature in his definition. Are they justhuman activities or social institutions as well? Taking into Latour’s theory – thehybridization of the natural and social – into consideration, I tend to think that itdoes not matter. Because considering all of them as culture domains does notnecessarily require a presumption that each of them was constituted within aboundary. Perhaps, Latour’s contribution to the theory of science and technology isto dismantle these boundaries. In this respect, it is conceptually possible to discussthe relationships among engineering and these cultural domains without a cleardefinition of the boundaries. That is to say, in this thesis, I see engineering as anelement of the culture, and so do I see other elements mentioned by Dewey.
Therefore, a study of the interrelationship among engineering and the other culturalelements can be characterized as a study of the relationship of culture andengineering. In fact, this relationship refers to the dynamics of engineering and itsrelevant elements in culture.
Based on my discussions in the previous sections, and to make my representation ofthe relations among engineering and the other elements concise, I perform somegroupings of Dewey’s cultural domains. I grouped those relatively philosophyconcentrated elements as theories of engineering which is closely related to thescientific meanings of engineering in this thesis. I grouped those social movementlike activities loaded elements into the civil society to pin-point the site on whichthe human meaning of engineering takes place. I draw a black-box which representsthe commercial meaning of engineering because this meaning of engineering ismanifested in commercial organizations. I put engineers inside the black-boxbecause these organizations are normally the employers of these individuals.
Hereunder the diagram presents the theoretical framework of my thesis:
Figure1-1 Theoretical framework
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In this diagram we see the theories of engineering – especially the scientific and thecommercial schools – direct engineering practices by creating different types ofengineering design methodologies. When these theories are assimilated by thecompany, they will be turned into more practical procedures of which engineersinside the company will follow. Considering that the process of engineering designis iterative, from a retrospective, it can be expressed in a circular shape, as thecirculate triangle in the middle of the black-box.
The human meaning of engineering indicates that engineers shall be members of thecivil society and in the environmental movements for example, we see numerouspractices in this cultural domain that expressed this relationship.
We can also see a strong inter-relationship between theories of engineering and thecivil society. On one hand, by modeling the civil society to the customers oftechnology, some strong evidence appeared in the sense that the innovation designmethodology try to combine this cultural domain into its field of study. On the otherhand, considering social movements as means of collective knowledge making theinfluence of the civil society to the theories of engineering can be traced. Perhaps,the best examples of these contributions to the theory of science and technology canbe read in Jamison’s publications such as Social Movements - A CognitiveApproach (1991), The Making of Green Knowledge - Environmental Politics andCultural Transformation (2001) and most recently The Making of Green Engineers– Sustainable Development and the Hybrid Imagination (2013).
With this presentation of the relationships between engineering and its medium, itseems that a circle has been shaped which suggests that engineers are bothinfluenced by and influencing the culture. However, this perception is largely basedon my understandings of the Western experiences. The question is whether thisunderstanding can fit into the Chinese context and be useful to help Chineseengineers to find their own ways of becoming good engineers. To some extent, thisdiagram becomes the hypothesis of my research, and my PhD study devotes to thetesting of this “guess”.
1.1.8. A TRANSLATION OF THEORIES TO PRACTICAL ISSUES
In order to bridge theories and practices, I make a simple chart to list the practicalissues related to the theoretical questions presented above. Perhaps the carefulreaders of this thesis will find that they are not simply to reiterate the same questioninto other expressions. The aim of making this list is that from my interviews andobservations, I found that my colleagues did think about all these theoreticalquestions but they expressed them in their own ways. For example, many of mycolleagues think that scientific knowledge together with social skills will make agood engineer but is the term “social skills” precise in theoretical terms? And whatis the content of “social skills”? As such I realized a gap between the language of
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theorizing and the language used in real life engineering. On top of that theinterviews were performed in Chinese, and the problem of translation exists. Inorder to express the thoughts and ideas of my colleagues in their most original sense,I made my transcripts of interviews, as simple and straightforward as possible.
Here in this section the transcription of the theoretical questions to the everydaylanguage in my best effort gave some examples of how my colleagues think aboutequivalent concepts and ideas.
The second intention of making a chart like this is to present to the readers inadvance of the themes discussed in the interviews.
Table 1-1 Theoretical questions and practical issues
Theoretical Questions Practical Issues
What distinguishes engineers fromtechnicians? What is the most valuable practice ofan engineer?
What are the relationships betweenengineering and science? Is more knowledge enough to becomea better engineer?
What are the different meanings ofengineering? What are capacity buildings for?
What are engineering designs and theirprocesses? How to evaluate and managementengineering designs?
Why did engineering become a “weakprofession”? Difficulties and confusions ofbecoming good engineers.
What are the national characteristics ofengineering? What are the Chinese characteristicsof engineering?
What is the relationship betweenculture and engineering? A hint of becoming good engineers.
1.2. METHODS OF STUDYING ENGINEERS
Since changes and personal experiences have become the main theme this PhDstudy, it indicated that this type of study shall be categorized as a socio-historicalstudy of the engineering activities inside a company. After the narrative turn of
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sociology which started from the 1970s, the utilization of personal experiences – interms of stories – has given birth to a series of research methodologies in the realmof sociology and historical inquiries. (Polletta et. al, 2011; Calhoun, 1998; Gothamand Staples, 1996; Maines, 1993; and Borisenhova, 2009). In these studies, thenarrative turn of the sociology led to two major developments of sociology. In theepistemological sense, on one hand, sociologists learned from historians thatgeneral theories might be too abstract to certain social changes in a specific culturalcontext. (Calhoun, 1998) On the other hand, historical evidence might supplementsociological theories which derived from observations and logical reasoning ofcauses and effects, with a historical explanation of the causality and itsconsequences. In this regard, the validity of theories can be justified by significantspecific historical events. (Maines, 1993)
In fact, both of these two orientations in the socio-historical studies of socialphenomena after the 1990s tried to combine the essences of the sociological study –meaning generation – and the historical analysis – specific cause and effectsnarratives – together. (Calhoun, 1998) The foundation of this type of study wasconstructed on personal storytelling which sociologists used as empirical data whilehistorians used as testimonies of events. However, in terms of socio-historicalstudies, storytelling might have a different meaning. According to Polletta et al.(2011) storytelling in a real life situation has the following features. First a story isan account of a sequence of events in the order in which they occur to make a point.Second, stories contain plots in which the cause and effect relationships areinterpreted by the storyteller. Third, although the audiences expect cause and effectrelationships to be presented in the stories, they did not expect the interpretation ofthe ending of a story be restricted to the sole version of the storyteller, in the sensethat the audiences always want to provide their own interpretations of the story.
My approach is inspired both by Maines’ (1993) perception of sociology andBucciarelli’s (1996) empirical study of engineering design via an anthropologicalmethod. Maines depicted sociology as a form of communication becausesociologists cannot generate meaning solely from their own imaginations. It isthrough an understanding of the context, the languages of the storyteller that theresearcher might express the meaning of stories without a misinterpretation of theauthentic narratives. Also according to Maines (1993), sociologists can also beconsidered as narrators, in the sense that the researcher’s own establishment of theinterpretations of stories is quite necessary as long as he or she knows suchreconstruct of the story contribute to what kind of inquiries they are attempting toanswer, be it a general theory, or a historically specific theory, or even simply just anarrative explanation (Calhoun, 1998). Maines’ perception of sociologicalnarratives as a result of communication largely derived from his perception that allsocial phenomena are forms of communications. Perhaps what Maines indicatedwas that the entire research process in the name of a socio-historical study can beperformed as a communication as well.
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To my understanding Bucciarelli’s research (1996) on the designing engineers insome American engineering firms is an established research which can becategorized as a socio-historical study on engineering design. To a large extent,Bucciarelli’s notion of the “object world” mimicked the real life communications ofengineering design work inside a company, and such a notion derived from hiscommunications with the individuals involved. His interpretations of the designprocedures and the organization of engineering designs were largely done in a waywhich treated engineering design as a communication process out of which aconsensus instead of a decision was finally reached.
Bucciarelli performed a participant observation research in the companies as anexternal consultant. This gave him an opportunity to keep a moderate distance fromthe object of observation. In this respect, his book Designing Engineers can beconsidered as his reconstruction of the stories of what had happened in thosecompanies with his involvement and observation.
Bucciarelli’s application of the participant observation methodology to the study ofengineering design was quite convincing and thus influenced not only this study butalso some recent academic studies about the same topic in Europe10 because itoffered an approachable method to tackle the changes of engineering design insidea design organization. However, there are some differences between this PhD studyand his research. First, Bucciarelli’s research was performed in three differententities while this PhD study was performed in only one company but in order tobalance an overly CGN centric view, an external interviewee from AREVA NP wasinvited. Second, as a mechanic engineer himself, Bucciarelli was quite familiar withthe technical terminologies of mechanical engineering which happened to be theobject of design he witnessed during his observation, while I was educated to be achemical engineer who investigated a nuclear power plant’s engineering design.According to Bucciarelli’s notion of the “object world”, I had a disciplinary divideto cross. I needed to learn their languages so that I can get some understanding ofwhat they meant. For that purpose, I even needed to establish working relationshipswith them so that my communications with them could be done effectively, and thatwould finally lead to a willingness of their participation in my project. Otherwise,due to disciplinary barriers, my communication with them might be far toosuperficial. Thirdly, the fundamental differences between this PhD study andBucciarelli’s is that Bucciarelli’s book can be characterized as a theory orientedsociological study, while my research is primarily narrative driven. For instance, theengineering design organization structure in CGN, from the outset, can be seen as
10 F. Baird, C.J. Moore and A.P. Jagodzinski,(2000), An ethnographic study of engineeringdesign teams at Rolls-Royce Aerospace, Design Studies 21 (2000) 333–355, Elsevier ScienceLtd; Peter Lloyd, (2000), Storytelling and the development of discourse in the engineeringdesign process, Design Studies 21 (2000) 357–373, Elsevier Science Ltd.
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derived from disciplinary divisions but connecting this phenomenon to thetraditions of Chinese engineering culture, such a structure might have another origin– the close relationship of engineering to politics. This discrepancy led me toconnect engineering design – this social phenomenon – to its cultural roots.
The participant observation method was largely used as a supplement to theindividual interviews performed in this study because it provided me with an accessto the interviewees and also helped me to develop a relatively more preciseinterpretation of my research findings. This was the reason why such participatoryobservation was performed earlier than the interviews in this PhD study. Eventhough I claimed that theory generation is not the intention of this PhD study, I stilldid not abandon a cause and effect reasoning in my interpretation because thatwould be the logical foundation of my interpretation of the relationships which Iindicated in this thesis.
Perhaps, what differentiates this thesis most from a theory generation work is thefeature that I tried not only to provide a cultural reason for CGN’s engineeringdesign changes but also to illustrate how CGN engineers attempted to change theculture tacitly. This style may confuse the conventional relations of causes andeffects but I was convinced by the stories given by my interviewees and a readingof an autobiography of a previous CGN engineer, that such two-directionalreversible relationships seemed quite evident. In this regard, the culturalinterpretation of improving engineering design in this thesis is not culturedeterminism in the sense that culture shaped engineering activities. It implies thatculture can also be altered or at least influenced by individual designers’ consciousactions, albeit, the effects might not able to be measured. Connecting personalengineering experiences and the culture, from a historical perspective, also indicatesthe situated feature or cultural sensitivity of this human knowledge making activitywhich I try to elaborate in this thesis. These narratives which derived from this dualdirectional relationship of engineering and culture and the socio-historical study ofit depict the “reality” that I observed, was involved in, and reconstructed during thecourse of this PhD research.
1.3. RESEARCH PROCESS OF THIS PHD PROJECT
This research project had two phases, with the preliminary phase, and the laterrefined researches. In the preliminary phase, after some not very successful surveysabout engineering design capacity, I carried out some preliminary interviews toCGN’s top managers. At that time, since the higher ranked employees in CGN werenormally more experienced, I was thinking that I might be able to get abundantinformation from such interviews. But I was wrong. Our company leaders normallythink that they represent CGN – the company – to some extent. Therefore, in theinterviews, I found they intentionally avoided expressing their personal opinions.This meant that their opinions were highly concentrated to the economic storyline
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of company development. The general manager of Taishan project considered themost effective way of improving CGN’s engineering design as to upgrade ourknowledge and expertise through project experiences, in the sense that as long asthe project could be accomplished CGN’s engineering design can be improvedbecause the EPR technology – Gen 3 technology – is considered as more advancedtechnology. The deputy general manager of CNPDC – CNPEC’s design division –rejected my request of a personal interview but replied to me in email saying thatthe capacity of engineering design was manifested by the qualification certificatesissued by China’s construction administration authorities, in the sense that as longas CNPDC was granted a certificate of performing nuclear power plant design thenCNPDC’s design could be regarded as completely legitimate which indicated thatCNPDC was fully capable of ensuring the intrinsic safety of the nuclear powerplant it designed.
Later, I was not sure to what extent the company leaders confused the concept of aphysical person to a legal person, but it gave me a feeling that they were thecompany at the time when I communicated with them. Relying on such sources ofinformation, this study could only be a study about the company as an economiclegal person. Therefore, it would not meet my research ambition. It was after thesefruitless attempts, I targeted my research at the individual engineers.
In order to collect personal stories, I needed to carry out my research by interviews.Due to the unsuccessful feeling of interviewing company leaders, I was not surewhether interviewing normal engineers would meet the same situation. With thisconcern I adopted a participant observation as a supplement. My position inCNPEC as the technology transfer project manager for the Taishan EPR Projectlargely supported the adoption of this research methodology.
It took a long time for me to carry out the interviews in the second phase of myresearch not because the recording and transcription of interviews was timeconsuming but because I had to find appropriate people to be interviewed. As arequirement of the oral history interviews, interviewees had to grant the interviewera right to publish or release their words. In this respect, their words serve as a verbaltestimony of what has happened to them or what they have witnessed. (OHA, 2009)This requirement, as I understood, ensures the liability of this type of research in thesense that the interviewees agreed to the interviewer that their words were notfabricated on the demands of the interviewer. The biggest problem for me, due tomy failure in the preliminary interviews, was who were the people who couldprovide me such a guarantee and grant me a right to publish part of their personallives, and offer opinions which might deviate from or be critical to the dominantcompany policies and perceptions.
I tackled this problem by initiating a company sponsored research project to worktogether with our engineers in the name of knowledge management with an
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intention of improving engineering design. Through this project, we learned thelimitations of a social science method, and importantly we realized how far theresult of this seemingly impartial, omnipotent theory generation methodology coulddeviate to our common initial intentions. Through this experience we all learnedthat improving engineering design might have other meanings than just a CGNversion of interpreting the validity and adaptability of scientific management. Itmight be true that knowledge is socially made inside CGN, but it might be moreimportant to understand how the social and cultural dynamics inside and outsidethis company that lead to the making of knowledge and our perceptions of our work.
This period of working together with our design engineers, and design relatedengineers gave me an opportunity of interviewing all of the members of ourresearch team. Through the interviews and casual talks, their participation in themaking of a “new” culture related to improving engineering practices in Chinagradually became traceable for me.
1.4. STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS
The PhD thesis consists of four parts, with the first part – Introduction and Chapter1– serving as the problem formulation and theoretical discussions of the researchquestions. The second part – Chapters 2 and 3 – consists of a literature study aboutthe engineering culture in China and nuclear power engineering practices in Chinaspecifically reflected by CGN’s engineering projects. The third part – Chapters 4and 5 – are primarily empirical “storytelling” focusing on how the broad cultureinfluences CGN engineers’ practices and their thoughts and attempts at makingchanges in their own practices. Chapter 6 is the conclusion of this thesis wheresome theoretical and practical implications of the research findings are presented.
A general picture of the engineering culture related to nuclear power technology issketched from a Chinese perspective in Chapter 2. In this Chapter, I ascribe the lackof a social movement against nuclear power in China to the dominant utilitarianperception of science and technology established over China’s history ofmodernization. This indicates that the research performed in this PhD projectrequired a transcendence of this cultural barrier.
In Chapter 3, I tried to connect CGN’s path to engineering design with nuclearpower technology’s rise and fall in contemporary China. Also, I tried todemonstrate how Chinese traditional habits of engineering were manifested in thismodern company. As such, I want to show how culture influenced CGN’sengineering practices, especially how the powerful economic thinking triumphed inthe shaping of CGN engineers’ perceptions toward their own work. A lot of thetopics discussed in this chapter originated from my casual talks with variousanonymous CGN engineers, however, since most of the information mentioned was
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documented by published books and articles, I wrote this chapter mainly in the styleof a documentary history.
In Chapter 4, I present a story of CGN engineers’ attempt of challenging thedominant culture of engineering. My involvement in this attempt was quite evident;therefore, by and large it is an illustration of the preliminary researches of this PhDproject.
In Chapter 5, CGN design engineers’ experiences are presented in an oral historyapproach. The organization of this chapter is not arranged topic by topic but personby person so that a complete story of the interviewee is presented withoutinterruptions. The titles of engineers in terms of system design engineers,equipment design engineers, and commercial engineers are not intended tocategorize them into sub-classes and hence to place them into smaller social groupsas the social construction of technology studies. The intention of giving them thosetitles is rather to relate their experiences to their real life work in CGN, which mighthelp the reader to understand their particular personal history.
Chapter 6 is a conclusion and reflection chapter. The aim of this chapter is to makeengineers’ attempts of changing culture more visible and understandable.
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CHAPTER 2. HISTORICAL ANDCULTURAL BACKGROUNDS
2.1. CULTURAL IMAGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INCHINA
The cultural images of science and technology in this thesis refer to a broader socialand perhaps philosophical perception of science and technology in China. Since it isa combination of a wide range of topics which include science and technologyeducation, the sociology of science and technology, some traditional philosophyrelevant to science and technology, and the contemporary Chinese politics ofscience and technology it might be appropriate to generalize these elements aboutscience technology and society in China as cultural elements, and as such thecontext of science and technology development in China might be revealed. In plainwords, in this thesis, I attempt to carry out a study on the relationship betweenChinese culture and science and technology. Like many scholars who entered intothis field, my point of departure started from the learnings of Joseph Needham.
Needham – an English biochemist at the Cambridge University – studied Chinese inhis late thirties and was the first to reveal to the English-speaking West the richnessand complexities of the Chinese scientific traditions. Therefore, later students of thehistory of Chinese science and technology start from his argument which was infact based on a presumption that Chinese science and technology developmentshould have certain Chinese characteristics to study the history of Chinese scienceand technology. (Akcetin, 2014) Needham implied that due to the differences ofcultures, science and technology development might deviates into different modes,in the sense that China might develop its own style of science and technology. AsNeedham (1979) put it:
“Why, then, did modern science, as opposed to ancient and medievalscience (with all that modern science implied in terms of politicaldominance), develop only in the Western world? Nothing but a carefulanalysis, a veritable titration, of the cultures of East and West willeventually answer this question. Doubtless many factors of anintellectual and philosophical character played their part, but there werecertainly also important social and economic causes which demandinvestigation.” (Needham, 1979, p. II)
A seemingly logical flaw of Needham’s argument was discovered by contemporaryscholars like Graeme Lang in Hong Kong. Lang in his articles published in 1997questioned Needham’s presumption by postulating a counter question to
A BOOK OF CHANGES IN ENGINEERING
48
Needham’s big question: why should culture be different? However, from myperspective, it is an even more inapproachable question. Therefore I would justadmit the differences of cultures as taken for granted.
Lang’s (1997) perception of the Chinese characteristics of science and technologydevelopment, especially science, rested on the more physical aspects of Chineseculture, specifically, its geopolitical feature. In Lang’s perspective, China – ageographically unified empire state – was not supportive to the emergence ofindependent universities in the middle ages; however, a separated Europe wasoptimal for academic freedom.
My understanding of Lang’s theory is that he tried to provide some physicalevidences of Needham’s argument which seemed to be entirely constructed onphilosophical reasoning. In fact, Lang did support Needham’s identification of thefundamental cultural difference between China and the West that influences scienceand technology develop in China, as Needham (1979) put it:
“In the first place it can be shown in great detail that the philosophiaperennis of China was an organic materialism. This can be illustratedfrom the pronouncements of philosophers and scientific thinkers ofevery epoch. The mechanical view of the world simply did not developin Chinese thought, and the organicist view in which every phenomenonwas connected with every other according to hierarchical order wasuniversal among Chinese thinkers.” (Needham, 1979, p. 21)
This fundamental difference led to a strange phenomenon in China, which mightstill be the case today, that even though Chinese people achieved many successes inthe making of knowledge about the material world and applied it to human lives, itseemed that such knowledge was not theorized as it was in the West. In other words,science and technology was perhaps not theoretical but rather practical knowledgein China. Needham (1979) put it explicitly as:
“I should not want to disagree altogether with the idea that the Chinesewere a fundamentally practical people, inclined to distrust all theories.”(Needham, 1979, p. 23)
In this respect, pre-modern China was culturally incapable of producing science, inthe sense that China’s traditional irrational theory was different from the Europeanmechanical physical science. Underneath these discussions of pre-modern Chinesescience and technology development, a cultural determinism was quite evident.However, provided that the above arguments made sense in constructing arelationship between culture and science and technology in China, their basicpresumption of a fixed culture was worth questioning. Culture is in fact flexible andchanges over time (Dewey, 1939), which might indicate differences of its
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influences on science and technology in China through a historical retrospective. Asfar as I am concerned, I am not constructing my argument on culture determinism.My argument is constructed on the following presumptions.
First, the focus of this thesis is modern science and technology in China, instead ofpre-modern knowledge which might be termed as “science” in some modern sense.That is to say, I perceive modern science and technology a pure Western inventionwhich is almost the same throughout the world. However, it is not to say thatChinese traditional knowledge has no impact. My argument is that the impact ofpre-modern Chinese knowledge rested on the adoption of modern science andtechnology in China rather than the creation of science and technology with“Chinese characteristics”. What made China different from the West are perhaps itscultural perceptions of such Western inventions – both knowledge and its institution.It is due to a different cultural perception of science and technology that science andtechnology were adopted differently in China. Relating these concerns to nuclearpower science and technology, they might be able to explain why the promoter’sculture prevails over the resister’s culture in contemporary China.
Second, taking culture as a flexible and changing factor does not mean that I denyits influence. It means that Chinese traditions and Western concepts might havedifferent influences in Chinese adoptions of science and technology in differentperiods of time. It is implied that in each period of Chinese history, there existeddifferent culture motifs relevant to science and technology development. Cultureevolves as well as the adoption of science and technology changes. With thispresumption in mind, I might be able to discuss how the dynamic of the promoter’sand the resister’s cultures of nuclear power is going to evolve in the future.
These presumptions of the relationship between culture and modern science andtechnology in China derived largely from my understandings of the historicalchanges of the politics or sociology of science and technology, and science andtechnology education in China.
When China started its modernization in the late 19th century, the modes ofknowledge production began to differentiate in this ancient civilization. ChineseLearning (Zhong Xue) and Western Studies (Xi Xue) gradually defined their ownparadigms. The modernists – the promoters of Western Studies – believed in thesuperiority of Western science and technology and argued that their appropriationin China would enable the nation to reach the economic and industrial level of theWest. On the contrary, the conservatives insisted a moral and spiritual superiority inChinese Learning and rejected Western Studies which were regarded as a threat ofthe deterioration of Chinese civilization. (Elman, 2005) In this period, the modernistintellectuals struggled on two fronts. On one hand, they were confronting theWestern rational scientific and technological powers with an indigenous barrenlegacy which relied on irrational cosmology and experiences. On the other hand,
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they struggled to get rid of the shackles of the conservative knowledge makingparadigm in which social norms were seen as prestigious knowledge whileknowledge about natural and physical things was deemed as inferior. In this milieuthe only choice left to the modernists was to learn from the West. (Kang, 2012)
Underneath the bifurcated attitudes toward Western science and technology, was acommon point of departure from which the conservatives maintained their hubriswhile the modernists adopted an air of humility. The point of departure was thatboth of them considered the Chinese defeat in the Opium War in 1840 betweenChina and Britain only as a defeat by force instead of a loss of civilization andcivilized values.
Needham mentioned in his five-volume Science and Civilization in China someChinese contributions to the Western development of modern science andtechnology, such as gunpowder and the compass. (Needham, 1986) These Chineseancient inventions, in the conservatives’ eyes, were nurtured by Chinese knowledge.It was the Westerners’ abuse of these Chinese inventions that finally defeated theChinese army. In this respect, it seemed that the Chinese were defeated by theirown feats, and also proved that the Chinese were morally and intellectually superior.(Ku, 1915) The modernists were more realistic, for, to some extent, they sensed thegreat power behind the gunboats and cannons which could not be manufactured inChina. It was the method of manipulating the non-human world with rationalsystematic thinking. However, looking back into the Chinese legacies, themodernists found nothing equivalent to mobilize.
Even the natural philosopher – from the Chinese standpoint – Song Yingxing(1587-1666) who wrote the book Tian Gong Kai Wu (Chinese Technology in theSeventeenth Century) in which the production processes of a large array ofcommercial goods such as paper and wine were elaborated in detail similar tocontemporary chemical processes, was a follower of Confucius. Song appeared todevelop his approach to knowledge based on observation and experiment. However,unlike the European scholars who used their observed facts to mirror the process ofnature, Song sought to unveil the rationale behind the cosmos as a medium toachieve social and political order. (Lee, 2009) In the sense that he made an analogyof nature to humanity, while the separation of human and nature was evident inWestern studies in Song’s age. His mixed perception of nature and humanity can bereflected by the expression he used to describe recycled paper. In Tian Gong KaiWu recycled paper was termed as “reincarnated” paper, meaning literally the“returning of the soul”. (Song, 1933)
In this regard, the modernists ascribed the backwardness of Chinese industrial andmilitary power to the lack of modern science and technology. However, at theperiod, early modern period of China, the foundation of Chinese culture was notshaken as it was in the 20th century. Neo-Confucianism which integrated more
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
51
traditional Confucianism with Taoism and Chinese Buddhism remained dominant.(Kang, 2012) Therefore, the core culture of China in the late 19th century related toknowledge making, was still focused on human relations and social order. Such afocus, according to Needham and others impeded the development of modernscience and technology in pre-modern China. From my perspective, this dominantConfucian culture in the late 19th century, reflected the specific attitude towardWestern science and technology in China at the time, and its legacy still casts itsinfluence on contemporary Chinese perceptions of science and technology. Thisspecific culture perception is what might be called a utilitarian view of science andtechnology. The ideology “learning from the advanced technologies in the West tostrengthen China” became the motif of Chinese politics of science and technologydevelopment, and it took root in the late 19th century.
The establishment of the Republic of China in 1911 and the later May FourthMovement in 1919 overthrew the dominant Confucian culture in China. Scienceand Democracy appeared to be the major weapons used to attack China’s traditionalfeudal culture in the May Fourth Movement. In this period, it is hard to concludethat a pro-science and technology culture had been established in China, but itstraditional values were subjected to fierce criticism and anti-traditionalism becamethe dominant trend. (Kang, 2012) Early 20th century was an era of political turmoilmanifested by constant civil wars in Chinese history. It was in this period,traditional Chinese culture was reviewed by Western educated Chinese intellectualsby Western approaches with a hope to find a solution for the Chinese problems atthat time. Among them Dr. Hu Shih (1891-1962), a student of John Dewy, wasperhaps the most influential. As the president of Peking University – China’s firstmodernized University – he led the May Fourth Movement, which could beregarded as one part of China’s New Culture Movement. (Grieder, 1970) In hisbook The Chinese Renaissance published in 1934, Hu Shih argued his perceptionsof China’s problem:
“The problem of China, however multifarious and complicated it mayseem at first sight, is in reality one of cultural conflict and readjustment.It is the problem of how to bring about a satisfactory adjustment in asituation where an ancient civilization has been forced against its ownwill into daily and intimate contact with the new civilization of the West;where the old civilization has clearly proved itself hopelessly inadequatein solving the pressing problems of national existence, economicpressure, social and political disorder, and intellectual confusion; andwhere, for reasons hitherto never fully understood, the new invadingcivilization has not yet succeeded in either grafting itself upon thetraditional culture or being extensively adopted in working out a newcultural equilibrium on a national scale.” (Hu, 1934, p.1)
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In contrast to the modernists in the 19th century China, this new generation ofWestern educated intellectuals ascribed social disorders and various problems ofChina to the inadequacy of Chinese ancient civilization. Furthermore, Hu Shihpointed out his proposed solutions to “the problem of China” as he made acomment on the Chinese 19th century modernist Wang Tao’s words:
“But Wang Tao was essentially right in prophesying that it was the newtools of the West that would unify the ways of life of the nations of theworld. For all the social changes in China can be traced to their earlybeginnings in the days when the new tools or vehicles of commerce andlocomotion first brought the Chinese people into unavoidable contactwith the strange ways and novel goods of the Western peoples.” (Hu,1934, p.94)
According to Hu Shih, Western science and technology supported by its socialinstitutions was the solution to reunite China in the 1920s. Therefore, what hecalled for was a wholesale adoption of Western science and technology in China’ssoil. However, what also differentiated Hu Shih from his later socialist counterpartsand his opponents was that Hu Shih proposed a gradual pragmatic evolutionarychange of Chinese culture instead of a prompt revolution. As Hu Shih (1934) put it:
“In some cases it has been necessary to undermine and destroy the oldobstacles and vested interests in order to accomplish a change; in suchcases, the conscious movement amounts to a revolution and oftenrequires long periods of persuasion and propaganda. In other cases oldideas and institutions are rejuvenated by suggestive influences from theWest, and reforms are brought about peacefully and without seriousbreak with the past. In still other cases long association with the newculture has made certain new ideas and practices so self-evident and sonatural that they are quietly adopted and old institutions are modified orreplaced without much ado……In such diffused changes of culture twofactors are necessary: contact and understanding.” (Hu, 1934, p.27)
Learning from the West, in Hu Shih’s interpretation was a cultural transitionequivalent to the persuasion and education of Western science and technology anddemocracy to Chinese people. Therefore, he hoped that a breakthrough of changingChinese culture could be started in the reform of Chinese language. Thus, his maincontribution in the May Fourth Movement could also be reflected by hiscontributions to the advocacy of using vernacular Chinese, in Chinese literature andeducation. (Grieder, 1970)
However, unlike Hu Shih who thought Western science and technology as aresolution of China’s problems, his opponent Ku Hungming (1857-1928) – aprofessor in Peking University – claimed that Chinese moral values were indeed the
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answer to the Western turmoil which was experienced in the First World War. Kuwas a paradoxical figure in Chinese history. He was born in Malaysia as a son ofChinese and British immigrants. He received his higher education in Edinburgh andLeipzig. After his graduation, he served as a diplomat in the government of theQing Dynasty. When the last Emperor in the Chinese history Xuan Tong resignedhis crown in 1911, Ku chose to leave the government and accepted a teachingposition in Peking University. In all Ku’s life, he contended that Chinese traditionalvalues and culture needed to be respected by the West. His publications andtranslations of Chinese canons, focused on the propagation of Chinese traditionalculture to the West. Among his voluminous books, The Spirit of the Chinese Peoplepublished in 1915, was perhaps the most influential, in which Ku insisted on thesuperiority of the Confucian learning about social order and the spiritualcharacteristics of Chinese people. (Kong, 2010) According to Ku, the focus onstrength – specifically machines and technology – in the Western culture was theorigin of chaos in the First World War in Europe, on the contrary Chinese cultureemphasized harmony which would bring ultimate peace to the world. (Ku, 1915)
In the early 20th century, Hu Shih’s idea was supported by early Chinese socialistssuch as Chen Duxiu. (Grieder, 1970) In the cultural milieu which deemed Westernscience technology and democracy as forces of advancement, Ku’s conservativeideas were rather weak in terms of influence especially among the young studentsin the modernized universities such as Peking University. (Hu, 1934; Grieder, 1970)But still we cannot deny that there existed a long lasting intellectual debate aboutscience and technology and their adoption in China. That might be the reason whyHu Shih perceived a conflict between Western civilization and Chinese traditions,and hence proposed a gradual evolutionary change of China’s new culture.
However, this type of gradual change toward pro science and technology culturewas interrupted by the later Japanese invasion, and the subsequent civil warbetween the socialists and the nationalists struggling for political power to reshapeChina. (Kang, 2012) As far as I am concerned, a pro science and technology culturewas established in the new socialist China – People’s Republic of China – after1949, especially in the 1980s and onward. This pro science and technology culturecan be reflected in three aspects, the political aspect, the educational aspect and thesociology of science and technology in China.
Marxism emphasized science and technology’s roles in the shaping of societalrelations and social order. (Hong, 2008) When Marx’s philosophy of science andtechnology as the momentum of social development and enhancement of humanlife, turned into be the ruling political ideology in China, science and technologydevelopment has consequently been strongly promoted by each generation ofChinese political leaders since 1949. In Mao’s years, “science for the people” hadbeen the main theme of Chinese science and technology policy. (Wisnioski, 2010)However, under this seemingly liberalized slogan, science and technology
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development in China was heavily influenced by class struggle ideology which infact addressed central control. (Paltemaa and Vuori 2009) In Mao’s perceptions, thepower of science and technology, in his term productive forces, should becontrolled by the proletariat which had become the ruling class, therefore, scientistsand engineers were required to be both properly ideologically minded andprofessionally competent. Social or political movements became Mao’s majorinstruments of policy implementations. In the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) andthe Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) the autonomy of scientists and engineers wassubverted. (Zhu, 2010) Scientists and engineers were classified as bourgeois, andmany of them were sent to the countryside to learn from the peasants. Just workinghard became the dominant belief of success, and scientists and engineers weretransformed into hard working workers. In general, in Mao’s era science andtechnology development in China experienced stagnation, for instance, during theGreat Leap Forward in order to meet steel production quota, peasants melted downany scrap metal they could find in their homemade backyard furnaces. Only scienceand technology related to the military progressed, such as the atomic bomb. Duringthe Cultural Revolution 106 out of 434 colleges of higher education was simplyclosed down and the enrollment in the remaining colleges was severely reduced.(Zhu, 2010)
Not only were scientists and engineers demoted to an inferior social position inMao’s years, social studies about science and technology in China were alsosuppressed. Intellectual discussions about the social or ethical aspects of scienceand technology were eliminated in the name of ideological purity due to a concernthat, in general, sociology was seen as “bourgeois” or capitalist academic remnantswhich needed to be wiped out in socialist China. (Su, 2003)
After the death of Chairman Mao, his Cultural Revolution which from the outsetcould be seen as a mass social movement that included a cultural reflection ofscience and technology development in China was indeed a fierce contest betweenrevolutionary and anti-revolutionary ideologies was abandoned. (Zhu, 2010, Kang,2012) Putting Cultural Revolution into its contemporary global context, it seemedthat it was a missed opportunity in China for a public rethinking of science andtechnology’s roles in society. Compared to the student movement andenvironmental movement in the 1960s and 1970s in the United States and otherWestern Countries, Cultural Revolution seemed like a misguided social movementunder a seemingly “good” name. In this respect, it might suggest, from anenvironmental activist point of view, why the ecological concerns about science andtechnological development emerged later in China than in the West.
Deng Xiaoping – the commonly recognized second generation leader in the historyof People’s Republic of China – deviated from Mao’s perceptions of science andtechnology. In his policy of “reform and opening-up” a new round of learning fromthe West began. Science and technology were explicitly recognized as key
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contributors to economic development in accordance with Deng’s policy of “fourmodernization” in which strengthening Chinese economic power persisted as itsessence. In the 1990s and on into the 21st century, Deng’s visions of science andtechnology development in China were inherited by his successors. President JiangZemin in his publications about science and technology insisted on their roles as“productive forces” in society; however, different from Mao’s perceptions, scienceand technology in Jiang’s perceptions shall be oriented to the booming of marketeconomy. Therefore, innovations were seen to be critically important tomodernizing Chinese society and scientists and engineers were treated as valuableintellectual resources by the state. (People’s Daily, 2001-3-22) President Hu Jintao,standing on the shoulders of his predecessors proclaimed his policy which can begeneralized as “scientific development” in which sustainable development andsome elements of social justice relating to science and technology developmentwere brought into consideration. (Xinhua News, 2006-1-9) This corresponded tosome local governments’ attempts of recalculating their Green GDPs after hisspeech. (Li and Lang, 2009) In recent years, President Xi Jinping, continued thescience and technology development policy ever since Deng’s years, meanwhile hepointed out some essential science and technologies of which China should givepriority, such as the info and bio science and technology, and new energytechnologies. (Xinhua News, 2014-6-3)
All these statements and modifications of China’s science and technology policiesin the post-Mao era indicated a closer connection of science and technology tomarket driven economy and to politics. Such intimate relationships were reflectedin Chinese science and technology education. Regarding primary and secondaryeducation, science and technology were taught as “privileged knowledge”. (Liu,2008) Liu Yongbing in Nanyang Technological University in Singapore analyzedMainland China’s primary schools’ language text books and depicted a pro scienceand technology discourse in China’s primary education. As Liu found, the logic ofnarratives about science and technology in the textbooks was constructed as follows.Firstly, modern science and technology are characterized as entities that contributeto the solution of human problems, and therefore, they offer a better life to thepeople. Secondly, since modern science and technology are accessible andbeneficial to all the people and society, they are the “privileged knowledge” forchildren to learn. Finally, rational mind and scientific attitude are the veryfoundation for that learning to be enacted. (Liu, 2008)
This sort of one dimensional thinking which praised the benefits of science andtechnology while disregarded their negative social and environmental consequenceslimited young students’ imaginations about other possible interpretations aboutscience and technology that in reality might be true. As Liu (2008) put it:
“In this discourse, modern science and technology are legitimized asmodernity and rationality. Individual and social betterment are portrayed
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as the direct result of the development of science and technology in thisrationality or pragmatic view. In this rationality, the knowledge ofscience and technology is held to be universally applicable andaccessible, and yet this position excludes the possibility that the oppositemay be true.” (Liu, 2008, p. 318)
According to Liu, such intentional admiration of science and technology ineducation derived from a deeper cultural background which Liu described as thepromotion of a “business as usual” mindset shared by the government and China’snewly emerged cultural – specifically commercial – elites after 1978. (Liu, 2008)
China’s focus in higher education can be traced by its scientific and technologicalresearch publications. A group of researchers (Kostoff, et al., 2005) in the UnitedStates published an article about the structure and infrastructure of Chinese highereducation by tracing 25 years’ Chinese academic output in SCI and SSCI (ScienceCitation Index/ Social Science Citation Index) articles. Their findings can besummarized as the following:
“China's publication of SCI research articles has had an annualexponential growth rate of 20% over the last 25 years. The major themesof these articles have shifted gradually over time from multidisciplinaryscience, medicine, and life science in 1980 to materials, chemistry, andphysics in 2005, in that order.” (Kostoff, et al., 2005, p. 1571)
When comparing China to the United States the following differences can beunveiled:
“The difference in thematic emphasis between the USA and China isdramatic! China emphasizes the physical and engineering sciences thatunderpin defense and commercial needs. The USA emphasizes researchareas focused on medical, psychological, and social problems. There areeven research areas where China leads the USA in absolute numbers ofresearch articles published.” (Kostoff, et al. 2005, p. 1573)
According to Kostoff and his colleagues, the growing numbers of China’s SCIpublication was due to more frequent international collaborations between Chinesescientists and Western colleagues such as the Americans and the Japanese after the1980s. (Kostoff et al., 2005) This phenomenon reflected the reach of “reform andopening-up” policy to the science and technology research sectors in China.Furthermore, their findings posed other implications. Kostoff group’s findings wereconsistent with Liu’s in the sense that both of them indicated a pro science andtechnology education in China. In this respect, science and technology education inChina can be interpreted as unbalanced. On one hand, researches with marketvalues were given extensive focus and investment, while those studies withoutshort-term returns such as social sciences, and sociology were largely marginalized
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on the other. Among these studies of liberal arts, philosophy and sociology, socialstudies about science and technology held its unique position in Chinese academiccontext.
In 1978 Deng Xiaoping encouraged some scientists and engineers – includingChina’s prestigious physical scientist Qian Xuesen who made great contribution toChina’s military research in the 1960s and 1970s – to establish the Chinese Societyfor Dialectics of Nature (CSDN). The name of this academic organization derivedfrom Friedrich Engels’ publication Dialectics of Nature (1925). (CSDN Website1Accessed November 20, 2014) The establishment of CSDN represented therejuvenation of Chinese social studies about science and technology in the newsocialist China. CSDN and its journal Dialectics of Nature since its beginning hasbecome the leading academic forum devoted to the philosophy of science andtechnology. In this forum, Chinese scholars started to reflect the roles of scienceand technology to economic development and to consider some of science andtechnology’s negative consequences to nature. (Zhu, 2010) Since CSDN’sestablishment, China’s social studies of science and technology have beenchanneled to the realm of Marxist philosophy of science and technology. In the firstnational meeting of CSDN members held in 1981, one of the executive directorssaid in his opening speech that CSDN was setup to promote Marxism studies inChina, therefore, members had to avoid a tendency to indoctrinate Marxism on onehand, and to prevent also a tendency to deny it on the other. Even though he alsoaddressed international collaboration between Chinese sociology of science andtechnology studies and its Western counterpart, Marxism remained the dominantideology which needed to be insisted upon. (CSDN Website2 Accessed November20, 2014)
In CSDN’s later national meetings which took place every five years, the languagechanges in the speeches were evident, in the sense that obvious ideological wordingsuch as Marxism was replaced by the wordings propagated by Chinese politicalleaders. In its 2006 national meeting, speeches given by its newly elected executivedirectors were highly consistent with the concept of “scientific development”proposed by President Hu Jingtao. (CSDN Website3, Accessed November 20, 2014)
Membership to CSDN from its beginning has always been open to governmentofficials, professors in philosophy departments in Chinese universities, anddirectors of social studies in Chinese technical universities etc. (CSDN Website2and 3, Accessed November 20, 2014) Therefore, the mainstream of China’s socialstudies about science and technology has long been surrounded over Marxism.However, Qin Zhu – a professor in Dalian University of Technology – identifiedseveral deviations of the ideological approach toward a more professional approachwhich focused on ethical, environmental, and social issues of science andtechnology, not only their productive functions, in Chinese social studies of scienceand technology. (Zhu, 2010) According to him, such limited deviations derived
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from the introduction of Western STS (Science Technology and Society)approaches to China. Noticeably, in the 1990s two scholars, Yin Dengxian fromChinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and Li Bocong from ChineseAcademy of Sciences (CAS) respectively, visited United States. After their return,due to the visits of two American STS scholars – Stephen H. Cutcliffe and CarlMitcham – to CASS the Journal of Dialectics of Nature devoted a special issue(supplement no.1, 1992) to STS issues. In those universities such as TsinghuaUniversity – China’s leading technical university – where there are moreopportunities of international collaborations on STS studies, professionalapproaches of social studies on science and technology began to be adopted. (Zhu,2010)
Based on a CSDN’s statistics, currently there are 20 doctoral programs based in thephilosophy departments of Chinese universities leading to a PhD degree of STSstudies – precisely a degree majored in the philosophy of science and technologywith Dialectics of Nature disciplinary training – among all Chinese universities, and70 programs leading to a Master’s degree. (CSDN Website1, Accessed November20, 2014) These schools and their faculties are the major sites and participantsthrough which social studies and researches about science and technology in Chinaare carried out. However, compared to the massive number of PhD andpostgraduate programs in scientific and technological disciplines, such a two digitsnumber seemed insignificant.
In addition to the indigenous studies of science and technology policy in China,contemporary Chinese science and technology policies received some internationalattention. Paltemaa and Vuori from the University of Turku, in Finland publishedan article discussing regime transitions in Chinese politics of technology in 2009.According to them Western discussions on whether society has a deterministicinfluence on technology or technology has a deterministic influence on society,were seemingly invalid in socialist China after 1949. What they observed is that thesocialist China (PRC) since its establishment has based its policies of science andtechnology development on the assumption that its decisions can have major effectson society. (Paltemaa and Vuori, 2009) This is largely due to the intrinsic utilitarianperceptions of science and technology in Marxist philosophy of science andtechnology. (Hong, 2008) However, what differentiate Deng and his followers’policies of science and technology to Mao’s was the criteria of the choice oftechnologies. In the sense that under Mao’s reign technologies with “revolutionaryutilitarian” value were chosen, while in Deng’s “four modernization” regime,technologies with “pragmatic utilitarian” value was chosen. Mao aimed to preventthe concentration of technical control into the hands of a few experts, thus proposedhis mass-science. Under this mode, Mao intended to liberate the workers frombeing merely the appendices of machines, and workers should be the developers oftechnology through their own experiences gained in production. In this respect,technology should not only be developed primarily by the experts in the
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laboratories. Hence, an elimination of social status differences was necessary.Consequently, such policies led to the adoption of alternative technologies in Chinain the 1960s and 1970s. Deng’s “pragmatic utilitarian” implied that there should beless restrictions and limits to science and technology development, and proposedmore tolerance to their impacts on society. A social hierarchy based on expertiseshould be tolerated, in reality strengthened, technological borrowing from the Westbecame encouraged, and as such the masses’ role in science and technologydevelopment was downplayed. (Paltemaa and Vuori, 2009)
Relating contemporary Chinese politics of science and technology to its historicalcontext, I would conclude that the utilitarian perceptions on science and technologyremained constant throughout China’s history. In pre-modern China, knowledgeabout nature and instruments was regarded as inferior to the more superiorknowledge about social orders. Even in the more liberal years of Chinesemodernization, science and technology in the modernists’ eyes was somethinguseful to reshape Chinese civilization. Compared to the socialist regime whichappreciated science and technology as paths to wealth, power and social control, theliberal scholars’ evolutionary change proposal seemed moderate. Traditionally,Chinese people respect knowledge (Liu, 2008) however, it has been in China’smodernization process science and technology has gradually taken the place ofsocial understandings as “privileged knowledge”. Therefore, contemporary Chinesescientists and engineers as experts received their higher social standings over thosewith less scientific knowledge. They are now equivalent to the cultural elites in pre-modern China. The establishment of this unbalanced pro science and technologyculture has had a strong influence on public participation of environmental politicsin China, and specifically to the development of nuclear power engineering.
2.2. CULTURAL REFLECTIONS OF SCIENCE ANDTECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM
Some academic studies about China’s environmental regulations and the civilsociety reached to a conclusion that Chinese environmental politics is a one partyled self-restricting power and sectorial interests’ compromise, affiliated to economygrowth. (Lang and Xu, 2013, Carter and Mol, 2006, Li and Lang, 2009, McLaren,2011, Wu, 2013, Xie and Heijden, 2010, Zhang and Barr, 2013) In general politicalopportunities for the development of environmental activism in China seem quitelimited. (Xie and Heijden, 2010, Roberts, 2007) On one hand, environmentalactivism in China has remained fragmented and highly localized focusing onspecific governmental projects or regional pollution incidents (Wu, 2013), eventhough the situation of the authoritarian control over environmental protection seemto be lessening in recent years, the government is still in fear of losing control oversociety, on the other hand. (Roberts, 2007, Lang and Xu 2013, Wu, 2013)
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Without a public space for expressing opinions about environmental pollutionwhich might deviate from the mainstream economic development discourse,Chinese public participation in environmental issues seems weak and difficult toachieve. From my perspective, the instability of the Chinese public spaces ofenvironmental activism derives from the following reasons. First, due to thedominant political milieu which favors central control, national scale environmentalmovements remain invisible in the public eye, while government supports theenhancement of environmental consciousness via a series of personal activities suchas photo shooting of the natural landscape and wild animals. (Zhang and Barr, 2013)In this respect, the Chinese environmental activism lacked a spirit of criticalreflections on human economic and industrial activities. In the sense that eventhough the aims of such activities can be understood as promoting environmentalconservation habits or culture among Chinese citizens by rendering them the un-polluted or destroyed scenes of natural beauty, such approaches remain weak inresolving social tensions among different social groups which might be expressedas environmental issues, such as the controversies to some government ledinfrastructure projects. Second, due to the lack of critical reflections on economicdevelopment by boosting Chinese industrial power, especially to science andtechnology, some technologies which were deemed as environmentally dangerousin the West were treated as advanced environmental friendly technologies in Chinasuch as the waste incineration plants and nuclear power. As far as I am concerned,these silences in Chinese environmental debate seem to be the logical consequencesof the pro science and technology culture in contemporary China, a culture that isstrengthened by the political system of the Chinese society. This perception ofChinese environmental politics can be read from some research reports publishedby scholars in Hong Kong.
In the article anti-incinerator campaigns and the evolution of protest politics inChina published in 2013, Lang and Xu studied three Chinese campaigns againstincinerators, in three Chinese cities, namely Beijing, Guangzhou, and Wujiang. Allof these campaigns were quite successful in that either the campaign led to thecancellation of the project or an indefinite postponement of the projects. Anothercommon point of these three campaigns was manifested by their NIMBY feature,which identified a regional and limited focus of such environmental activism. (Langand Xu, 2013)
In all these three halted projects – probably relocated – the local governmentsclaimed that waste-to-energy incinerators were technologies which would reducethe burdens of the environment, meanwhile in order to justify their claims, scientificand technological evidence was provided, by ensuring that the technologies to beadopted in these projects met the highest EU standards. However, such one-sidedguarantees were insufficient to lead to consent on the part of the local residents.(Lang and Xu, 2013)
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In both the Beijing and Guangzhou cases, it seems that the failure of the projectsderived from the governments’ careless decisions on the choice of the plants’locations. In the case of Beijing, the intended incineration plant site was chosen inLiulitun, Haidian district where scientists, academics, from Chinese prominentuniversities such as Peking University and Tsinghua Universities lived togetherwith newly established commercial elites from IT industries. In the case ofGuangzhou, a number of middle class journalists lived in the nearby area. Protestersin these areas were accustomed to use their political and media connections in theexpression of their unhappiness about waste incinerators. They possessed anadvantage of making their voice heard by the government, and known by a broaderscale of the public, thus led to the government’s rethinking of their choice oflocation. Another important factor which led to the fierce objection to the projectswas derived from China’s privatization of housing. In both regions, the most ardentparticipants were middle-class residents who had bought recently-builtcondominium apartments in nearby districts. Under a fear that the construction ofan incineration plant which might cause a depreciation of their newly acquiredassets in addition to the risk of physical health, the residents questionedgovernments’ scientific claims and presented counter-evidence with their scientificand engineering professional skills based on their voluntary web-based research.(Lang and Xu, 2013)
Compared to the cases in Beijing and Guangzhou, the Wujiang case seemed moremilitant. Lacking political and media connections possessed by their big citycounterparts, the protesters in Wujiang city chose anther strategy – massmobilization that overwhelmed the capacity of the local government to repress itand forced the government to close the plant rather than risk further turmoil. (Langand Xu, 2013, p. 842) However, as Lang and Xu identified in their article that thesuccess in Wujiang which was based on direct confrontation against thegovernment was an exceptional case because similar regional small scale mass-protests were easily suppressed when the first generation of incinerators wereinstalled in China in the 1990s. (Lang and Xu, 2013)
According to Lang and Xu, elite participation and the manipulation of the internetboth in terms of voluntary research and as tools of arousing public andgovernmental attention constituted the major success factors of Chineseenvironmental movements. These successful patterns can also be traced in othertypes of Chinese environmental activism, such as the environmental NGOs.
In many respects, Chinese contemporary environmental governance shares somecommon features with the industrialized countries. In recent years, China’senvironmental policy has shifted from the end-of-pipe mode of pollution control toa more active mode of environmental management. The transformation in 2008 ofthe State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) – a governmental bodyaffiliated to the central government – into the Ministry of Environmental Protection
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(MEP) – a constitutional part of the central government – which indicated astrengthening of power in environmental policy making and implementation at thecentral government level manifested this trend of political reform concerningenvironmental protection. Despite this institutional reform which followed theWestern model, the distinctive feature of China’s environmental governance fromthe Western model might be interpreted from the roles of the civil society inenvironmental governance. Environmental NGOs in China played a supportiveinstead of a corrective role of Chinese environmental policy implementations.(Carter and Mol, 2006) In the sense that national scale indigenous environmentalNGOs were treated as policy evaluation entities in society. Their major tasks werefocused on providing positive feed-backs of environmental policy implementationsand the enhancement of citizens’ environmental consciousness. This indicates thatonly this type of environmental NGOs with a focus in line with the utilitarianperception against them held by the government might be able to get their public –largely government – recognition.
Government recognition of environmental NGOs in China is expressed by NGO’sregistration mechanism. According to their registry status Chinese environmentalNGOs can be classified as GONGOs – government organized NGOs – andgrassroots NGOs. (Wu, 2013 and Xie et. al, 2010) Most of the grassroots NGOs inChina found it hard to be registered as non-governmental organizations. Insteadthey chose to either register as a business company or to simply avoid any form ofregistration and function instead as a kind of a loose social network. (Wu, 2013)The difficulties of getting legitimate organization status have generated severallimitations to grassroots NGOs’ developments, among which the source of fundingand the problem of public credibility became the most obvious. Thus, as Wu (2013)pointed out, these grassroots NGOs had to choose to work with GONGOs orinternational environmental NGOs to solve their problems of financing and tolegitimate their work. Such a situation implied that their scope is highly restricted tolocal affairs. From Wu’s interviews with 9 grassroots environmental NGOs inGuangdong Province and 4 in Guangxi Province in Southern China, their focuseswere mainly community environmental education or local scale naturalconservation. (Wu, 2013)
Compared to the grassroots environmental NGOs in China, GONGOs seem to be ina better situation. First and foremost, winning governmental registration as non-governmental organizations not only gives them legitimate status but also moreimportantly gives them possibilities to participate in the official environmentalpolitics in China. Friends of Nature (FON) established in 1993 and maintained asprobably the most influential indigenous environmental NGO in China, is aprominent example of this type of environmental NGO. (Xie et. al, 2010) Inpolitical respects, FON is better in getting access to China’s political institutionscompared to most Chinese NGOs. Such an intimate relationship with thegovernment gives FON a chance to organize cross-regional environmental
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protection projects and activities, not just restricted in Beijing where it is registered.One of the NGOs that Wu (2013) interviewed in Guangdong province is in fact asubsidiary of FON in Shenzhen City. That is to say FON was capable, from anorganizational point of view, to organize national scale environmental protectionactivities. In spite of this, it seems that FON in Beijing provides funding resourcesto its Shenzhen subsidiary. In this regard, FON is an organizationally sound NGOrather than a loose network solely based on voluntary membership, or a relativelyflexible consortium which might include multiple independent organizations. (Wu,2013 and FON Website1, Accessed Mach 12, 2014)
FON’s superiority derived from its founder. Liang Congjie (1932-2010), grandsonof the famous late 19th century Chinese reformist Liang Qichao (1873-1929), sonof Liang Sicheng (1901-1972), contemporary Chinese architect, the founder of theschool of architecture in Tsinghua University in 1946, was a member of thestanding committee of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)when he founded FON. Liang Congjie’s higher education was received in newChina from 1949 to 1953. He studied history in Tsinghua University. In 1953 due tothe reform in Chinese mainland’s higher education system, Tsinghua Universitywas designated into a scientific and technical university. The department of historyin Tsinghua was combined into Peking University which was at that timecharacterized as a liberal arts university. He received his bachelor’s degree inPeking University and later his Master’s degree in 1958 in the same university.After that he became a university professor in Yunnan Province in China. Duringthe Cultural Revolution, Liang Congjie was one of the many intellectuals who weresent to the countryside to receive their “proletarian” education. When the CulturalRevolution faded away, he came back from the countryside to Beijing andgradually reclaimed his family’s reputation and his personal career. (FON Website1,Accessed, December 3, 2014)
Nothing was said on the FON webpage on how and why Liang Congjie decided todevote his later life to China’s environmental protection. Therefore, I can onlyconjecture that such a motivation derived from his personal reflections on Chineseculture and perhaps his social networks with other Chinese liberal arts academics.That might be the reason why when FON was founded it was also a part of theInternational Academy for Chinese Culture (IAFCC) which is a Peking Universitybased GONGO dedicated to the research and development of Chinese culture –traditional Chinese culture to be precise. FON constituted as IAFCC’s GreenCulture Institute, and Liang Congjie served as its director. (FON Website1,Accessed 2014 December 3, 2014 and IAFCC Website1, Accessed December 3,2014) It seems that Liang Congjie shared some common visions with his formercolleagues and mentors in Peking University such as Feng Youlan and Ji Xianlin –all of them were prestigious Chinese scholars in philosophy and liberal arts – andthus they attempted to establish IAFCC as an academic research network in 1984.
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On the IAFCC’s webpage, FON’s (the Green Culture Institute of IAFCC) work wasdescribed as the following:
“to conduct public environmental education and development, toadvocate green civilization and to spread consciousness ofenvironmental protection among the public” (IAFCC Website1,Accessed December 3, 2014)
Liang Congjie’s position in CPPCC permitted him some channels to get access toChina’s environmental policy making. Therefore, when FON was founded hispersonal connections to the governmental institutions could be directly appropriatedby this NGO. However, from the tenets of FON’s work, it seemed that such anappropriation of Liang’s personal influence was quite modest. As a matter of fact, Itend to conclude that without Liang Congjie FON might not be founded andperhaps his influence on Chinese environmental activism was inherited from hisfamily’s reputation, even though there was no documented literature that gave suchkind of direct correlations. But what is certain is that grassroots environmentalNGOs have little in common with Liang Congjie’s organization.
Liang Congjie passed away in 2010, but FON’s participation in Chineseenvironmental politics has continued. According to FON’s latest press release inOctober 2014, FON participated in the drafting of China’s judicial interpretation ofenvironmental civil litigation. (FON Website3, Accessed December 3, 2014)Obviously, participation in such an occasion is not an honor which can be shared bygrassroots environmental NGOs, among which a large number of them, from a legalpoint of view, do not exist.
Another typical GONGO which could reflect some features of Chineseenvironmental activism is the Beijing Global Village Environmental EducationCenter (BGV in this thesis). The founder of BGV is Liao Xiaoyi. Born in 1954 Mrs.Liao completed her entire education in socialist new China. Compared to LiangCongjie, Mrs. Liao belongs to the younger generation of Chinese publicintellectuals. She was educated as a philosopher in China with her undergraduateand postgraduate educations in Chinese universities. From 1993 to 1995 she workedin North Carolina State University as a visiting scholar, and after that she cameback to China and established the Beijing Global Village Environmental EducationCenter. (BGV Website1, Accessed December 3, 2014) The early 1990s were thetime when the concept of non-profit organization began to be introduced into Chinafrom the West. Before the economic reform it is hard to distinguish for-profit andnot-for-profit organizations in China, because profit itself is a capitalist notion, butas the market economy has been developing in China for more than a decade, theconcept of profit regained its meaning in the Chinese society. Influenced byWestern environmental activism Liao started to combine the concept of non-profitorganization with environmental activism. During her years in the United States,
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Mrs. Liao made a documentary about environmental issues and focused on globalenvironmental politics and public relations related to environmental issues. Thusduring the first a few years of BGV, her focus was on public education viatelevision programs and popular publications. From 1999, BGV started tocollaborate with Beijing city government to promote green behavior in thecommunities and it was in the year 2000 when Beijing started to compete for thehosting of the 2008 Olympic Games BGV was chosen to be its environmentalconsultant. Such a series of collaborations with the public media and governmentbrought Liao and her BGV some public attention which led to their followingprojects. Most noticeably, BGV started to focus on sustainable energy issues in2003. From 2003 to 2013 BGV established a forum for public debates aboutsustainable energy. According to BGV 46 meetings were held and participantsranged from technical experts, governmental officials and some general publicattendants. 40 to 120 participants were invited in each meeting and BGVdocumented the content of each meeting on their website. In parallel to this publicforum of sustainable energy, BGV also hosted an environmental journalists’ salonwhich aimed to enhance peer communication among media professionals. (BGVWebsite2, Accessed December 3, 2014) However, as I can read from their 46reports, nuclear power seemed not to be a major theme in their discussion.
BGV and FON had collaborations in their energy related projects, specifically apropagation project of advocating energy saving by advising that 26 centigrade asthe proper indoor temperature in offices and private homes in summer. In fact sucha nationwide propagation project was an advertisement of the central government’ssemi-regulatory advice concerning air conditioning usage in governmental officesto the broader public spaces started in 2004. (BGV Websites1, Accessed December3, 2014) However, unlike the collaboration of grassroots environmental NGOs withFON which relied on the dependence of financial support, the collaborationbetween BGV and FON on this project of energy saving seemed much more like avoluntary consortium with an aim to extend public influence.
Both BGV and FON addressed the role of Chinese traditional culture to solveenvironmental problems in China. However, their approaches differed. FONfocused more on the philosophical and aesthetic aspects while BGV focused on theissues related to public hygiene. Bird watching, mountain climbing have been theclassical environmental awareness education programs of the FON with anenvironmental conservation attention, while a more community based BGVemphasizes the reclamation of some Chinese traditional habits to improve personalphysical health such as their small scale organic farming projects in rural areas.(BGVWebsite3 and FON Website4, Accessed December 3, 2014)
In general, Chinese environmental NGOs work with the government instead ofagainst it, largely due to the fact that the government control over society is stillpervasive. From a sociological point of view, making environmental activism a
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profession in China is rather difficult. Unlike what Jamison depicted thatenvironmental activism has gradually become professionalized in the West.(Jamison, 2001 and 2013) the situation in China is quite different. Theprofessionalization process has never been started in China or it just represents areverse path compared to Jamison’s observations. In order to reach publiccredibility and to gain influence, the organizers of NGOs had first to beprofessionalized in other social domains not necessarily in environmental protection.The more connections with Chinese official politics the more likely their activismwould be acknowledged by the government thus more resources could be mobilizedfor advocating environmental awareness in the Chinese society.
Chinese environmental activism is largely based on voluntary participation. BothFON and BGV can be categorized as civic voluntary groups. For instance both ofthem emphasize the recruitment of members and many of their routine projects areperformed by their members. The establishment of such NGOs largely relies on thewill of their founders, as does the participation of their anonymous members. In thisregard, it is more appropriate to focus the study of environmental activism in Chinaat the personal level, instead of treating it as a sort of social movement in a politicalsense such as the Cultural Revolution. Such a focus is especially important for thestudy of the cultural side of nuclear power engineering because as far as I amconcerned, it is a relatively absent topic of environmental activism in China,however, we might deduce from various publications in the West that it should infact be a core topic. Therefore, in this thesis the cultural reflections of nuclearpower engineering is rendered as a series of studies on individual engineers insidethe system, for that might be a better approach to get access to some insights intothis complicated topic.
2.3. CULTURAL REFLECTIONS ON NUCLEAR POWER
In this chapter I argued that a pro science and technology culture in contemporaryChinese society is reflected in the dominant utilitarian view of science andtechnology in the shaping of China’s science and technology policies and pays lessattention to science and technology’s cultural or social repercussions. However,these repercussions of science and technology development can be seen in variousforms of environmental activities in China. The major site where academic studiesabout science technology and society are performed is the philosophy of scienceand technology departments in Chinese universities and the mainstream discourseremains pro science and technology. There are some intellectuals with liberal artsbackgrounds who have shifted their attention from academic studies toenvironmental activism and achieved some success in advocating environmentalconsciousness. Due to a strong government control over the emerging civil society,Chinese environmental activism has to focus on those topics which seem to beclosely related to everyday life in which common people possess more power.Nuclear power which represents complicated technology and is normally built far
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from populous areas is remote from the public debate about its environmental andsocial consequences. Lack of access to decision making and insufficientcredibility – from a scientific perspective – could also be the reasons for the lowlevel of public discussion. As a result, it seems that cultural reflections on nuclearpower engineering could only be found within the system.
In 2012 He et al. based in the Chinese Academy of Science did a questionnaire fieldstudy in Shandong province after the Fukushima accident and depicted a generalpicture of the public knowledge, attitude and trust of nuclear power in China.According to their study, China can be characterized as a pro nuclear power country,due to the fact that both the government and the industry are supportive to thedevelopment of nuclear power, while public participation has not been influential inthe decision making process related to nuclear power. (He et al., 2014)
The basic landscape of Chinese public knowledge and attitude about nuclear powercan be illustrated by the following numbers. More than 80% of the respondents intheir research started to pay attention to nuclear power and radiation related risksonly after 2011 and such a growing amount of concerns was largely attributed to theChinese media which widely reported the nuclear disaster in Japan. But knowledgeabout earlier nuclear disasters such as the Chernobyl and the Three Mile Islandaccident was dramatically less. Among those who have some knowledge aboutnuclear risks only 20% claim that they know something about nuclear powertechnology but 60% of them have even less knowledge about the technology. Inaddition, very limited knowledge among the respondents about the policy andmanagement of nuclear power plants was identified. When the respondents wereasked about their attitude toward new construction of nuclear power plants, 33%expressed a supportive view; another 33% expressed a negative view, while 29%had no opinion. These figures show that the major players in Chinese nuclear powerconstruction plans are restricted to the government and the nuclear powercompanies which are all state owned enterprises. Even though pro nuclear powerand anti-nuclear power public attitudes seem evenly distributed among the generalpublic, such views are not closely related to the decision-making. Normally it is thegovernment’s persuasion founded on depicting nuclear power as a resolution to theincreasing energy demand triggered by rapid economic growth and populationgrowth, and to mitigate air pollution that determines the discourse about nuclearpower. (He et al., 2014)
In China’s nuclear power politics, the central government plays the role of planningand providing legitimacy – in terms of licensing – of nuclear power development.The nuclear power companies are in charge of policy implementations, while thelocal government treated the construction of nuclear power plants as an opportunityto further economic development. (He et al., 2014) Such a structure of nuclearpower politics can be traced in the National Development and ReformCommission’s (NDRC) Medium and Long-term Nuclear Power Development Plan
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proclaimed in 2007. This ambitious plan indicated that by the end of the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) period 25 GWe of new capacity is planned to be operational;45 GWe may be added by the end of the 13th Five-Year Plan. State ownedenterprises such as CNNC, CGN, and SNPTC are the implementers of this plan.(Zhou et al., 2011)
The Fukushima accident caused a comprehensive safety check of all nuclear powerprojects, including those which were under construction, but all signs showed that itwas just a temporary hold of China’s plan to acquire more nuclear power.(Thomson, 2013) In May 2012, a new 12th Five-Year Plan and the 2020 VisionGoals of Nuclear Safety and Radioactive Pollution Prevention and Control wereapproved in respond to the Fukushima nuclear crisis. (Thomson, 2013) This newplan is an adjusted version of the five-year plan published in 2007, which restrictsnew plant constructions at inland sites while still permits new plant constructions incoastal areas. Like the old plan, this new plan was made in a closed policycommunity including only the government and the industry. (He et al., 2014)
According to He et al. (2014), the Chinese public trusts the government more thannuclear power companies, but less on environmental NGOs. It is only among thehigher educated citizens that NGOs’ information about nuclear power plant isconsidered as reliable and trustworthy. (He. et al., 2014) However, there existssome distrust of the government and nuclear power operators such as in 2007 someInternet bloggers pointed out that the MEP had not issued an Environmental ImpactAssessment (EIA) for the Rushan – in Shandong Province – project prior to theofficial announcement of the project. A couple of national media networks pickedup the news and triggered an intensive local debate about the project. More recentlythe lack of domestic reporting on a small scale radioactive leak inside the nuclearisland in the Daya Bay plant on 23 May 2010 illustrated that transparency andcommunication with the public on nuclear issues is not really improving in China.(He. et al., 2014)
Perhaps, due to the fact that Chinese operators, up till now, gained a relatively saferecord, (Thomson, 2013) the Chinese general public’s concern about nuclear powerseemed to be focused on the transparency of nuclear power plants’ operation ratherthan a questioning of the inborn risks of nuclear power technology. The onlyserious discussions about the pros and cons of nuclear power technology are carriedout among the scientific and engineering professionals in China.
Gu et al. (2006) – nuclear scientists in China Institute of Atomic Energy – in theirarticle Strategic Considerations on Development of Nuclear Power and theAssociated Fuel Cycle in China, published in 2006 proposed a strong pro-nuclearposition:
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“China has an ambitious program to develop her nuclear energy in thecoming decades so as to ensure the sustainable development of nationaleconomy of the country.” (Gu et al., 2006, p. 965)
“In the coming 30 years or so, PWR is selected as the main reactor-typeof NPPs and Gen-3 PWRs will be the leading units of NPPs in China.With this goal in mind, we will quicken the pace of developing thetechnologies of Gen-3 PWRs with our own efforts while actively joiningthe international cooperation.” (Gu et al., 2006, p. 966)
“As a developing country, China’s technologies on nuclear fuel cyclelag behind the world advanced level. In the front end of the fuel cycle,China has established her industrial production capabilities. But thetechnologies need to be up-graded and the scale needs to be expanded.The back end of the fuel cycle in China is the weak point of the wholenuclear fuel cycle owing to the insufficient investment in the pastdecades. We have to pay more attention to and strengthen the R&Dwork in the back-end of the fuel cycle and build a complete fuel cycleindustry, so as to meet with the requirements of sustainable developmentof nuclear power in China.” (Gu et al., 2006, p. 966)
Such words can be understood as describing the tenets of the pro nuclear powerculture among scientists and engineers in China. First, nuclear power is related tosustainable development and economic growth, in which environmental concernsare abbreviated to tidy up the mess of nuclear waste. That is the reason why in theirperceptions the back end fuel recycle technology shall be given greater emphasis.Second, the idea of catching up with advanced foreign technologies appeared,which is not quite new in the language of Chinese scientists and engineers. As far asI am concerned, it is a consequence of the utilitarian view of science andtechnology. Since advanced technology is considered as more efficient, it must beof higher utilitarian value. That is the reason why Chinese engineers – at least in thenuclear power industry – are craving for the most advanced technology such as theGen-3 PWR technology mentioned in this article. Third, increasing financialinvestment to R&D activities is regarded as a positive factor to the upgrade oftechnology and engineering research capacity. In this respect, scientific andengineering research is expected to set up an even closer relationship with the stateand the industry; as such a research-state-market complex can be constituted. Withthis mechanism, it is believed that China’s self-reliance on Gen-3 nuclear powertechnology can finally be achieved. And importantly, it is implicated that Chinesepeople will benefit from these efforts.
However, not all the nuclear scientists and engineers in China give astraightforward support to the development of nuclear power. He Zuoxiu, one ofChina’s first generation nuclear physicists, a Tsinghua University graduate is one of
A BOOK OF CHANGES IN ENGINEERING
70
the most prominent figure among those who reluctantly accept this source of energy.He Zuoxiu was born in 1927, and studied nuclear physics in Tsinghua University inthe 1950s. After his graduation, he participated in China’s nuclear physics militaryresearch; he was elected an academician of the Chinese Academy of Science in1980. (CAS Website, Accessed December 4, 2014) Despite of his work in nuclearphysics research, in his later years he turned to be a professor of dialectics ofnature – Chinese philosophy of science – in Peking University in 1984. In thesecond national meeting of Chinese Society for Dialectics of Nature (CSDN), in theyear 1992, He Zuoxiu was elected one of its executive directors. In recent years, HeZuoxiu devoted his life to the advocacy of the humanistic spirit of science – in hisown term – which can be read from his publications in some Chinese newspaperssuch as the Xinhua Daily (2008-01-16) and other internet based interviews such asan interview by SINA.com.
He became an active internet blogger (He Zuoxiu’s blog:http://hezuoxiu.blogchina.com/index_1.html, Accessed December 4, 2014) offeringhis opinions about China’s nuclear power development. From his internet articles, itcan be read that he is a persistent protester of constructing inland nuclear powerplants. His argument, according to him, is not anti-scientific but authenticallyscientific. For example, he criticized the hypothetical methodologies used to justifythe intrinsic safety calculations adopted in nuclear power plant’s design. Accordingto him, science and calculation are not omnipotent, because there are some naturaldisasters which cannot be precisely predicted such as the tsunami in Fukushima.More critically, he made some ironic comments to show that the current scientificcalculation on nuclear safety is rather misleading. Designers claim that theprobability of severe accident in one reactor year is at the level of 10-7 to 10-6;however, taking into the consideration that up till now there are no more than 500reactors under operation throughout the world but we have experienced at least 3severe accidents, it seems that our scientific predictions dramaticallyunderestimated the real probability of severe accidents. Since inland nuclear powerplants require a huge amount of cooling water for their normal operation and evenmore emergency reserves, and we cannot predict the frequency of severe droughtwhich seems to be more frequent in recent years in China’s inland areas, inlandnuclear power plants’ safety for him cannot be ensured.
In some interviews, He Zuoxiu was opposing the booming development of Chinesenuclear power. He made an analogy of the rapid approvals of China’s new builtnuclear power plants started from 2008 to 2011 to the Great Leap Forward in thelate 1950s, which he thought was largely un-scientific. He pointed out that nuclearpower plants can only be built in coastal areas where cooling water is abundant andare thus safer. He also criticized that nuclear power companies’ lobbying for inlandnuclear power plants was derived from a mindset of market competition regardlessof the consequences. In still other interviews, for example the one reported byhexun website (http://news.hexun.com/2011-04-08/128583781.html, Accessed
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December 3, 2014) in April 2011, almost immediately after the Fukushima accident,he said that atomic energy shall only be used for limited specific purposes, as forthe mass production energy for civil use, he preferred hydro, wind or solar powers.But in 2012 when he updated his blog, such expressions were not written down.
It is difficult to establish a connection between He Zuoxiu’s personal opinions andthe newest Chinese nuclear power policy which clearly restricts new construction ofnuclear power plants at inland sites. In the sense that I cannot evaluate or evenknow whether He Zuoxiu had made some contribution or even was involved in themaking of this new plan. But certainly his blog aroused some social repercussionsin the sense that many of his internet articles were transmitted by other bloggers andhis opinions were opposed by the promoters of nuclear power in China. He is anestablished Chinese scientist and his approach of making his argument is largelyscientific such as his expression of nuclear radioactive release risks in a formula. Itseems that he is officially tolerated by the government, therefore, for better orworse, his voice can be heard by the general public.
He Zuoxiu never claimed himself to be an environmentalist. He might be aphysicist turned philosopher; in any case, he held a prestigious profession when heunwittingly participated in the Chinese environmental activities against nuclearpower. Anti-nuclear power activism might be a very difficult area thatenvironmental activists are able to tap into, even for Liang Congjie or Liao Xiaoyi.But their participation in the broader sense of Chinese environmental activismshared some common feature, which is before their involvement into this unstablepublic space – either intentionally or unwittingly – they have been professionallysuccessful. Without a fear of losing the way of making a living in society whichmight be caused by some politically incorrect expressions or actions, they practicedsome moderate critiques to China’s science and technology policy and its mode ofeconomic development. Their experiences hold some positive meaning in that fromthem the new generation of Chinese scientists and engineers feel that the socialstatus of Chinese intellectuals has now been changed in the post-Mao era. Althoughwe may still face some risks against our career development in case of expressingopinions contradictory to our employers’ policies, other than that there is no limitfor us to participate in the various forms of environmental activities in China, forexample to become a member of FON.
Chinese environmental activism, from my perspective, is largely an individualphenomenon which means that it is closely related to personal lives. Importantly,like it is in the West, performing a cultural reflection on science and technologydevelopment shall be counted as a major part of environmental activism in China.The Chinese feature of environmental activism, in this respect, especially when thetenets of this type of cultural reflection praxis relates to nuclear power engineering,is that Chinese scientists and engineers cannot choose to be an environmentalist as aprofession. That is to say their praxis pervades their work, lives, hobbies, and casual
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talks. We cannot expect that all these forms of praxis would generate broader socialrepercussions or impacts like the practices of the prestigious people. In fact somenormal engineers and scientists intentionally avoid bringing about suchrepercussions, and prefer to be unnoticed. But I would say that they remain activesilently, therefore, researchers, like me, who intend to study this silentenvironmental activism about nuclear power engineering in China, shall take allthese clues into consideration because all these seemingly minor factors are highlyrelevant to the means and ends of making changes to the engineering practices in anuclear power engineering company in China.
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CHAPTER 3. CGN’S GROWTH AND ITSENGINEERING DESIGN SYSTEM
3.1. FROM A POWER PLANT TO AN ENGINEERING COMPANY
China General Nuclear Power Group – CGN as its official abbreviation – developedfrom a nuclear power plant situated at the coast of Guangdong Province in southernChina. The power plant got its name from the name of the place where the twonuclear islands were constructed, Daya Bay. From a historical point of view, theestablishment of this nuclear power plant symbolized China’s civil use of atomicenergy that starts in the 1980s. Taking the historical cultural background of thisengineering project into consideration, the Daya Bay nuclear power plantengineering project is an exemplary project in the history of China’s science andtechnology development because from my point of view it reflected both thetraditional and the contemporary Chinese engineering experiences.
The traditional side of the engineering experience of this project refers to the habitsof engineering in the Chinese culture. First, as it was manifested by the Daya Bayproject, large scale engineering projects were often related to the state’s politicalambitions. In pre-modern China, the most well-known Chinese engineering feat, theGreat Wall was designed and constructed for the political purpose of preventing theChinese agricultural civilization from the invasion of northern nomadic peoples.(UNESCO1, Accessed August 9, 2015) In this respect, it was not a coincidence thatthe nuclear power plant project derived from a pursuit of China’s self-reliance onmassive scale centralized energy supply. This pursuit seemed to be urgent in the1970s and 1980s when the energy crisis became a global issue. (Thomson, 2013)
Second, the intimate relationship of Chinese infrastructural engineering practiceswith politics indicated some habits of the human or social aspects of engineering inChina, especially on its leadership and organizations. The Dujiangyan irrigationsystem located in Sichuan province built in the third century BC is perhaps theprimal case that can be traced on the establishment of these engineering habits.(UNESCO2, Accessed August 9, 2015)
The Dujiangyan project was led by the governor Li Bing of the Qin Dynasty duringthe Warring States period (406-221 BC). (UNESCO2, Accessed August 9, 2015)From a contemporary perspective, the planning of this project was not entirely anirrigation system in the sense that the choice of technology was in fact largelyshaped by political concerns. Before the Dujiangyan system was built, farmersliving along the banks of the Min River were annually troubled by flooding. Onesolution of this problem would have been to build a dam, but Li Bing as the
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governor of this region had also been responsible for keeping the waterway openfor military transportation, therefore instead he decided to construct an artificialcanal to redirect a portion of the river’s water flow in order to channel the excessivewater for irrigation purposes and keeping the vessel transportation open at the sametime.
In the year 2000, the Dujiangyan site was listed by the UNESCO as a WorldHeritage located in China, representing its cultural and physical significance. In thisthesis, I tend to think that its cultural influence might be more persistent incontemporary Chinese engineering than its technological legacy. Because it seemsto be quite obvious that some common features between this ancient infrastructuralproject and its contemporary counterparts such as the Daya Bay plant exist. Thenuclear power plant project from its planning stage was led by government officialsinstead of business elites as it was often the case in the West. From former premierLi Peng’s Diary (2004) published after his retirement, the Daya Bay projectconsisted of a major part of his work from the 1980s to the 1990s concerning thedevelopment of nuclear power in China. In his diary, as he recorded, manyimportant decisions such as the allocation of the plant and the choice of technologywere finally decided by the central government and more importantly theannouncement of the determination of building the Daya Bay plant with Frenchnuclear power technology was made by China's top leader Deng Xiaoping.Provided that we can compare the cultural perceptions on science and technology inChina over history, the utilitarian view over this type of knowledge seems to beevident and long lasting which can be expressed in another way that this utilitarianperception of engineering might serve as one part of Chinese traditions.
Engineering, especially infrastructural engineering, has long been a state enterprisein China, which can be verified by the origin of a governmental organ called gongbu which can be literally translated as the Ministry of Work11 in English. Thisgovernmental organ first appeared in the Zhou Dynasty (around 11 century BC tothe end of the Warring States period in around 2 century BC) and was kept constantto the last feudal dynasty – Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) – in China. For thousands ofyears, this government department managed infrastructural construction projectsover the territory of the Central Kingdom, including for example the irrigationprojects and the military projects such as the Great Wall. As the modernizationprocesses preceded in China especially in the late period of the Qing Dynasty thefunction of this governmental department extended. In addition to its traditionaltasks, gong bu was given the authority of supervising machine making, mining,industry development activities especially those engineering activities related to themilitary. (Zhao, 1990 and Zhao et al., 2002) Nowadays, in the current structure of
11 As it was translated by Joseph Needham, in page 27, in The Grand Titration – Science andSociety in East and West, 1979.
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China’s central government the traces of gong bu still exist. It is just that thisomnipotent department was dismantled into some smaller parts and each became anindependent governmental department of its own, such as the Ministry of Industryand Information Technology, the Ministry of Water Resources, the StateAdministration of Science Technology and Industry for National Defense, and theMinistry of Transport etc. In this respect, the professionalization of China’s modernengineers started from the public sector instead of the private sector. This traditionwas also inherited by the Daya Bay project in the sense that this project was fromits origin a state directed and owned business.
Another relatively newly emerged Chinese engineering habit which served as anintermediary between the traditional and the present Chinese engineering practices,refers to the notion of “learning from the West”. This indicates that Chineseengineering projects in its modernization process were often related to China’sinteractions with Western industrialized countries and the Daya Bay project was noexception. Even though the idea of building a nuclear power plant in the relativelyaffluent coastal provinces of China emerged long before the 1980s and thenegotiations concerning the Daya Bay project had been started in the early 1980s,the contract which symbolized the final planning of the Daya Bay plant was notsigned until the Sino-British negotiation over the sovereignty of Hong Kong hadbeen finally settled. (Yee, et al., 1987) Two years after the signature of the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong, in 1986, representatives from GuangdongNuclear Power Joint Venture Company (GNPJVC), the French – the nuclear island– and British – the conventional island – suppliers signed the key contractsgoverning the construction of the Daya Bay nuclear power plant. (Zhan et al. 2003)In this respect, the project is a demonstration of mainland’s future economiccontributions to Hong Kong which would foster Hong Kong’s stability andprosperity. (Yee, et al., 1987) Relating the Daya Bay project to the policy of“opening up”, Deng Xiaoping’s words after his meeting with the chairman of CLPgroup – China Lighting and Power Company, a Hong Kong based electricitygeneration company – on January 19th, 1985 recorded by Xin Hua News Agency’snewsletter made a clear illustration: “Adopting the opening up policy will allowsomething of capitalist origin enter China. But the socialist power is stronger, andwill achieve greater development. The ratio of socialist power will always remaindominant.” (Li 2004) Deng Xiaoping’s words, from a political perspective,legitimated the Daya Bay project including its incorporation of Western capital andtechnology.
According to the contracts the Daya Bay project was designed to be a turn-keyproject which meant that it was the French and British suppliers’ – mainly theFrench company Framatone – responsibility to guarantee its technical success andnuclear safety in technological terms. Chinese involvement in this project wasdelineated to construction support and follow-up operation and maintenance afterthe selected Chinese operators received training in French plants. Engineering
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design and equipment manufacturing were not in the scope of the GuangdongNuclear Power Joint Venture Company (GNPJVC) which served as the owner ofthe company. (Zhan et al., 2003) Thus, “learning from the West” in the Daya Bayproject could only be interpreted as learning how to operate.
At the time when the Daya Bay project was built, another nuclear power plant QinShan Phase 1 project in Zhejiang province at the eastern coast based entirely onChinese technology was also under construction. (Li, 2004) In this respect, the QinShan project represented China’s transformation of its previous military atomicscientific research and development to civil use of nuclear technology on arelatively complete self-reliant approach while the Daya Bay project seemed tofollow the approach that had been set up by the previous modernists back in the late19th century – technology transfer. Such a difference on the development oftechnology indicated a different path of growth between CGN and CNNC – ChinaNational Nuclear Corporation which is still a nuclear military industrial complex –especially on the perceptions of engineering design.
From a commercial perspective, the Daya Bay project can also represent somecontemporary trends of science and technology development with its origins rootedin China’s long modernizing processes and in the pre-modern criticism abouttechnology and engineering. Even though quite scarce, there were still some well-known records about China’s original cultural and social objections to engineeringand technology in its long history. Nevertheless, the motifs concerning the culturalevaluation of engineering projects changed over-time.
Perhaps the most evident social comments related to these engineering projectsreferred to the issue of abusing human labor, such as the case related to the GreatWall. The Great Wall was initially constructed by various independent feudal statesin the Warring Period. It was the first Chinese emperor Qin the First, whoconnected these initially separated defense facilities into a whole system after hisconquest of the last 6 states. (UNESCO1, Accessed August 9, 2015) In order toaccomplish his feat, the emperor manipulated hundreds of thousands of humanlaborers which might serve as one reason for the fall of the Qin Dynasty. Accordingto one of the Chinese legends, Madam Meng Jiang, whose husband was enlisted inthe huge labor force but unfortunately died due to extreme hard labor, went to theconstruction site to find her husband without knowing that her husband would neverreturn. After hearing this heart breaking news, she cried incessantly and her tearsled to the collapse of a section of the Great Wall. (Idema, 2012) This legend hasbeen passed down for generations as a criticism of this ancient Chinese engineeringproject in the name of a crime committed by the emperor. Even though Chinesepeople acknowledged the protective function of the Great Wall to their peacefulagricultural lives, its destructive effects were also revealed. However, negativerecords related to the Dujiangyan project are not found. Therefore, I can onlydeduce that ancient Chinese history commentators evaluated the cultural and social
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consequences of engineering projects by balancing both the positive and negativeimpacts on human lives. Life and death served as the most direct concern in the pre-modern Chinese assessment of technology, in the sense that, provided that thepositive aspects outweighed the negative, such engineering projects would beregarded as favorable.
It was in China’s initial industrialization process in the late 19th century thatstrengthening national defense became the major criterion of the cultural and socialevaluations of engineering. The modernists believed that Western technology wouldserve as the new Great Wall to protect Chinese people to live as their ancestorswithout interference from other civilizations. In addition, to strengthen its militarypower, national wealth would serve as its foundation. In this mindset, industrialdevelopment began to take root in China, for instance the construction of railroadswhich were considered as both positively effective to national defense and civiltransportation of wealth. Comparing this view of engineering and technology toChina’s pre-modern values, it seemed that commercial value had started to beadded to engineering and technology from this period of time. At the same time, theprotesters of modernization not only objected to the introduction of Western scienceand technology but also saw them as a threat to Chinese civilization instead of aprotective force.
In 1876 when the first railroad in China was built in Shanghai, a fierce oppositiontoward this industrial development appeared with the argument that rail roadswould not only corrupt the agricultural land, but also entice people to admirematerial benefits by trading rather from production. At the time when the traditionalvalue system outweighed the modern understanding, such a social objection led tothe dismantling of the already built first Chinese railroad. In 1880 when GovernorLiu Mingchuan, attempted to build another railroad in Taiwan, he experienced asimilar situation. The imperial court indicated him that his attempt was not incompliance with patrios nomos. (Jin et al., 2003) In the cases of the failures of earlyrailroad development, no matter what the difference between the opposing rhetoricexpressions, the hidden meaning was always to detach engineering and technologyfrom commercialization which in fact was one of the triggers of the industrialrevolution in Europe.
However, 100 years after China’s initial attempts of modernization, the entireambiance toward science and technology has been fundamentally changed whichfrom my perspective contributes to the success of nuclear power development. Theessence of this round of transformation can be characterized as the combination ofscience and technology with commercialization, on one hand, and the detachmentof it from the notion of national defense on the other. Such a transformation gavethe advocates of nuclear power apparent advantages dealing with social protestsagainst this technology.
A BOOK OF CHANGES IN ENGINEERING
78
First, detaching nuclear power from military technology impeded people’simagination of this technology with war thus easing the tension of life and deathrelated to this technology which might still exist in Chinese traditional images ofengineering projects. Second, a closer relationship of engineering and business gavethe government who made the entire plan a better position. It can be interpretedfrom the commercial angle that nuclear power is a lucrative business for thecommon good. Even though the planner might not deny its risks, it is much easierto transfer the tough question of balancing the merits and demerits of thistechnology to the general public and making the government an impartial thirdparty with a benign intention. Third, making nuclear power a business instead of apolitical affair can better soothe the tension of importing Western technology whichmight indicate a sense of foreign technological and economic invasion. It seemedthat the commercialization of nuclear power in China responded to all theseperplexing dilemmas which were unsolved by China’s previous attempts.
These might be the reasons, from a cultural perspective, why the Daya Bay nuclearpower plant was from its beginning designed to be a joint venture between a legalperson established by the Chinese government and the CLP group a foreign partnerand importantly using the French technology because the French governmentagreed to export nuclear power technology to China without political prerequisitesexcept a guarantee of the Chinese government not to use this technology on militarypurpose which was in fact at the beginning not intended. (Yee et al., 1987)
The dominant commercial culture triggered by the opening-up and economicreform policy permeated in China ever since 1978 may also explain why the DayaBay project which was launched after the Chernobyl disaster could still beaccomplished in China even with some protests which seemed to be no less fiercethan the old railroad case.
The Daya Bay project was placed in a geographical site about 50 kilometers awayfrom Hong Kong. According to the joint venture contract the Daya Bay plant wouldsell its electricity to Hong Kong CLP group after its commercial operation (Zhan etal., 2003). The deal would be liquidated by US dollar which would increase China’sforeign currency reserve that was appreciated valuable at the beginning of itseconomic reform and at the same time would relive Hong Kong’s shortage ofelectricity supply without building more plants in its territory (Li, 2004). In thisrespect, it seemed to be a win-win deal. However, the Chernobyl nuclear disasterignited a rapidly growing environmental concern which developed into a socialunrest in Hong Kong relating to the construction of this nuclear power plant (Yee etal., 1987). In a retrospect, its ending manifested the triumph of the preference ofeconomic growth.
Some newspaper reports against the construction of the Daya Bay nuclear powerplant helped to ignite an anti-nuclear power movement in Hong Kong, which from
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its beginning divided into three steams. There was the radical stream that insistedon a shelving of the Daya Bay project. There was the middle stream that suggestedpostponing this project until the fervent public opposition against this projectcooled down. The weakest voices against this project said that they were not in theopposition of China’s willingness to acquire nuclear power but the project justneeded to be relocated to a more remote area from Hong Kong, as such they couldeven bear the additional cost of this relocation. Even though the anti-nuclear powermedia, such as the Ming Pao which was the most active newspaper in themovement, used wordings such as “dead-harbor” to successfully attract publicattention of potential nuclear disasters, in their opponents’ eyes these protests werenot so difficult to be dealt with. (Yee et al., 1987)
The pro-nuclear power campaign was also started in the public media which servedas the major battle field of the debate about Daya Bay nuclear power plant. Unlikethe divided voices expressed by the anti-nuclear power campaigners, the pro-nuclear power professionals were more coordinated. First they reiterated that thepoint of departure of the Daya Bay project was from the good will of providing afoundation of Hong Kong’s long term prosperity. In addition, they indicated that theCentral Government in Beijing had already made a great investment into thisproject. Therefore, it was not an option that this power plant could be relocated.Second, the most effective strategy, from my point of view, was to argue thatscience and technology had been employed to shape the rational and reasonableimage of the pro-nuclear power campaigners leaving those who claimed that theproject held political meaning and who worried about nuclear disasters throughqualitative deductions an irrational and unreliable image. (Yee et al., 1987)
After Beijing’s commitment of receiving a long term transparent internationalmonitoring over Daya Bay’s future maintenance and operation, and an organizedreiteration of the advancement of the technology adopted in Daya Bay which wasfundamentally different from the Chernobyl plant in the public media, theopponents seemed to find their peace with a reluctant acceptance of this project. Inmany respects, the ending of this story seemed to be predicted by its beginning.Even at the beginning of the protests, there were heavily loaded economic concernsamong the anti-nuclear power campaigners. Those who claimed a concern of theplant’s threat to the political stability of Hong Kong emphasized its negativeinfluence to Hong Kong’s stock market in case a false alarm of disaster appeared onthe market (Yee et al., 1987). It seems to me, a misleading appropriation of thehuman concern into economic terms led to its loss. As it was in the 1980s whenscience and technology had been more incorporated in economic development, itseemed to be a false strategy to use the knowledge of economy which was supposedto be another school of rational thinking to attack science and technology, becausescience technology and economy seemed to strengthen each other in many ways inreality even before this era.
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From this brief overview of the debate about the Daya Bay project, I am trying toreach to a tentative conclusion that it was in the 1980s, after a long time ofsearching, China has finally found its way – perhaps shortcut to be more precise –to modernization. Opening-up and economic reform, serve as its rhetoricappearances while in fact the commercialization of science and technology consistsof its core. This was what the first modernists had envisioned but not realized due totheir misinterpretation of the function of science and technology in society in theirtimes. From a contemporary perspective, the dominant cultural image about scienceand technology in Chinese society might be its connection to economicdevelopment. Such a connection can be interpreted in many ways. In regard tonuclear power science and technology, we may use the Daya Bay nuclear powerplant project as the best demonstration. Consequently, it seems to be evident thatthis dominant cultural perception of science and technology indicates CGN’sorganizational growth after the Daya Bay project and its path to achieve the abilityof engineering design. Especially from this point of departure we might be able toexplain why engineering design was developed in the way as it appeared in CGN.
In 1994 the first unit of the Daya Bay nuclear power plant reached to itscommercial operation and the second unit was accomplished in 1995 (Zhan et al.,2003). CGN’s development after this demonstration project was well predicted byits planner, perhaps most famously by former Primer Li Peng. “To developmentChina’s nuclear power industry on rotational basis using the capitals accumulatedfrom the previously built plants.” (Li, 2004) This guiding principal served as themotif of CGN’s transformations in its follow up nuclear power projects, andimportantly from a retrospective, this concise sentence might explain the motivesbehind CGN’s transformations both technically and commercially.
In 1997 the central government granted a permission to build another nuclear powerplant just a few hundred meters away from the Daya Bay site named the Ling AoPhase 1 plant. In general, the Ling Ao Phase 1 project was technically a copy of theDaya Bay project in the sense that the technology adopted in this later project wasthe same as its predecessor’s. However, the major difference between the Daya Bayproject and the Ling Ao Phase 1 project was that in the later project the owner ofthe plant was changed into a complete Chinese legal person instead of a jointventure. Technically, Chinese engineers were given more opportunity to participatein its engineering design and equipment manufacturing. Compared to the turn-keyDaya Bay project which was a full scope procurement of foreign equipment andengineering services during the construction, the Liang Ao Phase 1 project adoptedsome moderate attempts of technology localization. 11% of the nuclear islandequipment and 23% of the conventional island equipment was manufactured byChinese domestic suppliers. In addition to that, the civil engineering design of thenuclear island was subcontracted to Beijing Institute of Nuclear Engineering(BINE). (Liu et al., 2003)
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The Ling Ao Phase 1 project also triggered some organizational changes of CGN’sproject management. With the technical assistance provided by Electricite deFrance (EDF), CGN formed its technical management team, which performed someengineering design review tasks. The technical management team was under therule of an engineering department. In addition to the technical management teamwith its official name as the technical management branch, there were several otherbranches included in the department, such as the procurement branch, theconstruction site management branch, and the testing and commissioning branch.All these branches used their English initials to distinguish each other. The Ebranch represented the technical management branch; the P branch meant theprocurement branch; C represented the construction site management branch and Swas given to the testing and commissioning branch. Thus EPCS together coveredthe major types of engineering practices in the engineering department of the LingAo Phase 1 project. (Liu et al., 2003) In fact such a division of labor was based onthe understanding of the phases of a standard engineering project.
In CGN engineering design is put first as plan making. All the follow-up work isregarded as implementation, such as procurement which sources on the marketavailable products that can satisfy the supposed functional requirements. When thematerials and human resources are ready, it is the responsibility of site managers –engineers – to build the concrete and steel structures and install equipment. At theend of the construction and installation but before the start-up, tests are needed toensure that the systems would function as they are designed. (CNPEC EngineeringTraining Center, 2010) This is the typical sequence of how a nuclear power plant bebuilt. It was in the Ling Ao Phase 1 project, engineers from Chinese mainlandstarted to participate in all these tasks because in the Daya Bay project some part ofthese jobs even in general and superficial terms were carried out by CLP engineers.(Liu et al. 2003)
Compared to the Daya Bay project, the Ling Ao Phase 1 project was a greatercommercial success, because the entire construction took only 6 years, exactly as itwas designed, without apparent delays. According to the official summary of thisproject published in the year 2003, the major reason for the smooth implementationof the project derived from the extent of the maturity of the technology whichmeant that no significant modifications – technical changes – were adopted in theLing Ao Phase 1 project compared to the Daya Bay project. (Liu et al., 2003)However, another unwritten factor might be perceived from the social perspective.Due to the silence of the anti-nuclear power movements in both Hong Kong andmainland China after the accomplishment of the Daya Bay project, the Ling AoPhase 1 project was implemented in a relatively peaceful ambience as if it was onlyan attempt of amplifying China’s technology reserves to ensure its energy safety.
The decade from 1995 to 2005, was a relatively quiet period of nuclear powerdevelopment in China. It seemed that Chinese energy policy planners were more
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interested in acquiring different types of nuclear power technologies than urgentlyputting one type of them into large scale application. In the 10 years, in addition tothe Ling Ao Phase 1 project, there were three other projects implemented at thecoastal areas in China. Two of them were situated at the Qin Shan site led byCNNC. The Qin Shan Phase 2 project after the Qin Shan Phase 1 project was basedon a self-reliant design which was, to some extent, an improvement of the Chinesehome grown nuclear power technology. The Qin Shan Phase 3 project was a projectwhich adopted the Canadian heavy water reactor technology. The Russiantechnology had also found its market in China with the Tian Wan Phase 1 projectlaunched in 1999 in Jiangsu province. Nuclear power became a demonstration ofinternational energy technology cooperation in China, but there was no sign thatany of these technologies would dominate the nuclear power market in China at thattime and in the future. (Zhou et al, 2011, Thomson, 2013) As a matter of fact,compared to what happened after 2005 and especially in 2007 and 2008, the totalmarket value of nuclear power was apparently smaller in these 10 years.
The real opportunity for the rapid development of nuclear power – the renaissanceof nuclear power in China – appeared in 2005 when the China Nuclear PowerMiddle-Long-Term Development Plan 2005-2020 was officially promulgated bythe National Development and Reform Commission. (Zhou et al, 2011) The plan12was written in five chapters with the first two chapters presented an overview ofnuclear power development in China and worldwide. Importantly, in the secondchapter a future development of nuclear power in China was scientifically andtechnologically legitimated upon two presumptions. The first supportingpresumption was that China had gained enough technology and economicpreparation from its self-reliant projects by CNNC and some internationalcommercial projects such as the Daya Bay and Ling Ao Phase 1. The secondpresumption was that nuclear power was considered as knowledge and capitalintensive industry on one hand, and a low carbon emission source of electricalpower supply on the other hand. Therefore, giving it a preferential status wouldcomply with the central government’s determination of reducing CO2 emissionsand maintaining or even strengthening China’s industrial and manufacturingcapacity at the same time. As such the foundation of China’s economic growth andthe progress of “modernization” would not be hampered.
In the following three technical chapters of the plan, technical or scientific methodsof achieving the goal that by the year 2020 40 million KWh capacity of nuclearpower would be installed were systematically written down. As a guideline, two
12 SDPC Official Website, http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/nyjt/nyzywx/t20071102_170122.htm, HeDian Zhong Chang Qi Fa Zhan Gui Hua 2005-2020, China Nuclear Power Middle-Long-Term Development Plan 2005-2020, 核电中长期发展规划（2005－2020年), (Accessed
May 20, 2013)
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parallel technology paths were identified which were again identical to the twomodes manifested in the 1980s. One was the mode of self-reliant and the other wastechnology transfer. Issues such as investment feasibility studies related to nuclearpower plant projects, site preparation and conservation, safety and reliability ofnuclear fuel circulation, waste treatment and main equipment manufacturing wereall included in this plan.
This plan brought up many changes in the Chinese nuclear power market andamong these changes two seemed to be more significant. First, in 2007 a new player,the American Westinghouse Nuclear Power, had finally entered into this countrywhich seemed to be impossible a few years ago. Along with the import of theWestinghouse AP1000 technology – Gen-3 pressurized water reactor technology inAmerican standard – a new Chinese nuclear power company – the State NuclearPower Technology Company (SNPTC) – was established in order to coordinate anational scale technology transfer of the AP1000 technology. (Zhou et al. 2011)Second, CGN caught up this opportunity to achieve its expansion from a nuclearpower plant to a nuclear power complex. Such a transformation was achieved bothtechnically and organizationally. Up till 2007, CNNC, CGN, SNPTC the threeChinese nuclear power engineering company had finally been shaped as aconsequence of the plan. It also indicated that competition was successfullyintroduced to the Chinese nuclear power market. This explained why heavilycommercial oriented growth strategy appeared in each of the three companies’policies.
What can be read from the 2005-2020 Nuclear Power Development Plan was that,there was no time in history like it was in the 2007 and 2008 that China was inurgent needs of nuclear power. Due to the high price of petroleum oil, an increasingburden of air pollution which became more and more serious in the big cities inChina such as the capital Beijing, and the worldwide financial crisis originated fromthe United States, nuclear power – a stable, low cost, emission free – technologyappeared to be the solution to all those problems. Importantly, cleaning the air bynuclear power as a replacement of the conventional coal powered plants would notinduce economic regression. This interpretation about nuclear power seems to be aconsensus among the majority of Chinese engineers and policy makers. It was inthese circumstances, CGN established its own engineering company CNPEC in2004, its design institute CNPDC in 2005 and its research institute CNPRI later in2006. (CNPEC, 2013)
These three subsidiaries of CGN derived from the engineering department in theLing Ao Phase 1 project for one purpose the Ling Ao Phase 2 project which was themost significant project for CGN because it was in this project CGN claimed itscomplete mastering of the French Gen-2 pressurized water reactor technology underits own Chinese brand CPR1000. (CNPEC, 2013) It meant that the newlyestablished CNPEC together with CNPDC and CNPRI served as the lump sum
A BOOK OF CHANGES IN ENGINEERING
84
contractor of the Ling Ao Phase 2 project instead of the French company AREVANP – previously Framatone. The key transformation of CGN in this period of timewas that it changed from an owner of nuclear power plants to an engineeringcompany which would be able to perform engineering design. However, in a morerealistic sense, the acquisition of this ability was achieved by a long termtechnology transfer through the Daya Bay and the Ling Ao Phase 1 projects. In thisrespect, CGN, in 2007 and 2008, was quite confident in claiming the maturity of thetechnology in its construction projects. In nuclear power industry, where maturityequals to reliability, CGN possessed, to some extent, a comparative advantageagainst CNNC and SNPTC. Even though the later purchased the right of use of thenewest AP1000 technology from Westinghouse, the reliability of this newtechnology needed to be proved by real constructions.
From 2005 to 2010, CGN got 5 major projects throughout China, the Ling AoPhase 2 project (2 units) in 2005 and accomplished in 2012, the Hongyan Riverproject (4 units) in 2007, the Ningde project (4 units) in 2008, the Yangjiang project(6 units) in 2008, and the Fangcheng Port project (2 units) in 2010, with itsCPR1000 technology. When Gen-3 technology became the main theme of theadvancement of nuclear power technology, CGN was not left behind. In 2007, CGNentered into a contract with its old partner AREVA NP to construct the Taishannuclear power plant with the EPR technology – Gen-3 technology by Europeanstandard. (Zhou et al., 2011) Associated with this contract, a technology transfercontract was signed through which CGN was granted a right of use of the EPRtechnology in China. It was intended by CGN that this new technology transfercontract would enable it to upgrade its own technology and educate a newgeneration of engineers especially designers.
The optimistic visions of nuclear power development would keep constant if theFukushima accident had not happened in 2011. (Thomson, 2013) The tragicaccident in Japan ignited a fierce debate on whether nuclear power plants should bebuilt at inland sites in China. China’s public media such as the central televisionstation gave abundant reports on this accident and with the participation of somefamous Chinese scientists such as Professor He Zuoxiu, the debate about the futuredevelopment of Chinese nuclear power attracted the attention of the country’s topleaders.
Almost immediately after the confirmation of this incident the central governmentceased approval of new ATP13s to the constructions of nuclear power plants.Twenty months later, a new plan – China Nuclear Power Middle-Long-TermDevelopment Plan 2011-2020 – was promulgated together with China NuclearSafety Plan 2011-2020 on the 24th of October 2012. In this new plan, new nuclear
13 ATP: Authorize to Proceed
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power plants shall only be built at coastal areas, previous attempts of launchingnuclear power projects at inland areas are halted at least in the foreseeable future. Inaddition, as it was written in the safety plan, new constructs shall only adopt Gen-3technologies which are considered to be safer in terms of a lower probability ofdesign based severe accidents. (Thomson, 2013)
Even though there was no doubt that CGN participated in the drafting of both plans,the company’s operation was still strongly influenced by the central government.First, CGN was forced to abandon its preparation for an inland project in Hubeiprovince, and before that, the groundwork had already been started. The samesituation also happened to CNNC’s inland project. Second, the plans indicated agloomy market future for CGN’s CPR1000 technology because it was a typicalGen-2 technology. CGN responded to these changes promptly. On one hand, itstarted its self-reliant research and development to upgrade the CPR1000technology to something that contained Gen-3 technical features. On the other hand,CGN started its pioneering attempts on the international nuclear power marketbecause it was believed that not all countries would phase out nuclear power afterthe Fukushima accident and the domestic market would saturate when all thecoastal sites had been taken. This international expansion intention was supportedby the central government with the newly elected president and the premierpromoting Chinese nuclear power technology and high speed rail system in theirdiplomatic visits.
In fact the second strategy of international expansion raised a demandingrequirement for CGN which led to an emphasis on its self-reliant research anddevelopment capability. Over the years, CGN relied on technology transfer toacquire sufficient knowledge for its domestic nuclear power plant constructions.However, in order to become a qualified bidder for international nuclear powerprojects, an independent intellectual property right of the technology is required.Technology transfer contracts can only guarantee a right of use of the technologiesin China under a license. That is to say neither the CPR1000 nor the EPRtechnology could support CGN’s ambition of getting a complete internationalcontract. This dilemma gave birth to CNNC and CGN’s joint effort of making thereal Chinese Gen-3 nuclear power technology with full property rights. But this wassomething that CGN had never experienced before. Therefore, it triggered a newround of reform inside CGN especially on its engineering design.
By the end of the year 2014, the future of nuclear power development in China andthe business potentials of CGN became clear again. The basic design of the ChineseGen-3 reactor HL1000 passed the safety review of the National Nuclear SafetyAdministration (NNSA). This led to a demonstration project granted to CGN on itsFangcheng Port site where the two CPR1000 units were still under construction.Another demonstration project was granted to CNNC on its Fuqing site where 4Gen-2 nuclear power units has been built. Technically CGN’s modifications to the
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already built CPR1000 units are accomplished by adding up some passive safetyinstruments to the active safety systems. This meant that the CPR1000 wastransformed into a technology with some Gen-3 features, which gave CGN to buildtwo more modified units on its Hongyan River site. All the good news arrived inearly 2015, in the sense that the impact of the Fukushima accident might have fadeaway. However, the anti-nuclear power discourses over the inland projects are stillpersistent and neither CNNC nor CGN has received an approval on their inlandconstruction plans by the central government. (CGN Website1, Accessed August 10,2015)
In the international market, CGN signed a framework contract with EDF in order toensure its participation in the EPR nuclear power plant construction in Britain.Independently, CGN was enlisted as the ultimate investor and the contractor of anuclear power plant project in Romania. On top of all these business successes in2014, the most significant commercial success for CGN was that CGN became alisted company on the Hong Kong stock market on December 10th 2014. Thismeans that CGN is now having greater financial power to support its futureexpansions both domestically and internationally than ever before. (CGN Website1,Accessed August 9, 2015)
Through this commercial storyline of CGN’s development, it is hard to measure intechnology innovation terms, how much progress has been achieved by thiscompany which changed from a small joint venture with only several hundredemployees to a nuclear power group company that employed more than 10thousand engineers and other professionals. What seems to be evident is that alongwith CGN’s commercial expansions, its scope of engineering extends as well. CGNlearned the technical know-whats of a nuclear power plant in the Daya Bay years,and gradually learned nuclear power plant project management section by section –procurement, site management, and system testing – in its cooperation withAREVA NP and EDF. Under the technology transfer contracts, CGN engineerslearned the technical know-hows – engineering designs – of how to build a nuclearpower plant, and finally, under market pressures traced back to some technicalknow-whys on nuclear power related scientific knowledge which could beimmediately used on its research and development activities.
In short, CGN’s acquisition of scientific and technological knowledge is not strictlyin line with the trajectory which starts from research and development activities. Itis much similar to a reverse track. Its expansions have been closely related to thepolitical climate shifts in China over the years after the opening-up and theeconomic reform. Social concern about nuclear power technology has never been adominant factor to define the fate of nuclear power in China. Thecommercialization of science and technology, according to me, serves as the mostimportant momentum of its triumph in the market. Even though, it is indicated inthis chapter that engineering design emerged and evolved in CGN along with its
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
87
implementation of different projects, the questions of how CGN engineers learn topractice engineering design are still unclear in this one dimensional – commercial –interpretation. Such questions will be dealt with in the following sections of thischapter, but at this point, I would rather conclude the growth of CGN a commercialinnovation.
3.2. TYPES OF ENGINEERING DESIGNS IN CGN
From CGN's engineering practices, engineering design is treated as one phase of theengineering process in its project implementation. This perception of engineeringdesign leads to two different understanding of its functions. First, engineeringdesign can be used as a tool to provide verifications of the business actions of theinvestor for example the procurement activities. Second, engineering design itselfcan be regarded as a form of decision making to regulate the follow-up engineeringactivities such as manufacturing and installation of equipment and the constructionof buildings. Each of them implies different knowledge or information requirements.In this respect, it indicates that in different periods of CGN’s history, different typesof engineering design might have existed depending on the work that CGNengineers performed.
In the standard FIDC14 contract definitions of the owner and the contractor or thesupplier, their scope of work can be portrayed as the following:
The Employer or the Owner: He shall grant access to the Site andpossession of the site, make arrangements for payments, pay theContract Price, disclose site data and co-operate with the Contractor tothe extent provided by the Contract. He shall also compensate theContractor for additional cost and disruption if a risk eventuates which isborne by the Employer. (Jaeger and Hok, 2010, p. 177)
The Contractor: The Contractor promises to the Employer to completethe Work and to remedy any defects therein. If the contract provides forthe design by the Contractor, then he will design the Work as well. Thedesign, if any, and the completion of the Work including the remedyingof defects shall be accomplished within time for completion. Moreover,
14 The International Federation of Consulting Engineers (commonly known as FIDIC,acronym for its French name Fédération Internationale Des Ingénieurs-Conseils) is aninternational standards organization for the construction industry, best known for the FIDICfamily of contract templates. FIDIC was initially founded in the French speaking Europeancountries and regions and gradually got accredited in continental Europe, (Jaeger and Hok,2010)
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if the contract provides for the operation of the Work by the Contractor,then he will operate the Work. (Jaeger and Hok, 2010, p. 191)
According to the definitions, knowledge or technology is not the ultimatecommodity pursued by the owner of a nuclear power plant, but electricity issomething that can be sold on the market. Therefore, it is what the owner wants.However, in order to generate the commodity, technology of building such aninfrastructure facility is needed. The question is whether the owner is necessary topossess that sort of engineering ability in the long run or such expertise can betemporarily hired in the market. Even though engineering design is not necessarilythe work of the contractor, due to economic concerns, the owner might not want toacquire the same technical abilities as the contractor. As a result, engineering designmay be allocated in both the owner and the contractor’s scope of work, its contentsmay vary. Such differences derives from the different problems confronted by theowner and the contractor and can be manifested by the different approaches ofproblem-solving.
In the nuclear power industry, especially in China, the owner takes theresponsibility of nuclear safety, that is to say it needs to go through a licensingprocess to get its permission of nuclear power plant construction and operation. Thetheme of this licensing process is an evaluation of the design which describes thetechnical safety features of a nuclear power plant. The owner answers questionsraised by the NNSA under a promise of the contractor who knows more detailedknowledge than the owner in the sense that the contractor knows how to accomplishits promises but the owner only requires a result. A result will be sufficient to helpthe owner to get its license and in this respect, a review of the contractor’s designwill be enough. In CGN’s engineering practices, especially in the Daya Bay andLing Ao Phase 1 project such design reviews served as the major engineeringdesign activities when CGN acted as the owner.
In CGN, even today, economic feasibility studies of any new built nuclear powerplants are regarded as a part of engineering design. In these studies a businessmodel is built with the basic data from equipment manufacturing, the labor marketand the electricity market. The model has two functions. On one hand, it could beused to present to the government’s economic regulatory bodies that such aninvestment is feasible. On the other hand, such a model can be used for the owner todeal with its financial matters such as the variations of the contract with thecontractor. But in any case, technical contents in these studies are very general.
It doesn’t mean that engineers in an owner company do not have to know muchknowledge about the nuclear power plant, but it just seems that knowing somebasics will be enough to fulfill his or her daily tasks. Perhaps the most importantskill for them is to understand the plant’s basic design. In case of profound ordetailed questions, the owner can easily purchase relevant expertise in the market
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from a third party when independent assessment is needed. Hiring EDF fortechnical assistance in the Ling Ao Phase 1 project was an example of this approachof engineering problem-solving, from a commercial perspective.
Unlike the owner, the contractors – such as AREVA NP and Westinghouse –appreciate technology, knowledge, or their design engineers as the most valuableresource. They have to maintain a persistent capability of duplicating theconstruction experience of one nuclear power plant to another site, another countryor another culture. At the same time, in order to adapt to new technologies, such asthe adoption of ICT technologies in plant control, some research and developmentis also needed. Normally, these research and development activities are calledmodifications or improvements on the already established engineering models. Inthis respect, technical innovations in nuclear power projects are achieved in agradual manner. When new technology emerged, such as the digital control system,it is the design engineers in these companies to transplant it into the nuclear powerplant system. In order to accomplish this transplantation, sufficient technical know-hows with scientific know-whys are needed, because the intrinsic safety of anuclear power plant design is based on a confidence of a thorough understanding ofthe object to be added in the system. As a result, from the technological knowledgemaking point of view, the real engineering design is performed by the contractorsbecause knowledge is the commodity that can be sold to the owner.
CGN’s engineering design, in a realistic sense, started in the Ling Ao Phase 2project. From an organizational perspective, CNPEC the newly established legalperson was detached from the owner company. In this respect, CNPEC was pushedto act like a contractor even though people may question the foundation of itsknowledge reserves, especially to compare this newbie to the veterans such asAREVA NP or even CNNC. Largely, the engineering design in the Ling Ao Phase2 project was an authorized duplication of the technical drawings used in the DayaBay and the Ling Ao Phase 1 projects with their later technical modifications. Dueto this duplicative feature, even though the project was accomplished in 2012 withmore than 80% of the major equipment manufactured in China under CGN’s design,and the entire plant’s buildings were designed and constructed by Chineseengineers and workers, it was still not convincing enough to say that CGN –CNPEC specifically – had tapped into the details deep enough for this nuclearpower plant’s engineering design. (CNPEC, 2013) That is to say, that CNPECmight has been put on a position as a contractor but it still takes time for CNPECengineers to learn the essence of engineering design through their later practices.
One example to illustrate this process of transformation from the owner typeddesign to the contractor typed design is obtained from my own observation. As theproject manager of the EPR technology transfer contract, I am given someopportunities to witness the training courses of AREVA experts to CGN design
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engineers as a part of the technology transfer contract’s quality control. Thefollowing story is what I saw in March 2015.
The course was about the design of a safety system (PTR system) related to thespent fuel pool – a water tank to remove the decay heat of the fuel assemblies storedin the spent fuel during normal and accidental conditions. The basic requirement ofthe design of the PTR system is to keep the water level inside the pool relativelystable so that it will never cause an internal flooding inside the nuclear island thatwill impair other devices and the water level shall never drop too low because eventhe partial uncovering of the spent fuel assemblies will cause radioactive releasewhich is in fact a nuclear accident. Therefore, it is not difficult to imagine that thissystem consists of pipes, pumps, valves, detectors and digital control devices. Onemajor task of its design is to find out how many and what types of pipes and pumpsare needed both to discharge water into the pool in case the water level is too lowand to suck water out of the pool in case the water level is too high.
In order to make sure that this system is completely safe, the designers shall takeinto their considerations the situation that the pipes may crack or break for whateverreasons. In that case passive drainage risk (siphoning) may occur which is inducedby the break on the pipe or in other places on the circuit connected to the pool. Ifthat happened in the suction operation of the system, the water level drop would beuncontrollable, in the sense that the water level will drop to the lowest end of thepipe, as it is shown in the following drawing. In order to prevent this situation, asiphon breaker is needed so that in the case of a break, the water level would onlydrop to the position where the pipe is inserted – shown by the dotted line.
Figure 3-1 A Design of the Siphon Breaker
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With some basic knowledge of physics CGN designers certainly understand thereason why a siphon breaker is put on the main pipe but in real life engineeringdesign their tasks remain uncompleted at this level of logical reasoning. They haveto identify the diameter of this siphon breaker which is in fact a small pipe as it isshown in the drawing situated on top of the main larger pipe. In addition to that,they have also to consider the specifications related to the welding of this siphonbreaker to the main pipe. Needless to say, how long it shall stand on top of thewater level and the angles of the curve at its top end should also be determined. Allthese details should be clearly identified so that the manufacturer or installationworkers on site will follow, otherwise, those who implement the design will notknow what to do. These specifications are the knowledge produced in the detaileddesign.
Previously, in the Daya Bay and the Ling Ao Phase 1 project, understanding theprinciples of design such as the recognition of a siphon breaker on the drawingwould fulfill the requirement of a design review task. Because, the owner of theplant only needs to know the completeness of the system, but as somebody whodirects the installation and manufacturing, information as the diameter, the length,and the shape seems to be important because the workers need to visualize what issupposed to be made. In this respect, the major difference between the owner typedengineering design and the contractor type appeared at the level of detailedspecifications. From the Ling Ao Phase 2 engineering design, these details need tobe worked out by CGN designers. This led to one of CGN trainee’s questions to thetrainer from AREVA NP – how to define the specifications of this siphon breaker?
The answer given by the AREVA trainer was a surprise to CGN designers becausehe said that he did not work out the specifications. Later he pointed out that it wasthe pipe manufacturer who completed the detailed design based on their designmanuals in the factory, but in the AREVA tower there was no such manuals andimportantly he was not required to make a detailed drawing at that level. CGNdesigners’ remark to his answer was that in their designs of the CPR1000 units suchdetailed information was needed, and it was what they found strange in AREVA’stechnical files received from the technology transfer contract that no suchinformation was included. CGN engineers worked out this problem by their owncalculations. Even though it was not a difficult problem to solve, they did hope ahandy design manual existed so that they would not spend that time for this tinyproblem on one hand, and would have some references of the correctness of theirdesigns on the other hand. Then a request for transferring this design manual wasraised by one of the trainees but it was rejected from the trainer because he wascertain that this information belonged to the intellectual property right of AREVA’ssub-supplier. Therefore it should be out of the scope of the technology transferbetween AREVA NP and CGN.
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After this short discussion, a more interesting question was raised about how tochoose the material – the stainless steel – used on this siphon breaker. The trainerclaimed that it should be the same as the main pipe which should have been testedto work properly under such conditions – radioactive and under water. He wascertain that studying the physical properties of metal materials was not his scope ofwork, if CGN engineers were interested in these topics, they might need to traceback to the research and development documents of the piping manufactures. Thetrainer understood that the trainees might think about possible improvements, suchas prolonging the duration of this small piece of equipment but he really did notknow that much. Perhaps all of them in the classroom realized that such a profoundquestion which seemed to be important and interesting was not a proper question inengineering design. However, it could be a proper question in terms of research anddevelopment. None of them kept a focus on that question, but at the same time noneof them would admit that such a question was not relevant. In this respect, thedemarcation of design and R&D seems to be quite blurry.
This example can be used to explain many aspects of CGN’s engineering designpractices, not just some comments on the technology transfer, even though itillustrates why CGN engineers always think that the technology transfer betweenAREVA NP and CGN is not sufficient or complete enough. According to this story,one reason for this feeling as if AREVA has been hiding something, is that someengineering design tasks in CGN are ascribed to manufacturing activities as theyare defined in AREVA NP. There might be some cultural reasons for this differenceof habits but in general, I tend to think that technology transfer is not purelytechnical. As I can summarize from the implementation of the contracts, technologytransfer resembles a communication process in which experience is transplantedfrom one organization to another.
Relating this small case to the entire engineering design of a nuclear power plant,the meaning of Paul and Beitz’s systematic design approach and its well-recognizedphased design procedures becomes clear in this engineering company. According toPaul and Beitz conceptual design refers to an array of human mind activities,namely, abstracting to find the essential problems, establishing function structures,searching for working principles, combining working principles into workingstructures, selecting a suitable working structure and firming it up into a principlesolution – a concept. (Paul and Beitz, 2007) In CGN’s engineering design practices,conceptual design refers to the clarification of the major technical specificationsand functional requirements of a nuclear power plant. These specifications andfunctional requirements include nuclear power plant’s capacity, general layout,
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safety parameters, life span, etc. such as the technical descriptions of the HL1000nuclear power plant 15on CGN’s official website.
These specifications serve as common goals of the owner of a nuclear power plantand its construction contractors. They are also guarantees – on a hypothetical basis– of ensuring nuclear safety. Together, these hypothesis and the limits shaped thetechnology that distinguish a typical type of nuclear power plant to another. Withthe data and brief illustrations, it is difficult to imagine what the nuclear powerplant will be looked like even for the nuclear power professionals. It is alsoextremely difficult for the general public to set up a correlation between theconcepts and nuclear safety. But they are sufficient to construct a set of criterionsby which the quality of engineers’ work can be measured.
Making the concepts visible on paper or computer screens is the work ofengineering designers who perform the basic design or embodiment design. In CGNthese engineers are called system designers. In this phase, designers start from theselected concepts to produce a definitive layout of the proposed technical product orsystem in accordance with some technical and economic standards or limitations.The result of CGN’s basic design for a nuclear power plant can be demonstrated bythe following graphics.
15 HL1000 Technical Specifications:
•Reactor core with 177 advanced fuel assemblies (STEP-12)
•Three trains (100%) of physically separated engineered safeguard systems
•Single reactor layout
•Molten corium in-vessel retention (IVR) - passive reactor pit injection system
•Secondary side passive residual heat removal system
•Core damage frequency < 1×10-6 /reactor year
•Large release frequency < 1×10-7 /reactor year
•Core thermal safety margin > 15%
•Design basis seismic class up to 0.3g
•Double containment capable of withstanding the impact of a large commercial airplane
•Comprehensive severe accident prevention and mitigation measures
•FirmSys, a proprietary nuclear-classed DCS system platform
•Leak-before-break technology
•Radioactive waste management system meeting waste minimization requirements
•Eliminating the possibility of large radioactive release in design
•60 years of design life
•Plant availability up to 90%
•Localization ratio: 85% for-rst unit, 95 % for mass construction
(CGN Website2, Accessed, April 13, 2015)
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Figure 3-2 HL1000 General Layout
Figure 3-2 is the general layout of a HL1000 power plant. The major function ofthis graphic is to express a visionary model of a nuclear power plant at itscompletion. In this computerized graphic, it is much easier to identify where thenuclear island locates and where the turbine generation is supposed to be installed.In this respect, it is a demarcation of the physical units of the entire system bygraphical expression. Together with Figure 3-3 listed below the complete flow of acontrolled nuclear fission reaction for the purpose of electricity production can bedemonstrated.
Figure 3-3 HL1000 nuclear power plant’s profile model
Figure 3-3 is a 3D demonstration of the water and steam circulation of a HL1000nuclear power plant, with the blue pipe representing water and the yellow pipe
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representing steam flow. Equipment and the main internal structure of the buildingare expressed in this model. Such a model is largely used to express thecompleteness of the nuclear power system. Even though digital control logics arenot expressed in this model, with some engineering knowledge such logics are notdifficult to be represented in the minds of those specialized engineers.
Model building is the essence of nuclear power plant’s basic design. With thismodel, the contractor will be able to provide a more convincing guarantee to theinvestor the foreseeable success of its construction. The investor will use this tomodel to conceive its project management and deal with its licensing process.
However, at this stage the connections between engineering design and itssubsequent equipment manufacturing and building construction activities are stillnot completely apparent. For example, the sizing of equipment is not determined,and the methods of building constructions are not defined. All these details are leftto the detailed design of the nuclear power plant, and in CGN, they are the tasks ofthe equipment designers and civil work designers. These detailed designers have toforesee what is going to happen in the manufacturing factories and on theconstruction sites, so that their graphics and documents can be realized intodifferent types of machines, be it a tank or a heat exchanger, or different types ofbuilding structures be it a concrete dome, or a steel structure. The example of thedesign for a siphon breaker given above is an illustration of the knowledge used inthe detailed design.
Paul and Beitz’s (2007) engineering design methodology derived from theirobservation of machine making activities. In some respects, they did not distinguishR&D activities from normal engineering design activities such as the designs basedon duplications of already established models. In their book, a typical sequence ofengineering design starts from the generation of concepts and ends with thefurnishing of details. Regarding to CGN, it might be proper to say that thiscompany spent about 30 years to establish this complete chain of engineeringdesign.
At the beginning, with the aid of a technology transfer contract, the conceptual andbasic designs for the Daya Bay and the Ling Ao Phase 1 project were just a reviewof the French M310 units’ designs. Taking into the consideration of the contents ofknowledge – details of information – such duplications were sufficient for CGN’sto act like an owner. However, when CGN transformed from an owner to acontractor, detailed design seems to be the missing chapter in the technologytransfer. Therefore, CGN has to rely on its own engineers to fill this knowledge gap.
CGN learns to perform nuclear power plant engineering design from different typesof projects and it is due to the different roles that CGN has played in these projectsthat the company shaped its own understanding of engineering design. This
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understanding, from a knowledge making point of view derived from the differenttopics of questions emerged in the projects. The following chart may illustrate thistransformation.
Table 3-1 Differences between CGN as the owner and the contractor
Topics of
Questions
CGN as an Owner CGN as a Contractor
 Contractual
obligations
 How to issue bidding
documents?
 How to get construction
permissions?
 How to respond to the
owner’s
requirements?
 How to work with
manufacturers and
construction workers?
 Limitations
and
restrictions
 Laws and governmental
regulations
 Technical standards
and codes
 Problem-
solving
approaches
 Technical problems can
be broken down and
solutions can be found in
the market
 Functions can be
achieved by proper
physical structures
 Verification
of solutions
 Independent third party
can be hired to ensure
fairness and impartiality
 System functions can
be verified by tests
 Quality can be
justified by quality
control and quality
assurance systems
In this thesis, I tend to regard Paul and Beitz’s three-phased engineering design as awidely accepted description of engineering design in the sense that suchengineering activities as reviewing the basic design performed by AREVA NP, theduplication of drawings and perhaps the translation of documents can be counted asengineering design activities, because each of them can be traced, more or less, inPaul and Beitz’s descriptions about the real life design process. In addition, theseactivities are also performed by engineers in AREVA where the systematic designapproach is adopted.
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What I indicate in this chapter is that these types of designs all exist in CGNdepending on the role CGN plays in the project. Perhaps this co-existence is both anadvantage and a disadvantage for engineers working in such an organization.
3.3. A CULTURAL INTERPRETATION OF CGN’S ENGINEERINGDESIGN SYSTEM
In the last a few pages of Engineering Design - A Systematic Approach the ThirdEdition, the editors of the book presented some positive comments about theadoption of this design approach in industry. They wrote:
Industrial companies applying a systematic approach state:• The number of patents, in particular defensive patents, has increased.• The overall duration of development projects is shorter, despite longerconceptual design phases.• The probability of finding good solutions is greater.• It is easier to manage the increasing complexity of problems andproducts.• Creativity increases while maintaining realistic deadlines.• A transfer effect is noticeable, that is, staff work more systematicallyin other areas.The following side effects are observed:• information flow improves• teamwork and motivation benefit• communication with clients increases(Paul and Beitz, 2007, p. 583)
These positive comments on the systematic approach reflect a good compatibility ofthis approach with industrial production. As it is written, this approach enhancesefficiency of problem-solving inside a company and its side effects help engineersto meet clients’ demands. In addition to the scientific reasons for these results, Itend to think that such compatibility derives from some cultural reasons.
Regarding to CGN, the most evident advantage of the systematic design approach isthat it complies with the scientific thinking which permeates in engineeringpractices. First, the approach is constructed on the presumption that difficultproblems can be broken down to less complicated tasks. The second presumption isthat sufficient answers to engineering problems refer to detailed information. Thecombination of these presumptions leads to a conclusion that no matter howdifficult a problem – a hypothesis or a tentative answer – is, it can be realized by asystematic broken down of the problem into smaller problems and its sufficientanswers can be achieved by finding out enough relevant details. It seems to me thatthese engineering habits are nurtured both in engineering education and inprofessional practices. Therefore, when AREVA introduced this approach to CGN,
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our engineers accepted it without substantial difficulties because they found such atheoretical framework highly relevant to their life experiences.
Another reason for the preference over the systematic approach of engineeringdesign in this company is the hubris reflected by CGN’s engineers’ attitude in thesense that with this approach which predicts a solution to any problem, engineersgain confidence of a project’s completion to avoid a sense of frustration at thebeginning of their work. That is to say, at the beginning of a project, engineers tendto believe that their work will succeed in the end. From the commercial perspective,such a confidence caters to the demands of the investors. In this respect, it explainswhy engineers always emphasize that their engineering goals and solutions arepractical – achievable – at least in CGN.
CGN’s engineering design organization – in terms of its structure – is highlyinfluenced by this mindset. Together with the theoretical guidelines provided byPaul and Beitz, it can be clearly identified that the division of labor in CGN’sengineering design institute (CNPDC) takes both the sequential and disciplinaryfeatures into consideration. The chart representing CNPDC’s organizationalstructure can be illustrated as the following:
Figure 3-4 CNPDC’s organizational structure
The general design division in CNPDC takes the responsibility of the conceptualdesign for a nuclear power plant. The engineers in this division serve as consultantsto the owner. They perform economic feasibility studies, issue operationalregulations, and most importantly gather information from already built nuclearpower plants to create new concepts of CGN’s future plants.
The basic design of CGN’s nuclear power plants is done in the system designdivision. As it has been illustrated in the previous section, concepts are transformedinto flow charts and engineering models through calculations and graphicaldemonstrations.
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The civil work, main equipment, digital control, and even the conventional island –mainly the turbine generator – design divisions are considered as the detailed designdivisions in CNPDC. Each of them focuses on pieces of equipment, or singlebuildings. They build the system out of proper physical structures.
The reactor engineering and safety analysis design division seems to be differentfrom all other divisions. The reactor pressure vessel’s mechanical design isperformed by the main equipment design division but in such a detailed design thedesigners might not question the scientific know-whys related to nuclear safety. Forthe mechanical designers, the reactor is just a pressurized vessel, and what they dois to make the vessel sturdy and durable. What makes the nuclear power mechanicalengineers different from their peers in other industries is that they have to considerthe making of a machine in a highly radioactive environment. The physical andchemical reactions inside this vessel are out of the concern of the mechanical designengineers. It is the task of the reactor engineering designers to work outmathematical models of these reactions. With these models the reactor engineeringdesigners will be able to justify the intrinsic safety of the entire nuclear power plant.Therefore, the products of this reactor engineering and safety analysis designdivision consist of computer codes in which the scientific language of nuclearphysics is translated into engineering languages, and some verbal illustrations – thesafety analysis reports. The preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) will be usedfor the application of construction license by the owner, and the final safety analysisreport (FSAR) will be used for the application of the license of operation. In thisrespect, this design division provides scientific verifications to the otherengineering disciplines in CNPDC. Perhaps it is due to the scientific nature of itstasks, this engineering design division is shared both by CNPDC and CNPRI –CGN’s R&D subsidiary.
With this organization structure, the information flow inside CNPDC is not difficultto be deduced. The general design division provides the initial input, and then thesystem designers translate the general technical functions and economicrequirements into achievable smaller disciplinary goals. What followed this systemconstruction phase is some parallel similar sub-system construction work untilenough information or knowledge is produced to the details of each piece ofequipment and each level and unit of the buildings.
The so-called interfaces of engineering design derive from the division of laborwithin this design organization. In this respect, two types of interfaces exist in CGN.From a top-down perspective, there exists a necessity to set up a mechanism ofinformation exchange between different phases of engineering design, such as thepassing down of the conceptual design results to the basic design and theinformation exchange between the system designers and detailed designers. From ahorizontal perspective, information exchange also exists among differentengineering disciplines, such as the equipment designer with the civil work designer,
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the electronic designer with the digital control designer. The bottom-up mode ofinformation exchange is also common in CGN’s engineering designs especiallywhen discrepancies appear in site construction and manufacturing activities. Oftenthese discrepancies lead to the modifications or variations of engineering design,but it is understandable that the greater the scale of modifications need to be donethe greater the difficulty they will pass up to the upper level. For example, a changein a pump will not lead to the change of the basic design and not to say theconceptual design. In fact, the conceptual design may never change once it has beendecided by a group of experts.
From the information exchange perspective, engineering design management inCGN can be regarded as a control of information, both its flows and its timeliness.Sufficiency of information is often a topic of concern among different engineeringdisciplines – the interfaces. In order to resolve these tensions, CGN forms anengineering design management division in CNPDC. This design managementdivision consists of several project management offices each hires somecoordinators. Unlike the design engineers who might participate in several nuclearpower plant projects, the coordinators are positioned in one particular project. Theymonitor the progress of design, and they channel information exchanges betweenthe divisions in one project. Another function of the design management projectoffice is that it serves as the interface between engineering design and the otherengineering activities included in the construction process such as procurement andinstallation.
In order to pin-point a design engineer’s function or position in CGN’s engineeringdesign system two indicators are needed, with one delineates his or her disciplinaryfeature, and the other points out his or her project attachment – e.g. Mr. X is thesystem designer for CGN’s Taishan Project. It might be proper to pose a culturalimage on CGN’s engineering designers as information processing machines,because on one hand, their daily work can be regarded as receiving inputs andproducing outputs, on the other hand they also have to transfer information to theirupper-level engineers when they find a problem that they cannot solve, and to theirpeers when they are certain that the problem is out of the scope of theirresponsibilities.
Two series of management on every single designer are evident. The divisiondecides which project they are appointed to, specifically on the issues like whetherthey should be dispatched on-site, and their promotions to a higher professionalhierarchy which normally indicates their competencies of solving complicatedproblems. The higher the ranking an engineer reaches, the greater the power he orshe might possess in technical decision making and also the more junior engineersworking under his or her supervision. The project line of management evaluates theresults of their work and translates these assessments into economic terms.Financial rewards will be given to those who accomplish their tasks in a timely
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
101
manner with accepted quality. That is to say the more projects a designerparticipates in, the higher income the designer may expect. The principles ofscientific management are realized in CGN as such. That is the reason why in theprevious chapters of this thesis, I categorize the systematic design as a scientificapproach of managing engineering design which is indicated by the economicmeaning of engineering. In this respect, the systematic design in CGN is based onan analogy of knowledge production to the mass production of goods.
In fact, the power distribution in CGN’s engineering design system is not balanced.It is quite obvious that the division’s – administrative – power is more influentialthan the project’s. This uneven distribution of power might derive from the Chinesetraditional habits of attaching science and technology to power. But taking someeconomic concerns into consideration, such a structure seems to be understandablebecause projects have their lifecycles. Therefore they cannot guarantee a lifelongemployment of any engineers. Since a lifelong employment is certainly moreappreciated, engineers are more willingly to follow the instructions of the divisioninstead of the short-term project. This is a reason why cross disciplinary job-hopping is so rare in CGN, and perhaps it increases the difficulties in cross-disciplinary problem-solving. It also indicates a comparative advantage of someseemingly important divisions such as the system design division and the reactorengineering division because engineers in these divisions are closer to the criticaland comprehensive knowledge of a nuclear power plant while others seem to haveless opportunity to get access to that knowledge. In such a circumstance, in order tohave a relatively better career development, mechanical engineers, electronicengineers, and others choose to become more specialized in their already narroweddisciplines.
3.4. SOME IMPLICATIONS
Through the history of CGN, I illustrate how Chinese traditions influence theshaping of CGN’s engineering designs but it seems to me, that such influences aremore obviously reflected by the organization in terms of its management styles.Direct links of the culture to the individual engineers are not as evident as they areexemplified by the organization. From my observation, CGN is developing in arelatively isolated arena in society where the outside seems irrelevant to CGN’sengineers. If it is the case, are Paul and Beitz wrong? They indicate that at least inthe conceptual design of a technical artifact, communications between engineersand their clients are quite necessary. Regarding to nuclear power engineering inChina, especially to CGN, the conceptual design seems to have other origins. Oneorigin may be the habit of learning from West; the other seems to be CGN’sambition – its own intention. No matter what the origin is, it is not originated fromCGN engineers’ communication with the society in a broader sense.
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If the communications of engineers with the society do not exist in CGN, how can Istudy the dynamics of engineers with the culture? At this point, I need to insertanother presumption that such communications exist but they are distorted. Thisdistortion can be explained by the following aspects.
One possible explanation of the distortion is that CGN engineers hold a separatedview of nuclear power, regarding it purely as a technology. Therefore, thegeneration of concepts in engineering design derives from a pursuit of technologicalimprovements. Efficiency becomes the keyword. Such a tendency can also be foundin the minor modifications in the detailed designs. That is to say, CGN engineerstend to develop their ideal nuclear power plant which they consider to be advanced.As a consequence, technological advancements are translated as better solutions tothe problems appeared in the society. In this respect, engineer’s communicationwith the society, in CGN engineers’ interpretations, equals to a publicunderstanding of their advanced inventions.
From a commercial perspective, like many novel technological products such as thenew mobile phone, nuclear power plant also requires market promotions. However,compared to those products, the advertisement of nuclear power is achieved by apersuasion of the general public to accept this technology by assuring its intrinsicsafety in high-tech exhibitions or by carrying out public opinion surveys instead ofinvesting a lot of money on TV or Internet commercials. In this respect, the aim ofsuch advertisement is to educate normal people that the risk of radioactive releasecan be effectively controlled. The reverse direction in the communication – learningfrom the people – is considered as unnecessary or troublesome.
Considering the fact that in China, the ultimate client of nuclear power plants is thegovernment, such distorted public communication is utilized as evidences of publicacceptance which can be submitted to the authorities in the licensing process of anuclear power plant’s construction and operation. When scientific decision makingbecomes the standard procedure for industrial development plans, CGN’s publiccommunication is rendered in a social science fashion.
Studying the relationship between nuclear power and the society with the socialscience paradigm has two advantages for CGN. On one hand, numericalexpressions seem to be more convincing and understandable for CGN engineers toknow the images of nuclear power and perhaps its social status in the society. Onthe other hand, since engineers are quite familiar with the manipulation of data,social science can be appropriated as means to channel public opinions. At least, itwill be more effective to get governmental permissions on certain developmentplans with scientific reports which show facts in numbers.
Such an appropriation of social science for the purpose of business interests isadopted by CGN. However, it seems to me that the utilization of the surveying
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methods has not been professional enough. In November 2014, a survey and avideotaped interview with university students were carried out by CGN’s publicrelation department in Guangzhou – the capital city of Guangdong Province wherehigher education institutions are concentrated.
In this survey, interviewees were first asked about their images on a nuclear powerplant by an analogy of this technical artifact to an animal.
Figure 3-5 Screenshot of the videotaped interview by CGN
In this screenshot the respondent replied that the nuclear power plant wassomething like a lion which represented both strength and danger to human. Otherreplies of this question included crocodile, tiger, horse, dog, and dinosaur. To someextent, the answers from the university students reflected diversified culturalimages on nuclear power in China. They indicated both positive and negativecomments of this technology among Chinese university students. Through theseanswers, some traces of the Chinese traditional assessments of science andtechnology, such as its threats to human life, can be revealed.
In the questionnaire survey, some carefully designed questions were asked. Forexample one question asked: “if nuclear power developments are based onsufficient public communications, such as public participation in operationmonitoring and environmental impact consultation, will you accept the applicationof this technology in more locations in China?” The result was that more than 70%of the interviewees provided positive answers.
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With this figure is it sufficient to reach to the conclusion that the majority of theChinese people, at least the well-educated people, support the development ofnuclear power? I am doubtful to that definitive conclusion. My confusions derivefrom some of my interpretations of the background information gathered in thissurvey with its final results and claims.
First, more than 70% of the interviewees’ hometowns are currently nuclear powerfree and there is no nuclear power development plans announced or no plant hasbeen built in the places from where they come from. Is it to say that at the time ofthe survey, nuclear power was an irrelevant topic for those respondents?
Second, along with the survey, a simple test of the basic scientific knowledge ofthis technology was carried out to both the science and technology streamedstudents and liberal arts streamed students. The result showed that more than 60%of the attendants scored lower than 6 out of the full score of 10. This result in theChinese educational grading system equals to failure. With this result, CGNconcluded that a lack of scientific understandings to nuclear power technology wasevident among Chinese university students in general. “Lacking scientificknowledge” is often the comment that some nuclear power experts give to thesociologists and humanists who oppose this technology. In this survey, the ironywas that CGN wanted to use the finding that 70% of the university studentssupported nuclear power development to legitimate its business ambitions butevidences showed that these respondents were also scientifically not qualified.
CGN realized this irony. Therefore, the report of this research was written with atitle saying that 70% percent of the Chinese university students support nuclearpower development. However, looking into its content, it can be found that theconclusion has been made to claim to the government that the popularization ofnuclear power related scientific knowledge is important. The reason for thisinconsistency of the title and its conclusion, as I can explain, is that the intention ofthe title is to strengthen a confidence in CGN engineers who devote their careers tothe development to this controversial technology. While the conclusion as it waswritten in the report might be the only way to get CGN out of this irony. Because,as a company whose survival depends on scientific disciplines which indicatehonesty as a part of its social responsibilities, it cannot fabricate data. Otherwise, itis highly likely that its public image will be destroyed. The only thing that CGN cando is perhaps to hope for some new data. For that purpose, CGN needs to put someeffort in changing the society from which the data generates. Needless to say, it isnot easy.
Something that I have learned from this case is that social scientists have beenemployed to serve for commercial interests in this company. In order to complywith the system, or to get acknowledgement from the engineering colleagues, socialscientists have to act like engineers. However, the object of their studies or perhaps
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designs is different from that of engineers. This difference leads to the irony thathas emerged. Perhaps the most challenging job for the social scientists in thiscompany is to eliminate this irony.
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CHAPTER 4. ATTEMPTS OFIMPROVING ENGINEERING DESIGNINSIDE THE SYSTEM
4.1. A PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION
It is not the theme of this PhD thesis to study the topic of improving engineeringdesign from a perspective of technological innovations. As far as I am concerned,technology innovation serves as one end of improving engineering design, but it iscertainly not the only goal that improving engineering design shall be base on.From a retrospective, the quantitative methods mentioned in this chapter is not theresearch methodology applied in my PhD research. In this respect, it seems notnecessary to present the results of both the company and the self-motivated researchactivities in details. But this experience has a lot of meanings. On one hand, itshows to the reader how a company policy research is performed in CGN and howthe habits, tacit norms and rules, and the organizational culture shape the fashion ofthis kind of researches. On the other hand, it depicts CGN engineers’understandings and approaches of how to improve their work. Thirdly, it is quiteevidently reflected from this experience what kind of changes the company wants tobring about.
It is shown in this chapter that finding what needs to be improved is a social process.The interpretation about the research findings is also a social process. Perhaps, allthese activities can be regarded as attempts to change the organizational culture.What seems to be convincing is that changing the culture is not easy in thisorganization because in a company where uniformity overwhelms diversity,conflicts of opinions are often resolved by compromise. My participant observationreveals the resolution of these conflicts and it is a supplement to my main researchfor this PhD project.
4.2. FROM A SELF-MOTIVATED RESEARCH TO A COMPANYPROJECT
In 2013, a few months after the initial literature study, I carried out a questionnairesurvey and some interviews with CGN engineers and managers to get some generalunderstanding of how they think about improving engineering design. At that time,these research activities were completely self-motivated with an intention of usingthese researches as the preliminary research of this PhD study. The choice of thequantitative research methodology for an understanding of what are the constituting
A BOOK OF CHANGES IN ENGINEERING
108
elements of engineering design capacity – Multidimensional Scaling (MDS)16–derived from my feeling that even though I was working for the Taishan project, Istill found my contacts with our design engineers limited. Due to the over-specialized division of labor in CGN, and the geographical separations of theoffices among different departments, it was very difficult for me to get access to thegeneral perception of engineering design in a short period of time. In addition, Ifound it not convincing to build my entire research about this technical question17on some limited number of qualitative interviews. As an engineering student, Itended to use questionnaire surveys to cope with all these difficulties.
Another part of the self-motivated study was an evaluation of the identifiedapproaches of improving engineering design by a binomial test18 which ChristopherFreeman (1974) used to evaluate successful technical innovations in the 1970s. Thebasic presumption of the choice of this methodology was to avoid personalprejudice, such as some engineers thought that receiving technical training was awaste of time in their personal improvements of their design skills while othersconsidered it to be vitally important. Statistics might be a tool that I could use toeliminate personal preferences.
Some major records, calculations and results of these researches are attached in theAppendix A of this thesis. As a summary, I tried to carry out a quantitative researchwith an intention to manifest the relationship between some personal features andthe result of engineering design. From a retrospective, these researches wererunning too far ahead before I finally shaped the research themes of this PhD thesis.In the data processing of these researches, another problem was identified. Iintentionally made the number of participants to the minimum possible level. Since
16 MDS: MDS is one of several visualization methods now widely used in all the sciences-methods that look for patterns in numerical data and display those patters graphically. You’llsee multidimensional scaling called smallest-space analysis. That’s because MDS programswork out the best spatial representation of a set of objects that are represented by a set ofsimilarities. (Bernard, 2011, p. 352)
17 At that time, my focus was engineering design capacity building which seemed to be atechnical problem.
18 In statistics, the binomial test is an exact test of the statistical significance of deviationsfrom a theoretically expected distribution of observations into two categories. One commonuse of the binomial test is in the case where the null hypothesis is that two categories areequally likely to occur (such as a coin toss). Tables are widely available to give thesignificance observed numbers of observations in the categories for this case. However, asthe example below shows, the binomial test is not restricted to this case. (Howell, 2007) Thismethod is used to distinguish which approach of improving engineering design is moreeffective perceived by the respondents.
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these participants were all voluntary there was no mandatory requirement on howserious they should respond to my surveys and behave in the interviews. When thequestionnaire sheets were returned to me, I found many of them were treatedcarelessly. For example, some respondents marked all of the identified approachesof improving engineering design effective. It did not mean that they should not doso, but it at least reflected that they did not take the questionnaires seriously. As aconsequence, it made my already limited sources of data even more scares.However, these researches enhanced my understandings of engineering design inCGN.
I consulted this problem with a serious participant Mr. F who later became one ofmy partners in the company project of improving engineering design. One reasonfor this was that since all the participants knew that their involvement wascompletely irrelevant to any company schemes or projects, they treated suchparticipations as a waste of time. No substantial influence to the company could begenerated from these voluntary projects. Therefore, I began to think ofincorporating my PhD study into some company projects, but at that time I did notsee any apparent opportunity that the company would support this attempt.
In 2013 the influence of the Fukushima accident was still vivid, but CGN was busyconstructing its already started CPR1000 plants. Engineering designers were full-loaded with project tasks and, importantly, the company did not think it necessaryto make any changes to its engineering design because at that time the establishedengineering design habits and system were sufficient to support its business at hand,and it was expected that new projects would not be approved in the near future. Thedevelopment of the Chinese Gen-3 nuclear power plants was not in the company’sagenda at that moment.
In the middle of 2014 nuclear power development appeared to warm up again. Theeconomists reiterated that nuclear power was the solution to the environmentalproblems at the lowest cost without compromising China’s economic growth.Regarding to CGN, restarting the national nuclear power construction plan was anopportunity to solve its own problems. One by one, the CPR1000 projects reachedto their testing and commissioning phases. Therefore, CGN designers’ workloaddropped dramatically. If this situation continued, CNPEC and CNPDC engineerswould have no work to do. In this circumstance, CNPEC tapped into some non-nuclear power businesses, such as some solar power plant projects and someengineering consultancy services to the Chinese railroad construction projects. Butin terms of business value, none of these smaller businesses was enough to maintaina stable income for the company’s employees. On one hand, CGN was eager fornew nuclear power projects of whatever kind both domestic and overseas. On theother hand, there was no evidence indicating that the central government was goingto compromise its mandatory requirements for the utilization of Gen-3 nuclearpower technology for future nuclear power constructions in China. The AP1000
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technology is not in the hands of CGN, and the power capacity of the EPR unit19 istoo high for those economically less developed provinces. All these factors pushedCGN to make some changes, especially to its engineering design, in order to bealive in the market.
The company decided to start a reform to reshape its engineering design. Accordingto the official interpretation, the aim of this reform concerning engineering design isto transform the contractor-typed design based on authorized duplications to anengineering design that starts from R&D activities.
An internal newsletter was issued asking for employees’ proposals to direct thisreform. In addition, employees were encouraged to form research groups and handin project applications. All accepted applications would be granted some companyfunding and importantly such projects were all listed in the yearly companyresearch scheme.
I found it a great opportunity to incorporate my PhD research into this companyprogram. I persuaded some engineers to form a research team to meet therequirements of application. I thought it would solve the problems appeared in 2013.The team consisted of 6 members. Beside me, Mr. F a CGN commercial engineer,Mr. W a CGN project manager, Mr. G a system designer, Mrs. S a civil workdesigner, and Mr. L a main equipment designer were the team member. Since all ofus knew each other in the Taishan Project, we decided not to appoint a team leader.Compared to the designers and the project manager, Mr. F and I seemed to be lessbusy and were based in Daya Bay – where CNPEC’s headquarter locates. We werechosen to be the coordinators. In fact the members were all well-chosen because Iintended to mix different perceptions of engineering design. On top of that, they arethe people that I think resourceful, active and responsible from my observations.
In the first meeting of our team held in Daya Bay, I proposed that our research forthe company should take the social concerns about nuclear power and other types ofenergy technologies into consideration in the sense that even the traditional schoolsof engineering design depicts a design starting from the shaping of a concept whichis an engineering interpretation of certain social concerns and demands. I thought inthe future, CGN was going to perform a regular engineering design which shouldnot be a copy and perhaps the company might participate in more non-nuclearpower projects. Based on the perception that the company needs to go back to theoriginal meanings of engineering design so that it will be prepared for futurechanges, I thought my proposal would attract attention. However, I did not insist onmy proposal, because I knew that we must work out a topic that would attract the
19 The EPR Unit capacity is designed to be 1700 MWh, 1.7 times of the CPR1000 andAP1000.
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attention of our higher management otherwise the project would never be granted.Pure academic interests would not help us in getting research funding from thecompany. It was not a surprise that our team members vetoed my proposal, due tothe fact that we all found such a topic to be too far away from our engineers’ self-recognitions as nuclear power engineers. We needed a more practical topic.
In the middle of the meeting there were two proposals which we thoughtappropriate: first, a study on the process of engineering design, and second, a studyof the relationships among engineering design and CNPEC’s other engineeringactivities, such as procurement, construction management and commissioning. Thefirst topic derived from a consideration that the engineering design process at thattime had a lot of problems that reduced its efficiency. On top of that, it was believedthat the optimization of the process would consequently lead to the improvement ofthe quality of our design products such as the correctness of drawings. The secondtopic originated from a speech given by one of our top leaders saying thatengineering design should no longer be just one phase of a nuclear power plantconstruction project rather it should be the leading work of all the engineeringactivities. In this respect, it might be worthy of our effort to study how this leadingstatus means to CNPDC, and to the other departments in CNPEC.
Personally, I supported the second topic, because at least it could contain someaspects of the social dynamics of engineering design with other engineeringpractices. But some of the group members opposed this proposal because such astudy would include too many interfaces that all of us wanted to avoid.
Mr. W did not agree with the first topic because the refinement of the engineeringdesign process in CGN’s project management experience had long been a criticaljob of the quality assurance engineers. Tapping into this topic, meant that weintruded into another established discipline. Mr. W’s understanding of thecompany’s call for proposals was that the company wanted to ask for possibledirections of changes not a repetition of other’s work with another method. In fact,Mr. W vetoed all the two proposals that we had at hand. Because, the hiddenmeaning of his opinions was that we should not criticize other’s work in the nameof research especially in those field where routines had been established. A safestrategy was to criticize our own work, as he implied.
Finally, we abandoned all of the initial proposals and turned to think of somethingthat featured engineering design. The company launched its knowledgemanagement system in February 2014 and decided to use this new system tosystematize CGN’s engineering knowledge gained from its CPR1000 constructionexperiences on one hand, and to foster technological innovations inside thecompany on the other hand. But at that time, the computer-based system was notcompleted yet. Only a framework had been built. A large proportion of its contentneeded to be filled in. Since engineering design is considered as a form of
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knowledge production in CGN, this knowledge management system became thetopic of our focus. Mr. F mentioned that the knowledge management system washeaded by the science and technology management department of CNPEC.Considering Mr. W’s implication, we needed to consult that department to makesure. Otherwise, as Mr. F later mentioned, it would generate a misunderstandingthat we intended to criticize their work rather to help them. Importantly, we alsoknew that our potential research funding was administered by that department.
After this first team meeting, Mr. F and I made an appointment with the head of thescience and technology management department. In our informal meeting, weexplained our intentions to him and we asked for advice. The head of thedepartment acknowledged our ideas, and he even admitted that the system wasalmost empty at that time. Therefore, he directly asked us to help his departmentwith the knowledge management system. Specifically, two tasks were assigned:first to categorize the knowledge in CNPDC and second, to show him how thissystem could be used to generate more technological innovations.
We organized the second team meeting to make our research proposals in one ofCNPDC’s meeting room about 30 kilometers away from Daya Bay. In this meeting,we worked out our proposal without a time consuming discussion, because we hadclear tasks, and we realized that the methods used in my self-motivated researchescan be directly appropriated in this research. The substantial work for us to do wasto perform some questionnaire surveys. Data processing for us was not a problem.With company supports, we were almost certain that the respondents wouldcooperate seriously.
However, there were still some modifications in this company research project tothe self-motivated project. First, instead of asking what are the skills needed andpersonal characteristics represented in engineering design, the respondents wereasked what is the knowledge used and what is produced in their work. After thisidentification procedure, a pile-sorting program20 can be run so that the itemsidentified can be categorized by a computer automatically. This would produce alist of knowledge items covering all engineering design disciplines and divisions inCNPDC. The two dimensional MDS map was abandoned in this research becausewe expected that the managers of CNPEC prefer definitive results rather thanrelative relations. The second modification was in fact a change to both the secondtask assigned by the head of the department and the initial self-motivated research.Instead of studying what are the most effective approaches of fostering innovations,we studied what knowledge is considered to be more innovative.
20 A computer program mentioned in Bernard’s (2011) book used to perform grouping ofsimilar concepts. In the research project knowledge is considered as a concept rather than aphysical document.
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The second modification derived from two considerations. On one hand, innovationrefers both to engineering practices and knowledge. (Sharif et al., 2012) That is tosay that we need to know what is considered to be innovations in CGN. From thebinominal test, it was expected that not only we would know what would beregarded as innovations in CGN, but also we could identify what kind ofinnovations were more appreciated. Due to the fact that the knowledge managementsystem had been installed, provided that we could work out a mechanism toevaluate innovations in CGN in terms of their perceived significance, it is mucheasier for us to propose to the science and technology management department toadd one module in that system. On the other hand, we tended to think thatencouraging innovative practices required a rewarding mechanism inside thecompany. But that was the topic that we did not want to be involved in because itwould bring in one more interface into our research – the financial department.Nevertheless, with an evaluation of the significance of innovations, we thought, theanswers to how to encourage them – especially some financial rewarding towardthese attempts – were not so difficult to work out.
As we wrote in the research application document, the research was designed intothree phases – a preparation phase, a data collection phase, and the last reviewingand report writing phase. The split of tasks, the making of a time schedule and theassignment of tasks within the team members, were done as a routine for all of usbecause we were accustomed to CGN’s habits on such matters. The three designerswere responsible for preparing questionnaire sheets and collecting data and thethree CNPEC engineers, including me, were responsible for the report writing andother associated matters. It was originally planned that the research project wouldlast for one year till the mid of 2015. But later, some force majeure compelled us tocomplete our research project by the end of 2014.
Our research application was accepted by the general manager’s office. Includingour team, there were all together 14 research teams chosen from more than onehundred applications. Other research topics about the company reform included, astudy of CGN’s future information management system in the big data era, a marketoriented study on CNPDC’s potentials of non-nuclear engineering projects, and ahuman resource study on the encouragement of young engineers careerdevelopment, just to name a few. Till October 2014, the reform studies wererunning in the mode as it was planned in the official announcement. Each month ameeting was held by the general manager’s office. Representatives from each of theresearch teams attended the meetings to report to the deputy general manager ofCNPEC in charge of this reform study program their progresses and difficulties.According to the general manager’s office, the purpose of such a monthly meetingwas not just for reporting, but for making a forum that researchers could learn fromeach other. The deputy general manager told us to feel free on our researches andexplained to us that it was not mandatory to reach to our conclusions in a hurrybecause the company would decide on how to draw a general conclusion from the
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diverse findings of our researches. In this respect, according to my understanding,the deputy general manager’s words expressed the company’s intention of acentralized control over all these researches.
4.3. MAIN FINDINGS OF THE INITIAL ACTIVITIES
The readers of this chapter are advised to refer to the Appendix A of this thesis. Inthis appendix, I only list the main results of my self-motivated research due to aconsideration of the company’s rigid censorship21 regulations on the publication ofacademic research reports. Since the self-motivated research and the companyresearch are methodologically similar, I present the findings from both of them in asynthesis.
Since the company research project studied knowledge while the self-motivatedproject studied engineering design capacity, those elements related to the personalcharacteristics of designers were no longer identified in the company project. Butan increasing number of technical terminologies emerged in the category of thetechnical knowledge items. In addition to the self-motivated research project,knowledge about the process of design in CNPDC played a more significant part.Also a group of knowledge named “knowing of company organizational structures”followed.
The two researches both revealed that some designers think commercial knowledgesuch as the understanding of the contracts is important for engineering designerswhile others do not think the same. On the contrary, they claimed that commercialengineers should learn more engineering knowledge.
The understanding of technical standards and environmental health and safetylegislations is regarded as very important, because that kind of knowledge is thecriterion to measure the quality of their designs and the safety hypothesis of anuclear power plant.
Professional communication skills appear in both projects. All these itemsemphasize on the internal communications among the engineering disciplines insidethe company, rather on the interaction with the society outside.
There are differences between the respondents from different design divisions, butthese minor differences only appear when specific disciplinary terminology is usedto describe individual technical backgrounds.
21 The censorship is performed by the Intellectual Property Office and the ConfidentialityEnforcement Office. It is required that anything related to the company’s internal policycannot be released without their approval.
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The second part of the two research projects produced complementary results. Inthe company research project, it was shown that patents, technical modificationsleading to improvements of the functionality are considered as the most significantinnovations, modifications to design procedures and methodologies are treated asless significant, and solutions to the non-conformances of manufacturing andconstruction activities are treated as the least important, the same to the introductionof new equipment and technics to the nuclear power plant.
In the self-motivated research, I found that improving engineering design can beachieved in two ways. First, learning by doing seems to be favored by both ourmanagers and engineers. That is to say, the best way of improving engineeringdesign is to work for a real life engineering project. Another approach can beexpressed as a knowledge transfer between the mentor and apprentice. Thisapproach emphasizes gaining knowledge about the reason for practices. Learningby doing is considered as more important. Because in a circumstance of tightscheduling control, knowing what to do is more important than knowing why itshould be done in that way. However, this preference seems to be contradictory tothe ranking of technological innovations. That is to say, different value criterionsare used on evaluating engineering design as knowledge and as a practice. In theranking of innovations, scientific value is adopted while in practice economic valueseems to be the yard stick.
4.4. SOME LESSONS LEARNED
The head of the science and technology management department was not satisfiedwith the first part of our research because did not agree with our considerations ofconnecting knowledge with practice. Even though we roughly identified 200 sub-categories of knowledge, he straightforwardly pointed out that this was not what hewanted. He reminded us that any already existed bibliography classificationsystems are more commensurate than ours. What he wanted was a completecatalogue of the methodological documents issued by CNPDC and the referencesused in CNPDC’s engineering design relating to all the engineering documents –drawings and reports – issued for the construction and manufacturing. Therefore, inhis mind, knowledge management was perhaps a system of bibliography, andperhaps what he wanted us to do was to digitalize our documents and drawings,which had already been done by CNPEC’s document center inside the projectmanagement department. As such what he termed the “implicit knowledge” wouldbecome more explicit and then could be utilized conveniently. The relationshipbetween knowledge and practice was not the concern of the department head.
On the contrary, he was quite satisfied with our methods and results of studyinginnovations. The ranking system looked like a systematic peer view of the newlyemerged documents. One feature of the binomial test is that it can systematicallyreduce randomness. In this respect, such an evaluation gives an image of fairness.
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Considering that only 16 experts were invited to the evaluation but a distinguishableresult appeared, with serval hundred names of experts in their data bank, he wasquite confident that it was quite a convenient method for him to perform moreprecise evaluations. Importantly, as a PhD in computer science, he realized thatadding a binominal test module to the knowledge management system was not adifficult task.
When we were considering whether we should continue our study on the first partin order to make a more consummate dendrogram of CNPDC’s knowledge, or weshould corporate with the “big data” team to make this study move forward, wenoticed a change in the implementation of the company reform study program. InNovember 2014, we were not informed to take part in the monthly meeting.According to the general manager’s office that such a meeting was canceled. Wetelephoned the contact person in the general manager’s office, in that phone call wewere told that the deputy general manager in charge of this program changed. Thenew deputy general manager in charge considered this program less important.Because in his mind, the critical factor leading to a successful company reform iswhat he called “top level design”.
Later, I attended one of the new deputy manager’s training courses. His philosophyof company reform was based on the following expression “We survive ontechnology and we thrive on low costs”. We were told that he worked out thisexpression from his understandings and experiences, and this sentence served as thetitle of his speech to all CNPEC engineers. Unlike the former deputy generalmanager who asked for employees’ opinions, the new deputy general manageradopted a traditional approach to channel company reform – top-downadministrative push. He promulgated some general norms. And then these normswere broken down into several disciplinary topics, such as how should CNPDCrespond to company changes, and how should the procurement department. Insidethe departments, such questions were broken down to a further degree into itsbranches and even further to its small groups until perhaps one question reached toa specific engineer. Answering such questions became a part of engineers’ job. Inthis respect, it became an obligation rather than a voluntary participation.
Under this scheme, I don’t think that new ideas will generate because theconclusions have been made in advance. What engineers have to do is to find somepractices that have already existed and tailor them to fit in this new scheme.
In December 2014, two months after the shift of the tone of this reform studyprogram, we received an email which asked us to complete our research by the endof the year. It said that all teams must submit their research reports to the generalmanager’s office before the deadline. The result was that our reports would be keptas company archives in the document center.
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In 2015, along with some good news of China’s future development of nuclearpower, the company seemed to be back on its old routine again. People becamebusy as usual, the designers retained their confidence and project control engineerswere considering shifting to either an international project or the HL1000 project. Itlooks as if the HL1000 project itself represents a full-scope company reform, andthe former reform discussions which lack a concrete project backing have beenshelved.
What I have learned from this experience is that improvements of engineeringdesign inside the system may not fulfill CGN engineers’ pursuits of becoming goodengineers. In order to get company recognition engineers normally compromise tothe organizational culture that absorbs Chinese engineering traditions. Criticizingwhat is wrong can be interpreted as criticizing the culture. This is what CGNengineers try to avoid. They tend to find problems in the field that they are familiarwith while others are not. In this respect improvements can be done as minormodifications to the established traditions and habits. However, what appears in thiscase is that company’s determination of making improvements is not firm.Engineers’ motivations can be used to serve its purpose of adapting to the changingmarket conditions. When evidences show that such conditions remain unchanged,engineers’ service has no use. Sometimes the traditional bureaucratic ortechnocratic approach of adjusting organizations and procedures is considered asmore effective. As a result, I tend to conclude that engineers’ personal pursuits ofbecoming good engineers cannot rely on the company.
Perhaps “improvement” is not the proper approach to make good engineers. Changeseems to be the correct keyword. These changes might have already existed in ourlives.
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CHAPTER 5. THE HUMAN SIDE OFNUCLEAR POWER ENGINEERING
This chapter portrays some engineers’ personal engagements in CGN’s nuclearpower engineering projects. Due to the varieties of their personal backgrounds andtheir specific tasks performed, CGN’s transitions in engineering design can bereflected in its engineers’ personal transformations. The figures appear in thischapter are far from prominent, in terms of prestige, compared to the figuresmentioned in Chapter 2. It may not be proper to say that any of them have broughtabout any changes to this company but they have all experience some changes intheir careers. Therefore, through their experiences, their efforts in changingthemselves relating to changes of the company can be presented and studied.
5.1. A SYSTEM DESIGN ENGINEER – MR. G’S EXPERIENCE
5.1.1. A DESCRIPTION OF NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
In CGN’s division of labor, specifically regarding to engineering design, there is anengineering discipline called “system design”. The major tasks for the systemdesigners are to construct the entire material and digital flows of a nuclear powerplant. It is their job to make a system out of assemblies of equipment. Thisdefinition can be elicited from Mr. G’s – one of our system designers – words onhis tasks in the JDO (Joint Design Organization between AREVA NP and CNPDC)for the Taishan nuclear power plant’s design:
“My position was very important in the JDO. Firstly, I was in charge ofthe RCP system. It means the entire nuclear steam generation and heatexchange system, not just the Reactor Coolant Pump. It includes thesteam generator, the pressurizer, the piping and the pumps. And somecontrol units. Secondly, I also took some responsibility of designmanagement. Therefore, there were a lot of discussions about my tasksin the negotiation of the contract.” (Appendix, B)
5.1.2. THE TRANSITION FROM A STUDENT TO AN ENGINEER
Since this discipline of engineering design includes knowledge about nuclearfission reactors and nuclear physics sciences, engineers work in this discipline aremostly those students educated by the Chinese technical universities with nuclearphysics and reactor engineering majors, such as Tsinghua University, Xi’anJiaotong University, and Shanghai Jiaotong University. Mr. G is a graduate fromTsinghua University with a Master’s degree majored in reactor engineering.
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He was recruited by CGN in 2004 when the renaissance of nuclear power in Chinahas just begun. Perhaps it was because of his cooperation with CGN in hispostgraduate research activities in a joint R&D project between TsinghuaUniversity and CGN, he was first hired in CGN’s Technology Center – an entityaffiliated to the headquarter. At that time CGN’s engineering design entity CNPDChas not yet been established. In Mr. G’s interpretations of the establishment ofCNPDC, it symbolized CGN’s first engineering transition from an owner-typednuclear power plant operator to a nuclear power engineering company which startedto build nuclear power plants based on its imported technologies and engineeringmodification experiences gained from its operation.
“CNPEC was established in the year 2003 and at that time theTechnology Center was an independent entity in the CGN group for thepurpose of providing technical consultancy services to new-built plantsand technical upgrade of the existing units.” (Appendix, B)
“Later when CGN decided to set up its design institute, peopleemployed in the Technology Center were distributed to the divisions ofthis newly established design institute namely CNPDC. Therefore, theTechnology Center became the predecessor of CNPDC’s Nuclear IslandSystem Design Division and the Rector Engineering Design Division.The conventional island design division was at the beginning a jointgroup consisting of some engineers dispatched from the GEDI(Guangdong Electricity Design Institute) and some engineers majored inconventional island engineering who originally worked in CGN. Suchan arrangement of the conventional island design team was in fact aconsequence of CGN’s investment to GEDI. It was in 2005, when theLing Ao Phase 2 project started.” (Appendix, B)
His participation in this round of company reform was not only manifested by hischange of position in CGN’s organization but also presented by his descriptionsabout the different types of work he was assigned after the change of position. Inhis own words, before 2005 his work can be categorized as “learning” – such as theR&D project he participated in. It was in CGN’s first cross-provincial project, theHongyan River project, which started in 2006, his work was changed into “doing”.(Appendix, B) The Hongyan River project held a sense of a milestone to CGN. Itwas the first CGN’s project outside Guangdong province and more specificallyoutside Daya Bay area. It was also the first project in which its design wascompletely performed by CNPDC. The most important feature of this project is thatthe technology used in this project is a Chinese brand named CPR1000 – a CGN’sderivative of AREVA NP’s M310 technology. This represented CGN’s capacity ofperforming Gen-2 nuclear power plant’s engineering design, even though beforethat CGN’s plant construction entity CNPEC had already gained abundant
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experience in nuclear power plant’s construction management, equipmentinstallation and commissioning.
5.1.3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE
The logic underneath his understanding of engineering design derived from hisinterpretation of the relationship between scientific knowledge and practice. As Mr.G put it:
“It was in the Hongyan River Project, I first learned what is indeedengineering design for a nuclear power plant. Scientific knowledge doesnot equal to the capability of engineering design.” (Appendix, B)
According to Mr. G, engineering design is a work which transforms knowledge intopractical usage. Even though R&D activities can be regarded as a form ofengineering design, such work only points out future or possible usages of certainknowledge which is theoretically founded, but real life engineering design, at leastin CGN, is not founded on this hypothetical basis. Only justified knowledge byprevious experiences can be used in nuclear power plant’s designs. Therefore, forhim, improving CGN’s engineering design requires more practices. This utilitarianperception of knowledge is in line with the Confucius’ sayings about “learning” and“doing” which Mr. G, quoted to support his opinion.
Mr. G quoted: “xue er shi xi zhi, bu yi yue hu.”22 He further interpreted:“Studying is tough, while practicing is happy.” … …“Studying theknowledge is tough but when you use the knowledge to solve problemsit turns out to be happy. When you practice, you may gain some feeling,and such feelings reflect enhancement of your skills.”(Appendix, B)
Good design in Mr. G’s perceptions equals to the making of a precise blueprint onwhich the system of a nuclear power plant can be built and the equipment can beassembled without any deviation from it. This requires abundant experience ofproblem-solving so that the designers know exactly what kind of knowledgecorresponds to the questions to be solved and such knowledge should be justifiedknowledge. This demanding requirement would have some conflicts with real lifeengineering design experiences, as Mr. G also realized.
Due to the fact that the CPR1000 nuclear power plants are to a large extent licensedcopies of the French M310 plants, it indicated that Chinese designers have limitedchances of getting first-hand experiences of similar engineering designs. Therefore,
22 “It is indeed a pleasure to acquire knowledge and, as you go on acquiring, to put intopractice what you have acquired.”(Ku, Hung Ming’s Translation, 1898, in The Discoursesand Sayings of Confucius)
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in order to get such valuable first-hand experience, it seems that the designers haveto be put into the situation when the original questions first appear. Because eventhough in a retrospect the solutions can be understood through learning, designerscannot acquire the sensitivity of the knowledge from established answers. That is tosay the understanding a solution to a specific question does not equal to acquiringthe ability of solving similar questions.
5.1.4. A GOOD METHOD OF IMPROVING ENGINEERING DESIGN
In order to resolve this tension between “learning” and “doing”, a specific programunder the EPR technology transfer project, a Joint Design Organization (JDO), wasgenerated. The intention of this program was to set up a learning-by-doing approachwhich was considered as more useful than the document transfer approach, inassisting the licensee of the technology transfer contract to acquire technical know-hows and know-whys.
“When CGN negotiated with AREVA and Westinghouse about the EPRand AP1000 technology transfers, the JDO was included as a majortheme of such technology transfer projects. This means that our topmanagement has realized what capacity building is. So CGNintentionally and systematically dispatched people to AREVA’s designorganizations to learn from them. As a consequence, those who weredispatched got some in-depth understanding of what is engineeringdesign and what is a normal engineering design process, and even whatis engineering design management. The JDO covered a wide range ofour engineering disciplines.” (Appendix, B)
According to Mr. G, the result of the trainings seems quite satisfactory. As he put it:
“Each job descriptions about the JDO positions depicted what was therole of the designer, and his or her corresponding capability. Theorganization of JDO required detailed planning. At that time CGN’sexperts concretized such a planning. This is critical. The 180 designersdispatched to JDO were the seeds planted to AREVA’s land. Later theseseeds took roots. After that, we were transplanted back to the land ofCGN. Now we are still nurtured by CGN, but some are given more carewhile others may receive less attention.” (Appendix, B)
On the AREVA side, it seems that the adoption of the learning-by-doing approachis also regarded as a success. As the AREVA technology transfer manager Mr. Mput it:
“That is why I say to you the best way to learn is to be obliged to do thejob. He (a designer) was involved in such a detailed design job. But to
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do a detailed design you have always a basic question about the reasonwhy. And obviously when you do detailed design you learn somethingabout the basic and conceptual design. So JDO is a good thing.”(Appendix, C)
As Mr. G said in the interview, he was an important member of the JDO not justbecause in the management hierarchy he was appointed as the Chinese technicalmanager, but because he performed different types of tasks that the JDO couldprovide. This indicates that he has accumulated a lot of experiences from varietiesof problem-solving tasks.
“A system designer is a synthetic person. According to what I haveheard from EDF, the grown-up of a system engineer takes 10 years’ time.This person is required to shift from varieties of positions. In the end,this person can finally be placed to the position of system synthesis. Sowhen I did my job as the designer of the RCP system, I became quiteaware of the safety issues of the nuclear power plant, the reactorengineering, the digital control engineering and the equipment. I neededto interact – setting up interfaces – with them voluntarily. So as a systemdesigner, my design is a design of the process and at the same time, I dosome job which should be done by the digital control people. This kindof job shifting or synthesis in CGN is relatively blank, because wenormally think a system designer should not tap into the digital controlfield etc.” (Appendix, B)
It seems that time is a critical factor to accumulate abundant experience, and acompetent system design engineer can be finally nurtured over time. But anotherquestion appears: “is abundant time along enough?” From Mr. G’s words, I think itmay not be the case. As he mentioned, there is a question of transplantation, in thesense that whether what is learned from AREVA can be applied in the design workin CGN. After the JDO had completed its job in France, CGN engineers returnedback to China, and diffused into CGN’s design divisions. Some of them considerthat their experiences gained in the JDO attract CGN’s attention which normallyindicates a successful transplantation but some may think that their learning useless,especially, regarding to changing CGN’s engineering design practices with AREVAas a model.
Mr. G seems to categorize himself as a successful case:
“In AREVA I mainly concentrated on the basic design of the Taishanproject, but when I returned back to NID (Nuclear Island DesignDivision), I faced a lot of problems derived from the detailed designs ofseveral projects. Still there were some problems related to theconstruction and commissioning of the on-going projects and also some
A BOOK OF CHANGES IN ENGINEERING
124
problems of equipment manufacturing. As a system designer I need tomake analysis of whether some non-conformances of the manufacturingto the design would impair the functional requirements of the system. Inthese three years, I gained more detailed experience on solving siterelated engineering problems. After the Fukushima accident, Iencountered engineering problems that aimed to the improvements ofthe already built units such as the add-up of a high positioned waterreserve for the Ling Ao Phase 2 units. I felt that what I accumulated inJDO, the methodological knowledge and the understanding of the designprocess, helped me a lot in the problem-solving of these improvementdesigns and other site related detailed design issues.” (Appendix, B)
5.1.5. MR. G’S ATTEMPT OF TRANSPLANTATION AS A TECHNICALLEADER
As a chief engineer in NID, Mr. G started his own small project in changing CGN’sengineering design. What he has done is a mapping of the missing knowledge in hisdivision with a comparison to what he has learned in AREVA.
“After I came back as the chief engineer, I am in the position to organizecapacity building for my fellow engineers. I think that I have a clearerpicture of what kind of capacity is required in my team. So I organized across disciplinary capacity building across different branches in mydivision. I identified capacities according to my own standard andmotivated people who were willing and suitable to participate. Mystandard derives from my experience gained in AREVA. I compared thestereotype of a system engineer in AREVA to ours, and found out whatis missing in our organization. Then I intentionally triggered some sortof a voluntary capacity building campaign. This attempt lasted for 3years, from 2011 to 2014 before I left NID.”(Appendix, B)
The motivation of such an attempt is based on Mr. G’s feeling that due to therelatively shorter history of CGN’s engineering design and the higher percentage ofyoung engineers in CNPDC, the company’s accumulation of technical knowledge israther scares. Compared to AREVA which has dedicated to the design of nuclearpower plants and the manufacturing of the main equipment for several decades, itseems that CGN has to catch up.
“Their technology development is standing up on their predecessors’shoulders. They keep systematically their experiences and knowledge.Scientific, technological and methodological knowledge are all welldocumented, and looking into their industrial codes and regulations, theyare more consummate than ours.” (Appendix, B)
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5.1.6. MR. G’S IDENTIFICATION OF CGN’S PROBLEMS
During the interview when Mr. G addressed his emphasis on the accumulation ofknowledge, I was confused why he would not emphasize on the generation ofknowledge. This confusion derived from my reflections on his descriptions abouthis work. It seemed to me that he had never given any detailed examples of whatkinds of technical problems – a calculation on the break of a pipe or a choice of apump for example – he had ever solved in his job either in China or in France.Therefore, I felt hard to connect his job with the knowledge he referred to. He knewthat I was also educated to be an engineer. I thought he should have known that Imight be able to understand some engineering fundamental knowledge. Hisdescriptions of his work were focused on the scope instead of the content. Therefore,it made me to ask him questions about his daily routines such as how many hourshe spent on calculation and how many hours he used on making drawings.
He replied: “In China, normally we rely on meetings to solve problems.It takes up to 50% of my working hours. Here as you know, we areeither the coordinator or being coordinated.” Later he added: “After Icame back and was appointed as a chief engineer, most of my time wasused on attending meetings. In average I attend more than one meetingper day. The numbers of emails once increased to 300 per day at themaximum.” (Appendix, B)
Mr. G seems to be critical about his daily routines because he thinks designengineers should spend more time sit by their desks calculating or making drawings.He expresses his objection by a comparison to his daily routines in France.
“In France designers attend fewer meetings. Every day I calculate, makedocuments. I call to my colleagues as a kind of normal communication,but, very few meetings. I cannot make assignments for other people. Isimply do my own job. So I have more time to think and to do someconcrete work.” (Appendix, B)
I had similar confusions in the interviews with other CGN engineers. They seem tobe quite clear with their scope of work but cannot give detailed illustrations on theprocess out of which the problems are solved. Perhaps the real problem-solvingprocess appears in the numerous meetings our engineers are asked to take part in. Itlooks as if all problem-solving activities in CGN are a kind of collective work.
I ascribe the cause of this phenomenon to CNPEC and CNPDC’s organizationalstructure. In CGN as I illustrated in Chapter 3, the definition of the scope ofengineering work relies on two managerial dimensions. The project dimension canbe seen as a technical dimension which is stipulated by the sequence of engineeringtasks, for example design is put ahead of procurement and procurement is followed
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by installation and commissioning. The administrative dimension can be seen as adisciplinary dimension which indicates connections among technical disciplines.Such as the system design is connected with equipment design and digital controldesign. Therefore, we see multiple interfaces between designers and other kind ofengineers and among designers. This structure enables one designer of a particularengineering discipline to work on multiple projects, but at the same time, it alsorestricts individual designers to perform some cross-disciplinary work. For instance,a designer of a pump for project A is normally also a designer of the same pump forproject B, but only in limited situations he or she can be a designer for some pipingof project A or B even if he or she may also be technically capable. In this respect,engineering designers in CGN are quite sensitive to their scope of work, whichlimits their chances of facing with different types of engineering questions.
Regarding to this type of organizational structure, it seems that system designerslike Mr. G are rather difficult to be nurtured. An even the more problematicquestion associated with this structure is that along with their promotions – formengineer to senior engineer and to chief engineer – capable engineers are givenchances to solve more problems, but they are in reality getting further to practicalengineering activities. In this respect, they are gradually turned into technicalcommentators – the ones who make decisions based on making comments toother’s work.
5.1.7. IDENTIFICATION OF CGN’S PROBLEMS BY AN AREVAMANAGER
In fact, I am not the first person to notice this tension between organizationalstructure and the enhancement of the problem-solving capability of our engineers.But discussions about such issues are performed informally in casual conversationsamong CGN employees. An external observer Mr. M from AREVA expressed hisopinion about this phenomenon:
“I now need to make an inquiry. Where are all these people? The NIEPpeople (on the AREVA side) told me that some people who were trainedin the JDO are now not working for the EPR project. You miss a lot ofthings by doing like this. These people will forget something, or theymight leave the company in the worst situation. But after five or sixyears they move back to the design work they will have lost someknowledge. You have to keep these competent people in a growingcurve in term of the load of work. In this case they will get better andbetter. That is also a project management concern. To choose the goodguys and put them again and again on the technical positions.”(Appendix, C)
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5.1.8. A TYPICAL PATH OF CAREER DEVELOPMENT
In 2014, Mr. G experienced his most recent change in CGN. He was transformedfrom a designer to the full-time technical manager of the EPR technology transferproject. He told me that the latest engineering accomplishment he had made toCGN before this transformation was his design in CGN’s engineering modificationto the already built Gen-2 nuclear power plants. This modification is implementedby adding up a high positioned water reservoir near the nuclear power plant. In fact,it is a CGN’s reaction to the engineering study of the Fukushima accident. In theFukushima accident, the emergency diesel generator did not function because it wassubmerged by the sea waves which exceeded the design limits of the water-breakwhich was supposed to prevent submerging. Therefore, the Fukushima accident wasclassified as a beyond design basis accident. From a design perspective, coolantcirculation relying on emergency diesel generators is no longer considered as safeenough. In this respect, the concept of passive safety, symbolized by the AP1000design, get its favor among Chinese nuclear power engineering designers. Sincethere is no way to build a huge water tank on top of the concrete dome of thealready operated nuclear islands, the only modification that may generate the sameeffect is to build a water reservoir on the nearby mountains. It is contended thatgravity would produce enough pressure to circulate coolants inside the primary loop.Therefore such passive circulation will prevent the reactor core from meltingcaused by the residual heat. This passive safety approach is decided to put on usefor the reactors currently situated at the Daya Bay site. Mr. G is the chief designerof this modification, and this approach is going to be adapted to CGN’s futurenuclear power plant engineering designs.
Mr. G considered this experience in the adding up of a water reservoir as arelatively comprehensive exercise of his knowledge learned over the years.
Here Mr. G’s career development path can be summarized into three stages: stageone, he was transformed from a fresh graduate from Tsinghua University to adesign engineer in CGN; stage two, along with his accumulation of knowledge andpractical experience he was given more tasks and promoted to a chief designer;stage three, due to his experiences of working with AREVA and relativelycomprehensive knowledge about nuclear power reactor engineering he was chosento be a technical manager. But in this new position, he left engineering design andhis division NID.
From my interview with Mr. G, I was told the only “non-nuclear power”engineering design he had performed. It was a radiation protection design for apetrol chemical company. Radioactive rays are used in the chemical industry fordetection and monitoring purposes. Therefore, these radioactive sources arerequired to be shielded. CNPDC is among the few entities licensed by the Chineseauthority to perform radioactive shielding container designs. Therefore, CNPDC
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got a contract for this special type of container design. It was a chance for Mr. G topractice his knowledge about radiation protection which was from his owninterpretation a work for environmental protection.
From my observation, Mr. G is a person who is craving for new knowledge. Hisphilosophy of knowledge can be portrayed as learning followed by doing. Scientificknowledge is placed at a higher position than practice even though he admits theimportance of practice. As far as I can interpret his meaning of doing, it is perhapsgiving knowledge some utilitarian value. This means that his motivation of learningderives from utilitarian purposes. The purpose here does not necessarily equal to themonetary value. It can be a factor related to his career promotion or social status.When we travelled to France for a meeting with AREVA, I noticed that he broughthimself a PMBOK – a project management book – to read on the flight. When Iasked him about the reason to do so, he replied that he should learned somethingabout scientific project management, for he did not want to present to hiscounterpart on the AREVA side an amateurish impression.
5.1.9. A DIVIDE OF IDENTITY – PROFESSIONAL VS. SOCIAL
Mr. G is a golf player. But it is extremely paradoxical to determine whether thishobby can reflect Mr. G’s environmental awareness as a person not as aprofessional engineer. Playing golf is considered as a modern healthy game after itsintroduction to mainland China in the early 1980s. At least Mr. G thought so, andhe even volunteered to teach me how to play this luxurious game. On one handplaying golf can be considered as an environmental friendly sport, due to the factthat it brings human closer to nature. On the other hand, it represents a higher socialstatus of the player. Playing golf is an expensive game in China, in the sense that agolf course takes a large area of land which can be used for other purposes ratherfor the entertainment and recreation of the newly emerged richer class. This tensionbetween the usage of land for the construction of golf courses and its alternativesseems to be intense in the Chinese populated cities such as Shenzhen.
It was reported in the Shenzhen local evening news on January 18, 2013, that onegolf course built in 1985 was about to expire its land lease in half a year. (ShenzhenEvening News, 2013) Since the land is now situated at the center of the city due tothe over 30 years’ expansion of the city’s landscape, whether to grant a renewal ofthe leasing contract between the government and the developer has been put to apublic debate. The government has finally decided not to prolong the lease of thispiece of land for the golf course but to regenerate it to a public park. This casetriggers some of my thoughts about Chinese public environmental awareness. Iwould consider the final result regarding to the transformation of this piece of landinto a public park as a triumph of the general public’s environmental concernsabout their lives in this city.
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In this case it revealed some aspects of the social tensions underneathenvironmental consciousness-raising in China, in that whether environmentalconsciousness is a symbol of elegant personal hobbies or it is a basic demand of thegeneral public. From an economic perspective, changing this piece of land intocommercial or residential buildings for public use can also be a fair alternative, butmaking it a park which has less financial value is in fact a best solution for publicbenefits. In this respect, the final decision seems like a generous consumptioninstead of an economically minded production. It must be hard for the citygovernment to make this decision, but I think it is a good choice because it at leastchanges an unfair distribution of limited resources associated to the use of this pieceof land. In the sense that before this transformation, the chances of getting close tonature were sold to those who could afford this privilege at an extremely high price,but after that, the previously privileged chances were turned common for allcitizens of Shenzhen. This type of transformation refers to Lewis Mumford’s (1970)notion of ecological economy and this type of consumption is in fact what needs tobe encouraged.
Mr. G’s hobby of playing golf derives from a benefit provided by CGN. CGN hasbuilt a small golf course near the nuclear power plant in Daya Bay. Compared to themarket price, CGN employees can use this golf course at an extremely low cost. Itmay be true that this consumption for employees manifests CGN’s human concernespecially on its employees, but from a broader social perspective it is a privilege.
Mr. G’s experiences correspond to the CGN’s changes. Professionally, he changedfrom a design engineer under the framework of a licensed duplication to anexperienced professional of reverse engineering. In these transitions, Mr. G caughtup with the opportunities the company could provide. As CGN is now dedicated toa more in-depth research and development project, which aims to construct a Gen-3nuclear power plant with complete intellectual property, on the contrary, Mr. G isgetting further from this type of engineering practices with his useful knowledge. Isit going to be a missed opportunity for him?
Mr. G has no other career experiences other than his employment in CGN.Therefore, his transition represents a typical model for CGN’s engineeringdesigners. However, CGN engineers are quite diversified. That indicates the humanside of engineering in this company may have other interpretations.
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5.2. STRUCTURE DESIGN ENGINEERS – MRS. S AND MR. L
5.2.1. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SYSTEM AND STRUCTUREDESIGNS
Nuclear power engineering is an assembly of serval engineering disciplines,mechanical engineering, civil engineering, process control, etc. all included. Due tothe difference of the object of design, engineering designers have differentunderstandings of their tasks.
Mr. L – one of our main equipment designer – described his perception of his workas such:
“For me, designs can be classified into several categories. First the R&Drelated jobs, such as the design tasks in the ACPR 1000 (now HL1000)project. In detail, we get some input and based on our scope of work, wework out some calculations, and perform some verification. In the endwe lead to some conclusions and these conclusions serve as the input forfollow up engineering disciplines. Or the conclusions may support thenext phase of our own design such as the detailed design, in terms ofmaking manufacturing drawings and assembly drawings.” (Appendix, D)
“The second part of our job is to support manufacturing factories, incase the manufacturer raises some questions which require furtherinterpretation. Some questions derive from the misunderstandings of ourdrawings and some from the non-conformance reports (NCR)discovered by our surveillance people. NCR refers to the inconsistencyof the manufacturing with the design documents; it normally representsa manufacturing problem but not a fatal mistake. Testing and evaluationare required by the designer to decide whether this non-conformance canbe accepted according to the technical standard and the functionalrequirements.” (Appendix, D)
“The third part of the technical work refers to some supporting work tothe site problems which happen in erection and installation. Someequipment may be scratched during such activities. Therefore we needto send our engineers to the site to evaluate whether such slight damagewould impair the function of this mechanical part, and do some testingon whether it causes risks to its duration etc.” (Appendix, D)
Mrs. S – one of our civil engineering designers – described her design tasks as such:
“I make plans and blueprints for the building structures, and verify theirvalidity. Based on the comments from other disciplines – my colleagues
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– I need to make modifications on my plans and blueprints. These arewhat I call the technical tasks. I calculate based on numerical analysis; Iissue drawings and reports. These tasks directly reflect my ownperceptions on engineering design.” (Appendix, E)
The major difference between Mr. L and Mrs. S’s perceptions of engineering designand Mr. G’s illustration of his tasks is that both Mr. L and Mrs. S consider theirdesigns as an engineering blueprint making for a specific object – a building or amachine – rather than a process.
This deviance from the system designer’s perception can be reflected from theirdescriptions of a nuclear power plant as a system.
Mr. L said: “The nuclear power plant system consists of its sub-systems,we call units. Every unit has to perform its functions so that the entitycan be made. The entity is the system.” (Appendix, D)
When Mrs. S was asked about how much she knew about the nuclear power plantsystem, she replied:
“I kind of know something about the nuclear power plant system. But Icertainly don’t know all.” Later she acknowledged the relationship ofher work to her colleagues’. As she put it: “Not exactly, we need toknow some basic parameters of the system for example the seismicclassification of equipment. And we also have to know some data fromthe operational conditions. We need to perform our calculation andsimulation according to the definition of accidents, such as the basicdesign accidents, or severe accidents etc. We have to get a feeling ofwhat is a normal accident and what is a vital accident. Technicalstandards used in the design of the structure vary upon these conditions.However, the design for a nuclear power plant can be referenced tosome normal civil engineering standards. In nuclear power plant design,we need to know the calculation methods stipulated in the technicalstandard for different accidents, and the verification methods. Otherwise,our calculation cannot be done.” (Appendix, E)
5.2.2. THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPERIENCE AND DETAILS
Even though both mechanical engineering and civil engineering have beenestablished engineering disciplines from the scientific paradigm of physics, Mr. Land Mrs. S seemed to hold different criterions on defining what a good engineeringdesign is.
Mr. L gave his criterion as the following:
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“In my view, our job is to design good products, in terms of goodseismic resistance feature, and long term duration in operationalcircumstances. Therefore, we focus on the materials, and theirmechanical properties and their fatigue analysis. In order to ensure thestability and completeness of the equipment we focus on the structuraleffects of our machines. We cannot make mistakes because if ourproducts fail, it will have a big problem. Unlike the system designersand the safety analysis people who calculate safety risks on a probabilitystudy, we cannot rely on probability study. So risk does not meananything to us. Our job is to make sure that our products will still beable to function even in the most severe accidents.” (Appendix, D)
Mrs. S does not deny the essence of civil engineering design is to construct anendurable building which is a foremost requirement of nuclear power technology.As she put it:
“The essence is the analysis of the load-carrying capability, and theproperties of the materials, the concrete and the steel. When we figureout the stress and load distribution of the structure, we can work it out.Force and the properties of materials are the essential elements ofdesign.” (Appendix, E)
But in addition to this scientific perception on a good civil engineering design, Mrs.S emphasizes the importance of experience which is missing in Mr. L’s expressions.
In order for me to understand how a designer’s experience influences the quality ofthe design work, Mrs. S provided two examples. The first example was a problemof sizing:
“This problem derives from the so called ‘habits’ of our design.Normally the sizing of the holes on the floor plates is regular in ourprevious designs. It depends on the sizing of the bolt which would befastened into the hole in order to sustain the weight of a pipe and thecables inside it. No one has questioned the sizing and its impact on theload carrying capacity on the floor slab. Because we know the sizing ofthe holes is small so that it won’t bring about a problem. But this timewe intend to put more cables inside the pipe thus the hole is required tobe larger, and now someone raises the question on the load carryingcapacity issue, whether such a larger sizing of the hole will impact onthe stability of the floor slab. If we have not calculated the case of largesizing, we need to start the calculation from the beginning, which is atime consuming job for this tiny problem. But if someone have theexperience, the decision is easier to be made.” (Appendix, E)
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Another example she used to make her argument was about a mistake happened inthe reading of the civil engineering shop drawings. In the Taishan project, on thesteel structure detailed design drawings some oval circles were presented. Such ovalmarkings are intended to tell the constructor to make exactly oval holes on the steelbeam. When these holes are filled with bolts, the stress of such connections can bereleased. But what happened on Taishan site was that in one set of the steelstructure, all the holes were made into perfect round holes, thus the stress of thebeams and the bolts could not be released as it was intended. The constructor saidthat they misunderstood the oval drawing to the tolerance of the round shape. Sincethey can make perfect round holes, such oval shapes on the drawings aredisregarded. In fact, if some words can be added to the oval circles on the drawings,such a mistake of the contractor can be avoided. Unfortunately there were no suchillustrations on the drawings indicating that the holes shall be made intentionallyoval but not tolerances. Mrs. S said:
“Experienced designers would add words on because they must haveexperienced similar events. But it is hard to say if it is a mistake of thedesigner or not.”(Appendix, E)
As a summary of her points about experience Mr.S concluded:
“Experience comes from details. Knowing the scientific principles andthe knowledge do not equal to a good design. A good design comesfrom practices and the learnings from mistakes.” (Appendix, E)
5.2.3. PERSONAL BACKGROUNDS AND THE PERCEPTIONS OFGOOD DESIGNS
Such a difference on the interpretations of a good design partly derives from thedisciplinary features of Mr. L and Mrs. S. As a mechanic engineer Mr. L focuses onthe follow-up manufacturing process, in which the making of machines – hisdesigned objects – is largely done by other types of automatic machines. While Mrs.S’s blueprints are implemented by human workers on site. In the comparison ofturning their designs into real life material structures, more human factors shall becounted in Mrs. S’s designs. It looks as if the shaping of Mr. L’s designs into realityrequires only sequenced steps of physical and geometric transformations.Nevertheless, looking into the different career development backgrounds, theemergence of such a different evaluation of a good engineering design may haveother interpretations.
Mrs. S is a 45 years old female civil engineering structure engineer. She waseducated in the Southeast University in Nanjing China. Her university is one of therecognized good universities of engineering especially in architecture and civilengineering. She was educated to the bachelor’s level. She had 22 years of working
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experience always in civil engineering design. At the beginning she worked in herhome town after her graduation from the Southeast University in a mineral miningengineering design institute for seven years in a northern province. It was in the late1990s and early 2000s. She thought southern China would provide her with morepromising career development opportunities. She decided to move to Shenzhenwith her husband a mechanical engineer also a graduate from Southeast University.She joined ARUP – an internationally well-known civil engineering design andconsultancy firm – in its greater China branch in Shenzhen. She mainly worked onnormal civil engineering projects before she switched to CNPDC in 2008 whenCNPDC started to form its civil engineering design division. She was directlyemployed by CNPDC as a specialist in civil engineering design.
In this respect, focusing on the object of design, Mrs. S experienced two majorchanges: her first change was achieved by switching from a mining and mineralproduction factory building design to a commercial and resident building design.The latter, in her perception, contains more technical contents because thesecommercial buildings are structurally more complicated. The second transformationshe experienced was to change from a commercial building designer to a nuclearpower plant building designer. The design of the nuclear power plant building is, inher words, “more specialized” especially on its anti-seismic calculations. PuttingMrs. S’s changes into a broader social context, her career success is largely apersonal reflection on China’s economic reform of which the direction has becomeclear since the 1990s. Her second change can be characterized as benefited from therenaissance of nuclear power in China, which can be regarded as a part of China’son-going economic structural change or technological upgrade.
I became familiar with Mrs. S in late 2009 when I was asked to be involved in thenegotiation of a smaller joint design project between CNPDC’s civil engineeringdesign division and IOSIS – A French civil engineering firm – which served also asa sub-supplier of AREVA NP for the Taishan project. It was an additional self-reliance project on civil engineering design which could not be included in theNITT contract because AREVA NP, without enough competence of civilengineering design, had to sub-contract this part of nuclear power plant buildingdesign to a specialized company IOSIS. Mrs. S served as the technical leader in thisjoint design team. It was in the occasion that I was given the opportunity to have acloser observation of the real life working scenes in CNPDC. I even had atemporary small office beside Mrs. S’s office as the commercial engineer for theoperation of this joint design team. What I witnessed most was their correctivemodifications on the drawings issued. Some of these necessary changes werecaused by up-stream input changes, for example if a piping designer changed his orher choice of pipes to be used on site, then the civil engineers had to make a changeon the illustration of their shop-drawings, sizing or the route of the pipes. Some ofthese changes had to be adapted according to the feedbacks of the site constructionworkers. Because designers did their jobs on systematic imaginations but
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sometimes these imaginations conflicted with each other in reality. For instance,when the constructors were ready to install a pipe on the wall, they found thatanother pipe had already existed at the same position with a different color. In sucha circumstance they had to stop and wait for the explanation given by the designer.Either it was a mistake of illustrating the same pipe with two colors or it was amistake by marking two pipes at the same position. It gave me a feeling thatengineering design, as Bucciarelli (1996) portrayed, was a highly iterative processand the idealized systematic design process was just a logical sequence ofengineering activities.
Mr. L is a young man who was educated to be a mechanical engineer in theuniversity. He was employed by CGN in the year 2007 when he was just graduatedfrom Xi’an Jiaotong University with a bachelor’s degree. Now he was taking a part-time study in mechanical engineering to promote his education to the master’s level.Mr. L’s first job was in Shanghai, in one of CNPDC’s subsidiaries. Then he movedfrom Shanghai to Shenzhen. I got to know him in 2009 when he was appointed adesk job reviewing thousands of technical documents transferred under the NITTcontract – the technology transfer contract between AREVA NP and CGN on theEPR technology – on main equipment designs. His task was to reply to me what hefound missing in these seemingly numerous documents. The manufacturing of evena single piece of equipment requires a set of documents which include its heattreatment, crack detection, welding, etc. The issuance of these documents in theChinese technical system belongs to the responsibility of the designer instead of themanufacturer. In this respect, Mr. L was the designer to make sure its completeness.Therefore, he thinks like a manufacturer.
5.2.4. A DIFFERENT APPROACH OF LEARNING FROM AREVA
Compared to Mr. G, Mr. L was not given an opportunity to participate in the JDO.In this regard, his approach of improving engineering design, at least from atechnology transfer point of view, is learning through reading. Later Mr. L wasgiven an opportunity to review AP1000 main equipment design documents becauseCGN joined the AP1000 technology transfer. Both these desk jobs gave Mr. L achance to compare the EPR and the AP1000 equipment designs. When Iinterviewed Mr. L he made his comments as the following:
“I think EPR has a better reactor vessel. AP1000’s reactor vessel israther old. AP1000 may be advanced in its safety systems but when welook at the design of the reactor vessel it has nothing radicallyinnovative. What I can say here is that the EPR reactor vessel has solvedmore mechanical problems in its design than the AP1000.” (Appendix,D)
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At this point of the interview, I considered Mr. L as another typical young manadmiring for advanced technology. Thus his perception of improving engineeringdesign might be similar to Mr. G’s in the sense that getting more knowledge servedas his point of departure. But his reflections on this topic were beyond myconjectures.
“I don’t think the rotation of jobs is going to be helpful for engineeringdesign capacity building. Capacity building needs to have a purpose. Ifafter a round of rotation I am still appointed as the equipment designer, Iwill think it is a waste of my time. Because, the system knowledge onlyserves as the background of our design, we can learn it by ourselves. Wedon’t need in-depth knowledge of the system unless we findunderstanding the input data difficult. I think it is better to have a narrowsplit of work in our company so that people can focus. The methods andtools used in other disciplines can be very different. In equipment designwe don’t need their methods and tools.” (Appendix, D)
Compared to Mr. G and Mrs. S who possess a relatively collective understandingon this issue, Mr. L holds an egocentric stance. On one hand, he relates theimprovement of engineering design directly to himself as a personal promotion ofskills and knowledge. On the other hand, he seems to be satisfied with thefulfillment of his own job and at the same time remains careless about hiscolleagues. It is only in the situation that he finds a lack of information or aninsufficient understanding of data that may lead to his personal failure,communication among engineers and cross engineering disciplines shall take place.Provided that Mrs. S’s purpose of improving civil engineering design is in somesense altruistic, and Mr. G’s goal approach of improving system design throughaccumulation of knowledge seems neutral, Mr. L’s self-strengthening approach isstraightforwardly egocentric.
5.2.5. MR. L A FOLLOWER OF MR. G
It looks as if the rising curve of Mr. L’s career development can only be manifestedby his promotions under the established models of his predecessors such as Mr. G.Another reason for the egocentric recognition on Mr. L is that he thinks – at least hesaid – that his promotion and his good performances are almost a result of his ownendeavors instead of a collective achievement.
“The promotion to the group leader is a surprise for me. Because at thetime when I was promoted, I had only been working in CNPDC for 3years. Normally, in our division the promotion to a group leader is basedon the following criterions: Experience, in terms of how many years theperson has been working in CNPDC, and education background (majorand degree). If these criterions were constant I would never be chosen.
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My advantage is that every time when I receive a task, I try to thinkabout the expectations of my superior. And he once told me that everytime when I accomplished the work, in most cases, the result wasbeyond his expectations.” (Appendix, D)
Mr. L may not be a socialized person or in his mind social connections in anengineering company like ours can be simplified as competitions. Therefore,knowledge and skills become important resources and instruments of gainingpersonal comparative advantage. This understanding of the social relationshipsinside a company as competition may be an analogy of the marketing competitionsamong companies, such as his comparative evaluation on the reactor vessels of theEPR and the AP1000 technologies.
5.2.6. THE ANSWERS TO WHAT’S WRONG IN CGN BY MRS. S
In Mr. L’s perceptions of engineering design, his work consists of a series of dailyroutines: getting orders from his superiors, attending meetings to gather information,splitting work tasks among his group members, reviewing mechanical drawings,answering questions etc. Nothing seems to distract him from constructingmechanical structures in his own mind. Communication for him only happens whenhe finds it necessary. He does not perceive it as a burden because it is not importantin his work. But Mrs. S holds a different opinion on this matter. She said:
“Now my days are filled up with different technical tasks for differenton-going projects, some R&D projects, and some specific meetings suchas the quality assurance meetings etc. The situation that one engineerparticipates in two or three tasks at the same time is quite normal. Ingeneral too many meetings take up my hours. These meetings can beclassified into technical meetings with related disciplines, progressreport meetings to my superiors – to the divisions – and to the projectorganizations etc.” (Appendix, E)
“Another part of my job is to reply emails and writing reports. I feel thatmost of my time is used on either attending some meetings, or preparingfor those meetings. As far as I know, a lot of our engineers live andwork like this.” (Appendix, E)
“I think it is a feature of nuclear power engineering, because it involvestoo many people and too many disciplines for just one purpose. Fornormal civil engineering projects, less engineering disciplines arerequired. There is a huge cost of communication induced by such a hugenumber of interfaces. This is a typical feature of nuclear powerengineering.” (Appendix, E)
A BOOK OF CHANGES IN ENGINEERING
138
Mrs. S felt exhausted about multiple reporting and attending numerous meetingswhich might indicate that they were time consuming. In fact she criticized theefficiency of these types of communications instead of their necessity. According toher, meetings should be effective in terms of making decisions otherwise resourcesspent on them are wasted. This was especially the case during the year from 2008 to2013 when CNPDC’s offices were dispersed in four locations in Shenzhen City. Itwas the years before CNPDC’s office building were finally built for its nearly 2000employees. But even now CNPEC and CNPDC possessed different office buildingsabout 30 kilometers away from each other. Routine shuttle buses connecting theseoffice sites had to be set up for the purpose of human and material – largelydocuments – transmissions.
Another implication can be elicited from Mrs. S’s expression is that interfacesamong engineering disciplines can be problematic. Engineers in CGN prefer clearlydefined interfaces. One approach of the establishment of a clear-cut interface is tosplit a seemingly consummate interface into specific smaller parts, as specific aspossible. This may not increase the total number of interfaces among engineeringdisciplines in general but will certainly increase interfaces at the personal levelbecause engineers are the ones who perform specific tasks, and they are supposed tocontact with those who raise specific questions. In such a situation the number ofpeople attending a technical meeting can be numerous. Provided that each person isgiven a chance to speak, it is very likely that the meeting is going to be prolonged.But the critical problem is “Who is going to make a decision when all theparticipants seem to make sense?” (Appendix, E) A typical CGN approach ofsolving this problem is to raise such discussions up to a higher level meeting, suchas a meeting among chief engineers. But before that, these unsolved questions haveto be reported to that level by issuing a minute of meeting or a report.
Mrs. S’s words reminded me of a joke which Mr. G told me about the interfaces ofnuclear power engineering design. He once said that building a toilet in the maincontrol room inside the nuclear island required the participation of 20 differentengineering disciplines in CNPDC: air condition and ventilation, electricalengineering, fire prevention, water utilities, etc. He may exaggerate the facts but itreveals some facts.
5.2.7. THE PROBLEM OF INTERFACE IS A COMMON PHENOMENON
I am not trying to say that the problem about interfaces is a question with CGNcharacteristics only. It seemed to be an international problem experienced bynuclear power engineering companies. As Mr. M from AREVA NP put it:
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“Corporation between the interfaces is very complicated in this sort of‘real’ design. The corporation between the disciplines will experience aprocess first at the general level then into the details.” (Appendix, C)
Mr. M acknowledged the importance of communication between engineeringdisciplines via interfaces, but later he turned to express his critical view on AREVANP’s real-life operations on the interfaces in the Taishan project’s engineeringdesign.
“When we were doing Daya Bay and Ling Ao, all the people wereworking in the same tower, the AREVA Tower, including Sofinel(AREVA’s Design Institute). So it was easy to communicate; now it istoo scattered. We have people working in Germany, and people inFrance, and even in France we had many offices. Sofinel is not in Paris.Can you imagine?” (Appendix, C)
“And the split of work, who is in charge of this and that, when you do itlike that you multiply interfaces by 10 by 100. If you cannot manage theinterfaces you will fail. You will be in delay. From my own experience,for me, but it is off-record, the delay of the EPR is the result of theinterfaces. Too many people working together, and too much split of thework. There is a lack of organization and procedure of how things to bedone. That is my personal feeling. That is why for the management, agood organization should have sound basic procedures. If you solvethese fundamental topics you will be able to succeed.” (Appendix, C)
In many ways CGN is mimicking AREVA NP and such an attempt has long beenpermeated into various aspects of CGN’s engineering practices including itsengineers’ languages. The most evident example can be given by the Latinizedabbreviations of CNPEC’s second level organizational acronyms. CNPDC which isin fact a CNPEC’s subsidiary is abbreviated to EDE (Engineering Design Entity).The word entity which is to some extent foreign in the Chinese habit of usingEnglish is equivalent to the French word entité which sounds almost the same for aChinese who has learned some English. Even though the English word entity mightnot derive from a French origin but certainly French people are using entité in theirexpressions of company organizations at least I once heard of it given by mycounterparts in AREVA NP. It seems to me that CGN engineers through their longterm communications with the French partners have just borrowed this semi-English and French – in this case – expression to our own language.
CNPDC is called as she ji zhong xin or she ji yuan which can be literally translatedinto English as Engineering Design Center or Institute, instead of its official nameas China Nuclear Power Design Company in CGN engineers’ everyday language. Ifind that in English center and entity emphasize slightly different meanings whenthey are used to express organizational structures. According to the Merriam-
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Webster Dictionary of English entity means “an organization (as a business orgovernmental unit) that has an identity separated from those of its members”.(Merriam-Webster Dictionary1 Accessed December 24, 2014) Center can beinterpreted as “a facility providing a place for a particular activity or service”, “aregion of concentrated population” or “a source from which something originates”(Merriam-Webster Dictionary2 Accessed December 24, 2014) when it is used toillustrate organizational concepts. From these linguistic definitions, it is evident thatentity emphasizes different functional identity of an organization among other parts,while center addresses a sense of assembly or synthesis which focuses on centralcontrol or uniformity. In this respect, the choice of the word entity in CNPDC’sacronym is a deviation from its Chinese original concepts or intentions.
When French engineers say entity they may naturally be aware of its precisemeaning from their own cultural and language backgrounds, but when Chineseengineers appropriate this word, I am not sure whether they have noticed thedifference between the meanings they have chosen and how far the expressiondeviates from their original Chinese perceptions. I am not trying to be captious onChinese engineers’ proficiency in English language because it might just doesn’tmatter taking into the consideration that improving engineering design is to a greatextent a technical matter. Nor, I tend to ascribe this language phenomenon to thedifference of Chinese and Western cultural traditions. What I want to indicatethrough this seemingly irrelevant example is that learning from the West can havemore profound meanings which simply a metaphor as borrowing or appropriatingmay not be enough to interpret. Anyway, it seems that both Chinese and Frenchengineers prefer simplicity and that is the reason why the Taishan engineering flowchart was expressed by numerous acronyms.
Learning from AREVA may indicate that CGN encounters the same questionswhich AREVA has experienced. The dilemma of engineering interfaces serves asan example of this kind which means when CGN represents its contemporaryversion of learning from the West with some substantial contents, some criticalreviews of AREVA’s experiences are necessary. But unfortunately, I wouldconsider that such critical reviews lacked.
5.2.8. PROFESSIONALIZED ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
Mr. L is an active participant in CNPEC’s 3D printing technology study group. It isa spare-time voluntary internet forum – a loose network – established by CNPECengineers. According to Mr. L, 3D printing technology has now been utilized inmechanical industry for serval years, and probably one day it will be used fornuclear power plant’s main equipment manufacturing. Therefore, his participationin the voluntary learning of this technology fits into his engineering discipline andin addition, it represents his environmental concerns. He considers 3D printing anew approach of achieving lean production which will have a potential of
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dramatically reducing material consumptions in machine making. The most directsupporting example he gave was that 3D printing would make the molding of astructurally complicated die much easier. Promoting efficiency and avoiding wastehave become his perception of environmental protection. Importantly, this kind ofenvironmental concerns are what he thinks to be achievable by mechanicalengineers in China.
Mrs. S’s environmental consciousness seems to be more diversified. She mentionedsome of her previous jobs which could be regarded as making energy savingbuildings. In detail, she referred to her choices of using energy saving buildingmaterials. But in CNPDC she acknowledges that using energy saving materials iscompletely not a concern in nuclear power plant’s building design. What is treatedto be important in CNPDC is to make anti-seismic structures and to choose thematerials which can prevent radioactive rays from penetrating. Ironically, this canalso be interpreted as a form of practical environmental consciousness which isshared by all CGN engineers – in our own terms a nuclear safety culture.Aesthetical values are not her concerns because they belong to the concerns ofarchitects who are professionally regarded as another engineering discipline inChina.
5.3. COMMERCIAL ENGINEERS – MR. W AND MR. F
5.3.1. THE EXISTENCE OF COMMERCIAL ENGINEERS
System design and structural design engineers seem to live and work in their ownworlds. Communications between them and the outside world in terms of theirphysical models, calculations, and rational reasoning – their paradigms – can besummarized as a form of information exchange. In CGN, I would rather say thateven this form of external communication is not performed in a direct manner.There is a type of engineers who served as the mediators between the engineeringobject worlds and the outside social world. They are not direct participants inengineering design in the sense that they don’t issue drawings and calculationreports. But they cannot be exempted from engineering design because theirinfluences and involvements cover the entire life-span of the projects. Going downstream of a normal engineering sequence it is through them the purchasing orders ofcontainers, machines, cables, pipes, pumps etc. are contracted to CNPEC’s sub-suppliers based on CGN’s designs. It is also through them building designs aretransformed to construction and installation activities. From an economicperspective, it is through them design engineers’ work is translated into monetaryterms, as men-hour inputs, and consequently the values of knowledge becomevisible. Going up stream, before the kick-off, it is through these engineers theEnvironmental Impact Assessment (EIA), which is required by the NNSA to beincluded in the project’s feasibility study, is performed and submitted to the
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concerned governmental bodies. At the time of completion, it is also through themthe final safety analysis report (FSAR) is liaised with the NNSA, and finally apermission of fuel loading which is in fact the most important license leading tocommercial operation, is granted. In a summary, they are the ones who control andmonitor the progress of the project.
These commercial engineers can easily be distinguished from still other types ofCGN employees such as the administrative staff specifically a human resourcemanager for example. Commercial engineers are project based but those whoperformed general tasks are not positioned in a specific project organization.Compared to these administrative employees, commercial engineers are moreintimate to CGN’s engineering practices. From a managerial perspective theseengineers are normally placed in CNPEC’s Project Management Entity (PME) andPlanning and Business Entity (PBE).
Despite of these commercial engineers’ organizational differences like those ofdesign engineers permanently employed in different divisions, they are all put into avirtual project office. This virtual office is called a project management office underthe leadership of a general project manager. The split of work inside such a projectoffice is defined by the 9 areas of controls in the modern project managementknowledge system. (PMBOK 2008) The general project manager and his or herdeputies are in charge of the overall control responsibility of the nuclear powerplant project. The control of the scope of work is attributed to the contract engineers– drafting, interpreting, and modifying contracts when necessary. Schedulingcontrol engineers are those who perform the monitoring of the progresses. Budgetcontrol engineers are mainly those who deal with financial matters. Quality controland assurance engineers make sure the quality of the procured goods, theengineering practices of the designers and other service providers to comply withthe ISO9000 standard and those additional requirements set by NNSA such as theHAF codes (Chinese Nuclear Safety Regulations). In each project managementoffice there is a document control group, in which communication channels androutines are set up. This group delivers the right document to the right people andsends reports to the correct level of CNPEC’s higher management above the projectoffice. There should be a risk management engineer who collects various data andperforms some analysis in order to find abnormal incidents that may cause a delayor budget over-run which are regarded as the major risks to the project.Procurement engineers inside the office take the responsibility to outsource thegoods and services that cannot be generated within CNPEC but are essential to thecompletion of the project, such as the sub-contracting of the manufacturing of themain equipment – the reactor vessel – to qualified sub-suppliers. At this point 8types of jobs have been addressed except a human resource manager position whichnormally should be included in a standard project management office as it issuggested by the PMBOK. However, it is not the case in CNPEC.
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The task of predicting and distributing man-power is left for the administrators atthe company level, and at the same time, the general project manager possessessome power in human resource issues which are directly reflected by hisauthorization to decide which person should be appointed on which position insidethe project management office.
What is common among these seemingly separated and diffused tasks is a unifiedprocedure out of which the work is done in CNPEC. All these tasks start with akick-off, and then turned into their planning phase. After their implementationsalong with a series of monitoring and corrective activities; the closures can finallybe achieved. (PMBOK 2008) This common procedure has three aspects ofimplications. First, compared to the more traditional engineering disciplines,scientific management has set up its own discipline in CNPEC. It looks as ifscientific management has constructed its own object world. Second, from amethodological point of view, it made an analogy of project management to othertypes of engineering work especially to engineering design. That is to say, projectmanagement can also be perceived as a sort of design job by perceiving both ofthem as decision making. If this perception is true, then what is the object of thistype of design? This leads to the third implication of this discipline that indicatessocial relationships can be treated as objects of design.
In general CNPEC engineers’ external communications with the society areachieved by their commercial engineers. Precisely from a disciplinary perspective,these engineers can be named as project management engineers. But I think thatsuch a name does not reflect the essence of them. In CGN, it is through theseengineers technology has been transformed into commodities. Therefore, perhapscalling them commercial engineers is more appropriate in contrast to thosetechnical engineers.
5.3.2. EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF COMMERCIAL ENGINEERS
Unlike the system and structural designers who have to be educated in alreadyestablished engineering disciplines, commercial engineers in CGN come from avarieties of backgrounds. It is quite often that licensed lawyers serve as the contractengineers. Statisticians are hired to perform project scheduling tasks. Librarians areturned into document managers. However, what appears more often is that thetechnically trained engineers are turned into quality control and assurance officers,procurement engineers, and even budget control managers. It means that, in CGN,switching from a technical discipline to another less technically loaded job is aneasier case than its reverse direction because science and technology is consideredas more privileged knowledge.
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In order to illustrate our commercial engineers’ experiences, two individuals wereinterviewed. One of them is a thermal power engineering trained procurementengineer and the other is a contract engineer with a business administration degree.
Mr. W is now a 37 year old procurement manager in the Taishan project. Hisbachelor’s education was received from an engineering college specialized in thetraining of electrical power engineers in northern China not far from his hometown.He was born into an engineering family. His father is now a retired thermal powerengineer. In this respect he inherits his father’s engineering profession. Due to hisfather’s connections with the industry, Mr. W got a job in the same company inwhich his father had worked for decades as a conventional coal power plantinstallation and commissioning engineer after his graduation from that engineeringcollege. Two year after his working in that company, with a hope of bringing somechanges to his life, Mr. W decided to study in a master’s program in a moreprestigious university in Guangzhou, the South China’s University of Technology.It might be true that Mr. W experienced some culture shocks as a migrant from thenorthern part of this country to its southern part. What unchanged was hisengineering discipline in his postgraduate education.
With a Master’s degree, he was given an opportunity to work in a power plantengineering science and technology research and development institute inGuangzhou. It was a better company but the job did not last long. Not in a year hedecided to join CGN which he thought might bring him a brighter future, because inthe research and development institute his Master’s degree compared to a PhDdegree was considered less competitive. His first job in CGN started in 2005. It wasa position located on Yangjiang site, because he was recruited as a system testingand commissioning engineer. At that time the Yangjiang CPR1000 project was stillin its feasibility study phase in the sense that the authorization to proceed (ATP)had not yet been issued by the NNSA. Therefore, precisely, he served as acommissioning engineer in waiting. The major task he performed in that period oftime was to study the previously used engineering documents of the alreadycompleted projects such as the Daya Bay project and the Ling Ao Phase 1 project.CGN was quite optimistic, in 2005, in getting the Yangjiang project’s ATP becauseit was the time when the Ling Ao Phase 2 project was just started that symbolizedthe renaissance of China’s nuclear power.
His opportunity of transforming into a commercial engineer appeared in 2006 whenCGN tapped into a negotiation with AREVA NP on the construction of two EPRunits on Taishan site. Compared to the CPR1000 technology, the EPR seemed to bemore advanced Western technology, and this indicated that from a human resourceperspective, people involved in this project should be those with some freshknowledge and well prepared. That was the reason why Mr. W was chosen. Withsome knowledge reserves of knowing the nuclear power plant’s system and somesense of knowing how a nuclear power plant could be built from his studies on
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previous documents, he was appointed a position as the scheduling control engineerin the negotiation team. Joining the team brought Mr. W to Shenzhen.
The abovementioned interviewees are engineers with engineering educationbackgrounds. Mr. F is a commercial engineer in CGN without an engineeringhigher education. To some extent, he is not a school trained but a self-trainedengineer. His knowledge about engineering was largely gained from his work inCGN and in his previous experience in IBM.
Mr. F is now a 36 year old man who has been working in CGN for more than 8years. He is a second generation migrant from northern China to Shenzhen. Hisfamily moved to Shenzhen, China’s first special economic zone, in the early 1980sbefore Mr. F was old enough to receive his 9 years compulsory education. Hisprimary and secondary school education was received in Shenzhen. Unlike most ofthe CGN engineers who spent their high school years in science streamed classes,Mr. F was an art streamed student in high school. His choice in high school led himinto a foreign language and business studies university in Guangzhou to completehis higher education. After his graduation from Guangdong University of ForeignStudies, he went to the University of Surrey in the United Kingdom for hispostgraduate education. He came back to Shenzhen with a Master’s degree ininternational business management in 2004 and soon after his return he wasemployed by IBM.
Working for a multinational company was still a fashion among the young Chineseeducated people in the early 2000, but Mr. F was unsatisfied with his job in thisfamous company. On one hand, his job in IBM was largely clerical. Specifically itwas a customer service job, in which Mr. F was in charge of answering his clients’questions on a webpage. Therefore, he considered himself as an answering machine.Without a promising career development path, Mr. F considered it not a decentcareer. On the other hand, unlike CGN which was and still is trying to provide to itsemployees an internationally standard salary, IBM was paying according to itsperception of the localized standard. Knowing how an IBM employee was paid inthe UK, for example, Mr. F felt that he was treated unfairly in this internationalcompany in China.
CGN has been established in Shenzhen for almost 3 decades. Its headquarter, CGNtower, the science and technology building shared by CGN with the city’sIntellectual Property Office, a governmental agency, situates in the central businessdistrict of this city. This location can easily trigger a high-tech image on thiscompany. In addition, CGN’s shuttle buses connecting its dispersed offices and itsnuclear power plants’ sties serve as a good media for advertisement. Runningthough the city with a CGN logo, the buses give the commoners an impression thatCGN is a financially affluent company, in the sense that its employees’transportations are provided on a free of charge basis. In Mr. F’s case, this
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advertisement worked, because it gave him a guarantee that his benefits can beensured as long as he got recruited. It was in 2006 Mr. F joined CGN.
5.3.3. WHAT DO COMMERCIAL ENGINEERS DO?
By the end of 2007 when CGN and AREVA NP finally entered into the contract onthe construction of the Taishan EPR unit 1 and 2, which implied that the issuance ofan ATP was just a matter of time, Mr. W received his new assignment. Aconsortium consisting AREVA NP as the leader and CNPEC and CNPDC asAREVA NP’s sub-suppliers was formed to serve as the lump sum supplier to theowner. Due to the fact that the work for CNPEC was delineated within the balanceof the nuclear island (BNI) – not the complete scope – the overall scheduling workhad to be led by AREVA NP. Therefore, Mr. W was given a task on the schedulingcontrol of the procurement activities within CNPEC’s scope of supply. Thisassignment was later extended to an overall project management task whichincluded not only scheduling control but also coordination with CNPDC andAREVA NP representing CNPEC.
The extension of his job, from my perspective, was inevitable taking into theconsideration of the split of work within the consortium. Procurement engineers gettheir orders from the designers, because it is the designer who issues the technicalspecifications that stipulate what kind of equipment to procure. Even though,CNPDC is also involved in the design, it is only a service provider which cannottake the ultimate technical responsibility. AREVA NP who owns the technology’sintellectual property right, is the ultimate legal person who should be subject to thenuclear liabilities of the plant’s engineering design. That is to say CNPDC’s designshall be logoed under the name of AREVA NP and from a practical perspective, allthe documents used for procurement and construction must be approved byAREVA NP. In this respect, as a procurement manager in CNPEC for the Taishanproject, coordination between AREVA NP and CNPDC is inevitable. Coordinationof the procurement activities is not just a job of dealing with design matters. Almostall the 9 types of controls mentioned in the PMBOK (2008) are relevant.
Mr. W is a busy person. He travels a lot to different equipment manufacturers bothdomestically and abroad. When a non-conformance of manufacturing related to theCNPEC’s scope of supply is reported he is the first one to know. Then he has toclarify the situation with the designers in CNPDC or in AREVA NP. Since AREVANP is entitled to issue design modifications or variations as long as it findsnecessary, such orders have to be transmitted to the manufacturer from Mr. W.Normally, modifications are accompanied with financial issues because theyrepresent extra work. In real life, not all these tasks are done by Mr. W alone, but heplays an important part. There are about 30 to 50 engineers working under himdepending on the different phases of the engineering design. Internal meetings with
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designers and other types of commercial engineers take up a majority of Mr. W’sdaily routines.
Mr. F’s first job in CGN which lasted for about 8 years was to act as a contractengineer in charge of purchasing technical assistances and supporting services fromprominent foreign nuclear power engineering companies in case CGN met technicalproblems that it cannot solve or required some third party review of its technicaldocuments. The nature of Mr. F’s job did not change too much over the years buthis contacts covered a wide range of people including engineers in CGN and thebusiness persons in his suppliers. Similar to his jobs in the IBM, he kept onsourcing services, but for CGN he had to source outside in the market. By treatingCGN’s design engineers as his clients, Mr. F was given an opportunity to learnmore concrete technical contents which he thought appreciated his professionalstatus.
“Since I joined CGN in 2006 my job has always been related to ourengineering design. But it doesn’t mean that I personally performengineering design. I have always been playing a supportive role to ourdesigners. I am a contract engineer dedicated to technical assistancecontracts. That is to say, I purchase supporting services and documentsfrom prominent foreign nuclear power engineering companies to helpour designers to solve problems or review their work. Previously ourdesign could be described as duplications plus modifications; thereforewe need numerous references. In this respect, my job has been closelyrelated to our design activities.” (Appendix, G)
In 2014, in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, when China temporarilysuspended its ambitious nuclear power development in the domestic market andturned to be active in the international nuclear power market, Mr. F got hisopportunity to take part in the planning of a nuclear power export project. CGN’sattempts to export nuclear power plants derived from the country’s confidence inthe mastering of this technology which was reflected by its serval decades’successful construction and maintenance experiences. In addition, in recent years,perhaps China is the only country where both of the two well-known Gen-3 types ofnuclear power plants (AP1000 and EPR) are under construction. Together with aconsideration of upgrading China’s exports of industrial goods and services to anadvanced level, the central government encourages the export of nuclear powerplants. The most evident government support for this exporting policy can be readfrom the news reports dated after 2013. In one of the Reuters’ reports (2013-12-17)such a claim was formally addressed by Zhang Guobao, China’s former top energyofficer and a tireless promoter of nuclear energy. Mr. F is now a part of this attempteven though his role is minor.
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“Now I am in another oversea nuclear power engineering project, andstill is a contract engineer. My job is still to support our design.”(Appendix, G)
Perhaps the change from a contract engineer of purchasing technical services to acommercial engineer dedicated to a specific project pushes Mr. F further into thediscipline of scientific management.
“I am now a commercial manager for a big project even though it is stillin its preliminary planning stage. I am involved in the project’s licensingprocess. In this stage, I am also asked to source supporting servicesrelated to the modifications of the software we are using, the P6 system.It is the tool that we are using to manager our designs.” (Appendix, G)
5.3.4. COMMERCIAL ENGINEERS’ IDENTIFICATION OF THEPROBLEMS
Mr. W’s work can be regarded as follow-ups of engineering design. His perceptionsof engineering design focus on manufacturing. From his words the process ofengineering design and the types of problem-solving included can be understoodfrom a retrospective.
Mr. W distinguishes two types of engineers design in CGN:
“In both system and equipment designs, the designers will raise somerequirements on the specific equipment to be procured.” (Appendix, F)
From his words we are able to deduce that engineering design is a form of decisionmaking. Mr. W described this analogy of design to planning as the following:
“The designers directly limit the choices of procurement and predict therange of the price we are going to pay for each piece of equipment. Highdemanding requirements indicate fewer potential suppliers. Therefore,the price is going to be higher. In some cases, the supplier will berequired to carry out some R&D activities before manufacturing. Thiswill cause some unexpected prolonging of manufacturing.” (Appendix,F)
In this respect, a good design can be reflected by its accuracy of predicting follow-up activities and its compatibility to the established procedures and conditions – inthis case technical standards. On the other side, engineering designers as gooddecision makers have to be equipped with an ability to deal with abnormal incidentswhich deviate from their plans and predictions.
These reflections about engineering design are shaped from his experience:
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“In real life work, we often witness some deviations from the designrequirements, in the sense that the equipment on the market cannot meetthe technical specifications of our design. In case such a deviationoccurs, we need sound engineering design abilities so that we can findout how to deal with it.” (Appendix, F)
“Another aspect of engineering design capacity that I would like to pointout here is the understanding of industrial standard. The majorindustrialized countries adopted different industrial standards. TheEuropeans use their standard. And even within Europe, the Frenchadopts its own nuclear power industry standard RCCM while theGermans use their KTA. The good thing is that in Europe there is ageneral manufacturing standard. In China, we have the GB standard andthe Americans have their ASME. In such a globalized and diversifiedsituation, considering nuclear power engineering design and its follow-up procurement by competitive bidding, if the standard is chosen to beonly one without alternatives, the choices for procurement become verylimited. This will lead to a limited number of potential sub-suppliersfrom which we can finally choose one. A lot of bidders are rejectedbecause they are not familiar with the required standard ofmanufacturing. If the designers can understand all these standards thesituation will be better. Industrial standard for me is a set of rules andprocedures. It does not directly relate to the quality and functionality ofthe product. But if the designer is not familiar with the standard, he orshe cannot make a judgment on the product, and its impact to thesystem.” (Appendix, F)
According to Mr. W nuclear power technology is not a high-tech. It has a maturedindustrial base. Therefore, too much R&D in the engineering design phase is not apositive factor for a smooth implementation of the project. He prefers definite andrealistic plans or orders:
“We are not really doing high-tech products; we are indeed in need ofthose already industrialized and standard products. You cannot makeeach piece of equipment used in the nuclear power plant a product out ofa R&D process. This is not only true in our domestic market but also inthe global market. If even the European advanced suppliers cannotprovide ready products that meet the design requirement, I would saythat the design is not good at all. In that case the designer totallydisregards the reality. As a summary of this point, I would say that thedesigner must have enough information about manufacturing technics inthe market. The design should not be a requirement that cannot be met.”(Appendix, F)
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But that is not to say that in normal designs when all the information is consummate,engineering design can be performed in a smooth progress without disturbancescaused by iterations and deviations. In fact, verifications, reworks and tests whichsuspend or reverse the idealized process of a normal design are quite common. InCGN’s engineering procedures all these abnormal incidents, especially those appearin equipment manufacturing, are recorded in a specific type of project reports calledthe Non-Conformance Reports (NCRs).
“In our classification, NCRs are categorized into 3 types. The first typeis called the I-category, internal NCRs. These NCRs are those incidentsdiscovered by the manufacturers themselves. And these flaws can bemitigated or turned to normal by normal machine work, such aspolishing a surface etc.” (Appendix, F)
“The second type is called the E1 NCRs, external category 1 NCRs.These NCRs mean that if they are mitigated, the functional requirementsin the design can still be met.” (Appendix, F)
“E2 category NCRs mean that these flaws can never be mitigated. Thatis to say the owner of the plant has to accept the equipment with acompromise. But such a compromise shall also fulfill a set ofprerequisites. First, the designer has to commit that the functionalrequirements in the design exceed the real operational conditions.Therefore, even with such flaws the design margin can still ensureoperational safety. Second, through modifying other parts of the systemor adjusting operational procedures, no incidents that may impair theintrinsic safety will occur. In any case, an acceptance with a compromiseof the E2 NCRs means that the design requirements exceed the safetymargin, therefore the equipment is still considered as workable.”(Appendix, F)
Even though deviations may appear in different forms, their solutions can becategorized into two forms, specifically compromise and substitution:
“One method often used is to make a technical compromise in terms of asubstitution. Nuclear power plants are designed to work properly for 60years but there is some equipment which cannot last that long, say 30years, for example, according to our fatigue analysis some of the valvescannot reach to a service of 60 years. We have requirements not only forthe valves’ years of service but also their sizing and weight etc. In fact,to prolong the valve’s service, the easiest approach is to make the shellthicker but this will increase its weight and larger its size. Due to thesizing and weight limits, some valves must be lighter or smaller. In thiscase a compromise is needed. With a thinner shell, the years of service
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can only be ensured, say 30 years. As a consequence, the designer has toconsider its substitution in the in-service inspections. That is to say twovalues are needed to fulfill the plant’s operation for 60 years. One newvalve will replace the old 30 years after the plant’s commercialoperation. However, we must admit that there are always some problemswhich cannot be solved by this approach, in these situations the designerhave to find other solutions.” (Appendix, F)
“Another kind of substitution happens when a different material can bechosen. But it is very difficult in our self-reliant manufacturing becauseusing another material means to substitute an industrial standard.”(Appendix, F)
In this respect, the more cases the designers have dealt with, the more capable ofthe designers to perform good engineering designs. According to Mr. W improvingengineering design is a matter of accumulating experiences especially for ourequipment design engineers.
“I got a feeling that CGN engineers largely performed system designand lacked equipment design knowledge. The system designer focuseson flows and fluid mechanic. They seldom concern about structures,fatigues and materials. So from a CGN perspective, we need to nurturegood equipment designers. On quick approach is to recruit designerswith manufacturing experiences into CNPDC, or we need to tighten ourcorporation with our suppliers. As such the designers will get some first-hand senses on whether their requirements can be achieved in real lifemanufacturing. Now our designers do not have such senses, they oftendraft a plan first and then wait for manufacturers’ feedbacks andcorrections.” (Appendix, F)
But getting knowledge is not equivalent to gaining experience because it requires atransformation of the theoretical knowledge to practical useful knowledge and thatequals to project experience.
“From a personal perspective, engineering design capacity buildingrelies on experience. But experience cannot emerge just from booklearning. Without verifications and tests from a real life project,knowledge seems to be useless. That is the reason why I considerengineering design capacity building as an organizational issue. Now, Ifeel that CNPDC’s engineering design capacity is relatively theoreticalin the sense that it is not competent in dealing with the problemsemerging in real manufacturing processes. So engineering designcapacity building can be considered as system engineering. If thecompany can provide enough projects, experiences of our designengineers can be generated from them.” (Appendix, F)
A BOOK OF CHANGES IN ENGINEERING
152
It seems to me that Mr. W’s perception of engineering design and the approach ofimproving it are systematic. What he favors is an idealized precise systematicproduction of documents and decisions which stipulate follow-up engineeringactivities. In order to reach precision, experience is needed, because experience canbe useful in both predicting what will happen and finding out solutions in a timelymanner. Such kind of systematic thinking reflects a constant pursuit of knowing theunknowns. Unknowns are considered as dangerous because they may lead tofailures.
Unlike Mr. W, Mr. F’s job is more remote to engineering design. However, Mr. Fmade his own analogies of his commercial job to engineering design and addressedthe problems of engineering design and its solutions in a managerial tone. Whatseems to be evident from Mr. F’s words is that his systematic thinking is no lessheavy than his colleagues with scientific and technological educationalbackgrounds.
Mr. F said: “We are exactly doing like this. For example the choices ofour consortium members, or partners in the project, are in fact based onour data analysis on their competencies such as their revenues andprofits. There are a lot of things that we consider from a quantitativeperspective.” (Appendix, G)
Despite of this similarity of his commercial work to engineering design, differencesare also quite evident.
“From my perspective the designers have to be precise, while for anegotiator, approximation and compromise are always needed forexample the choice of governing laws for a contract. Each party favorsthat the contract shall be stipulated by the laws of its own country, but ifeveryone insists on their own wishes there will never be a contract. Sothe trade-off is to stipulate the contract on a third country’s law. Weencounter more social factors than the designers.” (Appendix, G)
Both Mr. F and Mr. W emphasize the importance of precision in theirunderstandings of engineering design. What differentiate Mr. F and Mr. W is thatMr. F thinks that only those social elements related to engineering design can becompromised. However, he does not know that in real life engineering design thosehard scientific elements can also be compromised. This scientific impression onengineering design leads to Mr. F’s perceptions on its management.
“It is hard to say that which task can be solved solely by quantitativereasoning but, as far as I am concerned, commercial or planning jobs inCGN are relied on scientific management. For example our projectmanagement is founded on scientific management principles, the 9 areas
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of controls. Our company’s management is constructed by itsmanagement systems, which are based on rational reasoning. So doesthe management of engineering design. It needs a system to organize ourwork so that it can operate smoothly. I think the engineering designmanagement system shall be more rigid.” (Appendix, G)
It seems that Mr. F and Mr. W meet the same conclusion on the function of thescientific management over engineering design. But it is important to clarify theirdifferent points of departure. Mr. W emphasizes the importance of scientificmanagement in order to avoid deviations, but Mr. F thinks that since engineeringdesign is a highly scientific job, it has to be ruled by scientific management andthere is no other way to regulate these activities. In this respect, the natural andsocial divide in Mr. F’s mind is quite obvious.
In CGN, Mr. F’s perception on engineering design seems to be amateurish, and thisimpressionistic opinion about engineering design can also be reflected by hisperception on the R&D activities.
“I am questioning our approach of design. Because I feel that we arealways performing a duplication of others’ design with our limitedmodifications. The EPR and the AP1000 are not our products. Our realproducts are those modifications. In this respect, the HL 1000 may beconsidered as our product but certainly CPR1000 is not that kind of aproduct. At least in the development of the HL1000, we go through itsR&D, not just duplications or modifications. We start from the origin. Ifengineering design is defined to be duplications and modifications, Itend to think that our designs are workable in a realistic sense taking intothe consideration of scheduling. But I still think engineering designshould be something more creative. The HL1000’s R&D may be anexample for that kind of engineering design.” (Appendix, G)
Perhaps, it is due to his long term involvement in sourcing technical assistance toour design engineers, Mr. F’s impression on good design focuses on the engineers’intellectual independence. In his perception, good work must first be original work.That is the reason why he also criticizes the daily routines of our engineeringdesigners.
“We need to reduce the waste of our energy in the interfaces. We needto reduce disputes over trifles among our departments and engineeringdisciplines. To do this a more scientific approach of management shouldbe relied on. I hope under a better management scheme, engineers canfocus, or spend more time, on real design activities or learning, ratherthan wasting their time on handling trivial things which are in fact notengineering design. However, I think improving our management can
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only serve a supportive role. The most important thing is that engineersspend more time on real engineering design. As such the result will bedifferent.” (Appendix, G)
“Good management may stimulate creative thinking among ourengineers. Just now I am trying to say that even though hard working isimportant, but it doesn’t mean that creative thinking can be naturallygenerated through hard working. Creative thinking is important for abetter design.” (Appendix, G)
5.3.5. ATTITUDES TO NUCLEAR POWER AND TO ENVIRONMENTALACTIVISM
Although Mr. W does not deny the lurking environmental risks regarding to nuclearpower technology, he points out that there must be a solution to this problem. WhenI discussed with him during a lunch time about He Zuoxiu, Mr. W pointed out thatthe ultimate risk of nuclear power technology is its waste. Technologies ofeliminating the radioactive hazards of nuclear wastes are currently unknown to us.In this respect, Mr. W is opposing He Zuoxiu. As Mr. W said to me that as aprestigious nuclear physicist He Zuoxiu should not oppose nuclear powertechnology, rather He Zuoxiu should use his expertise to find out new ways oftreating nuclear fission wastes or to invent nuclear reactors which will make nuclearfusion reaction feasible, because either of those would ultimately solve the problem.It may be appropriate to characterize Mr. W as a typical engineer who believes inthe unlimited growth of science and technology. On one hand, he believes thatscientific advancements on nuclear fission and fusion reactions would finally leadto a waste free technology of energy production, but on the other hand, he alsoadmits that such technology does not exist at the current stage. Consequently, wehave to be realistic at least for now. He indicates that we need to accept theenvironmental prices for using this source of energy. Since engineers are not likescientists, and R&D is not a necessary task that engineers have to devote to, theonly strategy left for engineers is to wait for a scientific breakthrough before takingactions to abandon the know-hows that we have. For Mr. W nuclear power is stillan effective way of meeting our increasing demand of energy. Therefore, engineersneed to master it and we still have a long way to go to make the system morereliable. Practically, there are a lot of things that can be done to make our system ofdesign more predictable which represents the mastering of this technology.
Provided that Mr. W’s criticism on Professor He Zuoxiu derives from a realisticvalue nurtured by his engineering educations, Mr. F’s support of this technology isbased on a firm trust of its intrinsic safety merged with his business acumen. It isalso evident that in Mr. F’s mind environmental activism is closely related to somesmall everyday life affairs. Here in CGN we are doing business. Therefore it hasnothing to do with this type of problem-solving.
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Mr. F said: “I understand that the essence of nuclear power engineeringis its safety culture. I also know that perhaps the general public’s imageof nuclear power is influenced by its negative consequences of thereported accidents. As far as I know the risk of nuclear power to impairthe natural environment is the radioactive release. But using uranium toproduce electricity can also be regarded as an environmental friendlytechnology. Compared to coal and petroleum power, nuclear power usesvery small amount of fuel. The major concern is whether we can controlthe risk. This kind of control is achieved by our scientific design, andregulated operation. If we can make sure that no accident is going tohappen, then nuclear power is a very good sauce of power. Compared tothe conventional ways of electricity production, nuclear power does notrequire a massive scale of mining.” (Appendix, G)
“I think the most severe environmental impact of a nuclear power plantis not reflected by its commercial operation but by its decommissioning.The land used to construct the plant cannot be used for other purposes. Itbecomes a dead concrete dome. And this status will last for a very longtime, 100 years maybe. The land will be a waste land. This is the onlybad thing I can point out on nuclear power technology. For other matters,I think that, as long as we can control radioactive releases, nuclearpower technology in general will benefit our society.” (Appendix, G)
Inadvertently, Mr. F depicts the great divide of personal participation inenvironmental protection activities and the involvement of environmental activism:
“From my personal perspective, I print on both sides of the paper. I usethe printed paper as my draft paper. I seldom waste paper. I buy a fuelsaving car and I care a lot about the disposal of my wastes. I think theseare common environmental habits. But if you ask me about someadvanced activities of environmental protection, I would say that I donot pay a greater concern on this matter. I merge environmentalactivities into my life. I do things that I can do. I go as far as I can toprotect the environment.” (Appendix, G)
“From the company perspective, I think our company emphasizesenvironmental protection. It is a clean energy supplier. When you thinkabout clean energy, that is environmental protection. As you know, weare not only developing nuclear power but also wind power, hydropower, solar power etc. But please be minded that we never constructcoal or petroleum powered plants. Coal and petroleum power is far fromthe notion of environmental protection. Building clean energy facilitiesis our company’s vision. In this respect, I would rather say that ourcompany put a great effort in environmental protection. This can be
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reflected by our products. But as a business company we are not thatdeep green. I think our prorogation of environmental protection isperformed in a relatively unperceivable manner. We are a clean energyprovider, and we change the culture by our work.” (Appendix, G)
The paradox of Mr. F’s expressions on environmental protection is that I cannotfind enough apparent correlations between his personal life and his jobs in CGN. Itlooks as if working in CGN is not a part of his life, or I may be able to deduce thatdoing business is not like living a life.
5.4. THE READING OF A BOOK – MR. YE’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY
In the previous three sections of this chapter I have portrayed some personal storiesof 5 CGN engineers. All of them are quite young in age. Therefore, theirexperiences can only reflect a partial image of the transitions of nuclear powerengineering in China, especially taking into the consideration that nucleartechnology has developed in this country ever since the Mao years. In the 1980s,this technology of military origin started to be used for civil purposes. Even thoughI have briefly discussed about such transitions in Chapter 3 of this thesis via thegrowing path that went through by CGN, personal reflections and participations inthese transitions still remains blank. In order to depict the human side of nuclearpower engineering in earlier periods, specifically from the 1950s to the 1990s, Ineed a storyteller who have actually witnessed. However, it was extremely difficultto find such a person. One reason for this difficulty is that the official retirement agein China is 60 for the majorities of Chinese people, while higher rankinggovernmental officials’ retirement can be prolonged. That is to say in CGN,officially employed engineers are all under the age of 60 except some part-timelyemployed consultants. Even those engineers or administrative officers around 60years old are unable to provide first-hand detailed stories in the long 1960s and1970s when they were just teenagers who might not exactly know what was reallyhappening in this country. Also they were not involved in China’s development ofnuclear technology in its early stage.
Certainly those people with first-hand personal experiences in this period of timemay still be alive, such as Professor He Zuoxiu whose voice can still be heard fromtime to time, or they may be somewhere living their retirement lives far away fromthis industry. With the help of my senior colleagues born in the 1960s and early1970s, and are now working in CNPEC, I finally figure out two of these people.
5.4.1. A SELF-TURNED PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL
I can only give a short introduction to one of them in this thesis, and it has to beanonymous because he rejected my request of an interview with him. In thetelephone call that I asked him for an interview, I explained to him that my PhD
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thesis was about how to improve nuclear power engineering design and importantlythis part-time PhD project was approved by CNPEC. I told him straightforwardlythat my approach was a cultural approach in which the human side of nuclear powerengineering served as a focus. I also told him that I read his book published in 2010.In that book he made a metaphor of nuclear science and technology to a double-edged sword, in the sense that both sides of its cultural image were portrayed. Sinceit was a popular science reading, in which the cultural and human sides of nuclearscience and technology were told as secrete stories, I thought he might be willing togive some of his personal stories about his participation in China’s nuclear powerengineering which were missing in his book. But he let me down, as he told me thatbeing a well-known retiree from the Chinese nuclear industry, he tried not to beinvolved in some disputing discussions about this industry because that woulddisturb decision making of the current leadership. His rejection was made in anexcuse that I could not pose any objection. He said that he was not in a good healthcondition. In fact, I knew he was trying to send a message that he did not want to bedisturbed from his peaceful retirement life. This engineering expert is a graduatefrom Tsinghua University. He was born in 1941. In this respect, he is a Chinesetrained nuclear science and technology expert, and importantly he must be able toprovide some cultural reflections that featured the generation of intellectuals of hisage. However, I can only accept his rejection as a missed opportunity for myresearch.
Mr. Ye Changyuan was this anonymous expert’s alumni, classmate which was alsohighly possible. He was also born in 1941 and went to Tsinghua University to studynuclear reactor engineering in 1958. Mr. Ye was the only person that I would puthis name in this empirical chapter. I may have to apologize for this because I didnot get his permission in person of treating him differently from the otherinterviewees in this thesis. The reason for this is that Mr. Ye passed away probablyin early 2012. Before his death, I did not know this person, because compared to hisprominent peers he seemed to be anonymous. Therefore, it was never possible that Imet him in person and carryout an interview with him. But I would here write abouthim and thank him for his contributions to my research, because he left a book – anautobiography – before he passed away from us.
His book titled Those Days and Those Things of Mine – literally translated intoEnglish – was published in 2014 more than a year after his death by China CulturePublishing House. I was told, but I am not sure, that he published this book on hisown cost, as his last will. This book is not a popularized book in any respect. It isnot sold in bookstores. It is not enlisted in public libraries’ catalogues, and it is evennot approachable on the internet book stores where a lot of rare books can bebrought. There are two ways that this book can be read. The first approach is to readMr. Ye’s blog which has been updated by his family members, the second approachis to get a paper copy from his trusted friends. As such the book circulates in thecompany. One of my colleagues was a close friend of Mr. Ye. He worked with Mr.
A BOOK OF CHANGES IN ENGINEERING
158
Ye in CGN’s Ling Ao Phase 1 project, when Mr. Ye was not retired yet. In thisrespect, Mr. Ye devoted the last a few years of his career to CGN. I got this bookfrom the colleague. Therefore, I can use this book to fill in the blanks that Imentioned above.
In the preface of his book Mr. Ye wrote:
“This book portrays some real life experiences of an ordinaryintellectual in Mainland China. It is a window through which the lives ofintellectuals of my age can be known and interpreted.”(Ye, 2014, p.1)
Unlike us – China’s younger generations of engineers – he entitled himself anintellectual throughout the book instead of a straightforward more professional titlean engineer which is quite common in recent years. It seemed that in his age –especially in the 1960s and 1970s – these two titles were not as clearlydistinguished as they are today. Intellectuals in contemporary China represent thoseknowledgeable people regardless of the disciplines of his or her learnings, whileengineers have now been used to identify a profession – a type of technical job.
Putting this blurry or changing definition of the title intellectual into a broadersocial and historical context, we may be able to further clarify the changes of thecultural perceptions of science and technology in society as I have tried to describein Chapter 2 of this thesis.
In pre-modern China, those with knowledge about social orders were named “shi”while those with knowledge and skills on natural things and the making ofinstruments were called “gong”. In terms of social rankings, “shi” was put in theforemost position, while “gong” was placed in the third place after “nong” – thoseengaged in agricultural production – but before “shang” – merchants. Therefore,there was no way that pre-modern craftsman or engineers were considered associally equivalent to intellectuals. Starting from China’s long lastingmodernization process, along with a re-evaluation of the two different types ofknowledge – knowledge about social orders and knowledge about nature andinstruments – the traditional definition of intellectuals began to change. This changecan be interpreted by the expansion of the scope of “shi”. Knowledge about natureand instruments demonstrated its importance in China’s initial contacts andconflicts with the West. Therefore, those with such useful knowledge – which isnow largely recognized as science and technology – became to be recruited into themore traditional elite social group of “shi” – intellectuals. (Xu, 2011) As aconsequence those knowledgeable people regardless of their origins and learningsare regarded as intellectuals for a certain period of time. According to myestimation, a rough partition, this period of time covers the entire history of theRepublic of China and the beginning two or three decades of the new socialistChina.
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However, in more recent years, the differentiation of engineers from intellectualsbegan to take place after China’s Cultural Revolution which ended in the late 1970sand China’s economic reforms which started in the early 1980s.
5.4.2. THE DILEMMA OF NUCLEAR POWER ENGINEERS IN 1960S AND1970S
As I can read from the history of China after 1949, this differentiation derived fromthe Cultural Revolution. Specifically the reason lies in the conflict manifested byMao’s policy of science and technology which ruled China for almost three decades(1950 to 1980). This conflict can be expressed as the following: on one hand, Maoappreciated the value of science and technology and emphasized on its roles in thecontrol and shaping of the society, but on the other hand, Mao did not give thosewho mastered knowledge equivalent social status.
Mr. Ye lived under this dilemma ever since 1958 when we he registered as aTsinghua University student which symbolized his social status. From Mr. Ye’srecords, Tsinghua University was established by the American government whichcleverly used the Qing Dynasty’s indemnity for the American’s losses in the boxers’rebellions. The United States was the only country among the eight powers thatreimbursed such a large amount of funding to help China to establish its moderneducation system instead of taking such precious resources as a form of theprimitive accumulation of capital. However, in the years when Mr. Ye waseducated in Tsinghua, such a story was interpreted as an American culture invasionwhen China was in its weakest moment. It had long been perceived that Tsinghuawas a school to cultivate pro-American elites. (Ye, 2014, p.96) This uniquebackground indicated his miserable encounters in the 1960s and 1970s when classstruggles, one after another, became the major themes of Chinese people’s lives,including intellectuals.
In 1958, the Great Leap Forward Movement started to take place. Universitystudents like Mr. Ye were required to participate in various forms of labor worksuch as tree planting and digging the basement of Tsinghua University’s firstexperimental nuclear reactor (the 200# reactor) near a river bank. He wrote that hecontributed at least 100 working days full-time to this construction project with hismanual work. (Ye, 2014, p.97 and 124) It was only in the relatively standby hours,in the intervals of the labor work, he and his fellow classmates were able to havesome book learning. In the studying hours he felt “free and leisured, therefore Iconcentrated on learning”. (Ye, 2014, p.124)
Revolutionary education was a major part of his life in the first two years in theuniversity. Such education was achieved by meetings and political debates. (Ye,2014, p.102-103) It was in the third year Mr. Ye decided on his major – nuclearreactor engineering. This is different from today in the sense that students have to
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choose a major before their admittance. Mr. Ye did not write why nuclear reactorengineering became his major, therefore I can only conjecture that his choice wasmade upon his respond to the call of the nation. The Great Leap Forward wasstopped by a nationwide famine in the years from 1961 to 1962. The nation had tolaunch its food rationing to cope with its shortage of food. Students like him werecertainly of no exception. Ironically, this famine gave the students of TsinghuaUniversity an opportunity to perform some technological innovations, which Mr.Ye later considered as a typical Chinese humor. (Ye, 2014, p.119)
He wrote: “In this period of time, the university asked us to participatein a technology innovation movement, to deal with the famine. Weheard that treating a normal steamed bread (a type of Chinese food madeof leavened dough) with ultrasonic waves, would make it twice as big.Experiments on the making of these ultrasonic steamed breads began inevery canteen. We smashed one end of a stainless steel pipe and blew itwith pressurized air. Earsplitting shrieks were produced and it wasbelieved that among these high frequency sounds, ultrasonic waves exist.In a month time, we found that we failed. Then everything returned tothe past but leaving dozens of smashed pipes in the kitchen.” (Ye, 2014,p.119)
In these early socialist years in China, Mr. Ye’s environmental concerns started toappear. In a footnote that expressed his criticism to the Great Leap ForwardMovement that took place in his home town – a small village in the mountainousareas in Fujian Province – his natural conservation and human concerns related toscience and technology are reflected:
“This primeval forest which has been nurtured by the great nature forthousands of years was completed cut down in just one month, in 1958,when the local county government gave an order to the thousands ofnearby villagers in the name of pumping out steel production. As aconsequence, trees were cut down and burnt into ashes in the smallfurnaces built in the backyards. Not a single kilo of steel was produced.Not just the forest was sacrificed but also the pans and boilers fromvillagers’ kitchens. Since no steel boilers and pans could be used, thepublic canteens had to be dismissed, and cooking became a greatproblem. People had to return to primitive lives, using earthenware potsinstead. What is more regretful is that, such kind of activities which arein fact in violation of scientific laws, catastrophic to the naturalenvironments, and completely ignorant and utopian, are still our‘forbidden zones’ with which until now we cannot directly confront.”(Ye, 2014, p.12)
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Mr. Ye graduated from Tsinghua University in 1964, six year after his admittance,with a bachelor’s degree, not because he was not qualified but because of thedisturbances to the higher education throughout the country. The good thing wasthat he did not have to worry or even to think about his career development, for hisfuture had already been planned by the government. He was given a job in the 401institute which was at that time a nuclear technology military research institute inBeijing. Now this 401 institute has been transformed into China Institute of AtomicEnergy, but in the 1960s it was a secret organization in which China’s militaryresearches on the nuclear bomb and nuclear submarine were performed. (Ye, 2014)
Compared to what Mr. Ye experienced from 1964 to 1978, his university yearsseem like a short happy hour. Mr. Ye did not claim what advanced technicalknowledge he learned from Tsinghua University. However, when I read about whathe was asked to do in his first job, I think it completely doesn’t matter. The firstassignment he received was to learn from the peasants in the countryside. He wassent to He’nan Province to work in the rice field. Willingly or not he was treated asan activist in the “Four-Clean-ups” Movement also known as the SocialistEducation Campaign which lasted for 3 years from 1963 to 1966. This campaign,from a retrospective, served as the prelude of the upcoming fiercer CulturalRevolution, in which some newly established political, economic, organizationaland ideological concepts were overhauled but not to a degree as it was in theCultural Revolution.
When this Socialist Education Campaign reached to its end, Mr. Ye thought that hecould return to Bejing because he considered himself to be well-educated. ButChairman Mao did not think like that. The Cultural Revolution began in 1966. Inhis book, Mr. Ye gave a very detailed description of his experience in the CulturalRevolution, but I would rather give a short summary of his life in those 10 years.From my perspective, his life in those years is completely irrelevant to any concretescientific or technical content. Therefore, one sentence is enough to conclude. Hereceived a reform through labor work, in Chinese terms. Even though he belongedto an organization – the 401 institute – his work was not done for that organization.It made me curious on how he kept his technical knowledge during the CulturalRevolution. In fact, in my perception, he did not participate in any form of scientificor engineering work for about more than a decade since his graduation fromTsinghua University till 1977.
As he wrote: “(In 1964) When we left Beijing to He’nan Province, wewere ordered not to bring any books with us, except the Selected Worksof Mao Tse-tung.” (Ye, 2014, p. 131)
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5.4.3. A NEW ROUND OF LEARNING FROM THE WEST
In 1977, when the Cultural Revolution finally reached to its ending Mr. Ye got achance to return back to the 401 institute, but due to political concerns his militarilysecret organization was moved to the inland Sichuan Province. He had to move toSichuan where he reunited with his family. He was saved by Deng Xiaoping’spolicy in the sense that Deng corrected Mao’s mistakes of treating intellectuals byplacing them in a correct social status. In 1978, he was “redressed”. But that wasironic because he had never committed any criminal offenses expect that being aknowledgeable person could be seen as a crime. In this round of reform, Mr. Ye’sidentity as a Tsinghua University graduate gave him some priority. Due to his goodacademic records, he was appointed a visiting scholar to an Italian energy researchinstitution called CASACCIA. (Ye, 2014)
In 1983 when Mr. Ye was 42 years old his first trip abroad started. His ownexperience of learning from the West started from this trip. “CASACCIA is anintegrated energy research center, where solar power, wind power, nuclear powerand even agriculture researches are carried out.” (Ye, 2014, p. 205) It was from thelearnings of the Western experience in the years of the energy crisis that triggeredChina’s effort to transfer this military technology to civil use. (Ye, 2014) Therefore,Mr. Ye was sent to the West to learn how this transformation can be realized.
He did not write in detail about his work in Italy. What I can read from his book isthat more or less he has found his idealized life – intellectual’s idealized life – inthat industrialized Western country.
“The center (CASACCIA) has a powerful man-machine interactive IBMcomputer. Each lab has a terminal which connects to the server. It isvery convenient to use. When necessary complicated calculations can besent to the BOLOGNA /FRASCATI computer center situated in Francewhere solutions will be generated. In fact, the European Communitieshas been closely connected. Information exchange is quite convenient.”(Ye 2014, p. 207)
“The center (CASACCIA) has a good library, which only needs 5employees. It has advanced equipment. You can search through itscollections of books and articles on a computer. Importantly, when youfind one, you can copy or borrow the book or the article as you like, andtake it out with you.” (Ye, 2014, p. 207)
It was in Italy he could be away from the disturbances of the unnecessary humanaffairs and concentrated on his pursuit of knowledge. Mr. Ye’s study in Italy wasnot only in CASACCIA, he also visited other nuclear power research centers suchas the ISPRA. In his descriptions about his visit to ISPRA, his perceptions on
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nuclear power technology and his interpretations about its relationship toenvironmental protection can be read:
“The host (ISPRA) introduced us in detail about their areas of research.Regarding to the composition of the staff and the distribution of funding,50.3% percent of their research funding is used on nuclear fissionreactor research, in which 54.5% is used on reactor safety studies. Fromthis figure, I feel that they emphasizes on nuclear power technology’ssafety. In spite of this, 14% of the overall research funding is used onenvironmental science researches. Among their research staff, 54%(416/769) is dedicated to nuclear fission reactor research, and 24.5%(189/769) is employed for environmental science research. From allthese figures, I come up with a conclusion that due to the severe lack ofenergy resources throughout the world, nuclear fission technology – thismatured technology – is given a strong emphasis. In this area, a majorityof financial resources and human power is spent on safety related andnuclear waste treatment researches. Secondly, environmental science isa relatively younger scientific discipline with just about 20 to 30 yearsof history, but considering that industrial pollution has becomeincreasingly severe, and it gradually becomes one of the three majorproblems of our world. Their human resource and financial inputs intothese research areas are quite visionary.”(Ye, 2014, p. 211-212)
I would perceive Mr. Ye as a pro-nuclear power scientist or engineer. Not justbecause his comments on this technology which indicate that it is a solution to boththe problem of energy shortage and the problem of industrial pollution, but becauseof the fact that throughout his book I cannot even find a single piece of sentence onhis reflections on the Chernobyl and the Three Mile Island nuclear accidents, whichhe should have been aware of. The pro-science and technology culture is sodominant in his thinking that gives me an impression that for Mr. Ye, science andtechnology is the only solution to the problems he has mentioned. He never thoughtthat the knowledge he admired might also be the cause of these complicatedproblems. In this respect, his anonymous alumnus seems to be more open-minded.
This kind of pro-science and technology tendency permeated in the later chapters ofhis book which described his participation in a nuclear fission reactor project in Iran,also in China’s first nuclear power plant export project in Pakistan, and in his lastfull-timely participated project in Daya Bay – the Ling Ao Phase 1 project. In allthese projects he was treated like an engineering expert. In all these projects, hissituation was quite different from his experiences in the 1960s and 1970s. His voiceas professional advices can be heard and accepted by others. This recovered hisimpaired confidence, and strengthened his self-esteem as a useful Chineseintellectual. However, it seemed to me that Mr. Ye was still not satisfied with hisstatus in the 401 institute when he returned from Pakistan to Beijing in the 1990s
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when this secret military research institute was transformed into a civil organization.As I can interpret his uneasy relationship with his organization, two cultural reasonsare worth studying.
5.4.4. THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF INTELLECTUALS
In Deng’s science and technology policy, knowledge development has been moreclosely related to economic development which indicates that scientists andengineers’ contributions to economic development can be valued in financial terms.That is to say, scientists and engineers will be differentiated by their economicvalue which can be translated into the different levels of incomes. At the practicallevel, in order to differentiate salaries, a ranking system of engineers and scientistsis needed. That leads to the emergence of a series of professional titles in theengineering profession, such as assistant engineer, engineer and chief engineer.Along with the rise in the ranking, the rise of power and the increase of income areaccompanied. Therefore, competitions are inevitable. However, Mr. Ye was notsuccessful in this competition to promote himself to the title of a chief engineer.
As he wrote: “This event tells me two things: first, it tells me that I amin a bad relationship with those people who has the power to determinemy fate. At any time, as long as they keep this power, they will bring theworst result to me. They have corrupted souls. In front of them, there isno fair. It also makes me determined to leave this abyss of suffering,otherwise I will not have any progress in the rest of my life. Second, inan old organization with a long history, in the past, job-hopping was notallowed. People has stayed and worked together for too long. People’sperceptions on me have been fixed and cannot be changed. No matterhow good I performed and how many papers I published, I am stillignored by them. At this moment, I need to move to another place.” (Ye,2014, p. 254)
In this respect, Deng’s science and technology policy can be interpreted as thetrigger of the professionalization of Chinese intellectuals. Since science andtechnology has established its market value, which was unthinkable in the Maoyears, intellectuals have to be adaptive to this change. They are pushed into themarket, and they have to face another mechanism of evaluation which seems to beunfair to their previous ideals. In this transition process, intellectuals, like Mr. Ye,with high self-esteems felt uneasy.
Another cultural reason for his constant disappointments with his intellectual statuscan be found in China’s cultural heritage. Being an intellectual with an analogy to“shi” is supposed to enjoy certain privileges in society, which Mr. Ye once enjoyedwhen he left his high school to Tsinghua University.
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“On the day I left my high school, the county people beat gongs andsounded drums, as a farewell ceremony to celebrate my success. Thecounty newspaper put my admission to the Tsinghua University a topheadline in the front page. I was the first Tsinghua University student inthis history of our county. I was treated like the number one scholar inthe imperial examination as if I were a historical figure in imperialChina. My admission made our principal and my father extremelyexcited.” (Ye, 2014, p. 84)
But one of his returns back home in 1978 was not that excited:
“In February 1978, after a 5 day and 4 night’s tiring travel, I finallyarrived at the nearest train station to my home town. Retrieving thisjourney, it was unspeakably miserable. At that time, a prominentuniversity graduate like me, my money was just enough for making aliving. In such a long distant travel, I could not afford a berth ticket. (Infact it was not for sale.) In the waiting for a transit train, I had to crouchon the floor to spend the long night with the vagrants in rags. We weredriven like a herd of ducks back and forth in the station.” (Ye, 2014, p. 2)
What I can read from these sentences is that Mr. Ye takes intellectuals’ reception ofprivileges for granted. It may have no wrongs of holding such a perception, becauseit is a part of the Chinese culture. But from a more liberal point of view, eradicatingsuch habits is also an idea that deserves encouragement. In this respect, ChairmanMao was not completely wrong. Compared to Mao’s, Deng’s science andtechnology policy can be interpreted as in conformance with the human nature ofmaking a better living. They all make sense. Perhaps a hybridization of all theseperceptions consists of the cultural image to intellectuals in China today.
In fact, Mr. Ye made a critical mistake throughout his life. He spent all his lifeknowing a lot but did not figure out the most important solution to answer to all hismishaps as he perceived in his book. This important know-how for intellectuals tolive in China over its history is to work with power instead of against it. Ironically,this has been a part of our culture for thousands of years ever since the Confuciustime.
5.4.5. MR. YE’S ATTEMPTS OF IMPROVING ENGINEERING DESIGN
In general, the last a few years – perhaps since 1996 – of his career in CGN werequite satisfactory to Mr. Ye. On one hand, his was respect by his youngercolleagues as a tough old guy (Ye, 2014, p.257), and on the other hand, his salarywas dramatically raised due to the leadership’s appreciation of his work. (Ye, 2014,p.265) He served as a construction quality assurance specialist on site for the LingAo Phase 1 project (1996-2003). After his official retirement in 2001 he was still
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hired on a part-time basis until his death. Being critical served as a motif of hiswork in CGN. During his stay in CGN, he wrote 57 letters to express his opinionsabout the problems that he found in the construction of that nuclear power plant toCGN’s leaders. (Ye, 2014, p.265)
In one of his letters he wrote something about the problems of engineering designappeared in the Ling Ao Phase 1 project.
“Foreign designers made some mistakes in their interface management.This led to a series of non-conformance construction and installationactivities with the design… … for example, 64 holes each with adiameter of 500mm needs to be penetrated in the UJE building for theinstallation of brackets to support the main steam transmission pipes andthe main water circulation pipes. This was a huge design mistake, whichendangered the stability of the concrete structure of the nuclear island.According to NNSA’s (HAD003/06) nuclear safety regulation,designers must issue a NCR, and report the handling of this incident toNNSA. Additional costs caused by these mitigations shall be borne bythe designer. As far as I know, in the nuclear island design, up till now,more than 2000 items of design variations have been issued. It is saidthat we agree to treat these variations as design modifications. That is tosay the accompanied additional cost will be borne by us. In fact, weneed to distinguish the different natures of these design variations. It isevident that those variations in terms of correcting design mistakescannot be treated as normal modifications. All the additional costscaused by these mistakes should be borne by the designer.” (Ye, 2014,p.264)
“The fuel transportation vehicle was missed in the design… … it meansto me that the designer’s sense of responsibility needs to be questioned!The validity and effectiveness of the designer’s quality assurance systemremain to be doubted and challenged.” (Ye, 2014, p.264)
Mr. Ye was an honest and responsible man, but he did not give a feedback on howthese problems were finally solved. According to the classification of CGNengineers, Mr. Ye’s position in CGN can be regarded as a project managementengineer. Perhaps due to confidentiality reasons, throughout his book nothingtechnically detailed was given about his engineering activities in the 401 institute.But Mr. Ye did witness CGN’s transition of engineering design from an ownertyped to a contractor typed design. Even though, frankly speaking, his book is nothelpful to trace the evolution of China’s nuclear power engineering designs sincethe 1960s, it reflects the transitions of our past nuclear science and technologyintellectuals to the contemporary scientists and engineers.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS ANDIMPLICATIONS
6.1. CONFLICTS BETWEEN ENGINEERS AND THEORGANIZATION
In the previous chapters, I have argued that in China nuclear power development issurrounded by a mind-set that relates science and technology to economic growth ormore directly to the accumulation of power and wealth. Science and technology isutilized as an instrument to achieve that end, which also indicate an appropriation ofthe scientific methods to solve nuclear power development related social problems.In this thesis it is implied that such a dominant commercial culture has itsinfluences on CGN’s engineering design practices. Such influences are reflected byCGN’s design organizations and engineers’ understandings of engineering design.
Chinese nuclear power development plans emphasized the “technology-push” (Dosi,1982) effects of this technology, and consequently in order to bring it into thesociety, a “market” has to be created as it appeared in the 1980s. With this market,nuclear power technology can be advertised as a realistic solution to the energy andenvironmental problems and the notion of nuclear safety can be further interpretedinto national nuclear industrial safety regulations and standards which are, from aneconomic perspective, a set of rules that legal persons must subject to in order tosurvive in the market. From a more practical perspective, these rules are translatedinto a systematic contractual language. As a consequence a chain of commercialresponsibilities becomes consummate.
In this chain, companies like CNPEC and CNPDC are responsible for providing anintrinsic safety of the nuclear power plant through their designs and constructionactivities. The manufacturers offered a solid material foundation of achieving thissafety claim, by means of meeting the high demanding quality standards. Externally,from a CGN perspective, the interactions among the market players are restrictedinside this specific market, and internally inside the organization, such contractualresponsibilities are broken down into achievable technical goals which theestablished scientific and technological paradigms are able to solve. It seems to methat such divisions and connections of contractual responsibilities serve as theground principle that shapes the division of labor, the structure of the organizations,and the definition of interfaces in the entire nuclear power industrial sector.
Negative implications related to this ground principle are quite evident. On onehand, it restricts companies’ communications with the broader society. It seems thatthe border of such kind of external communications can only encircle the nuclear
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power market players. The civil society is excluded because it is considered astroublesome and needs to be educated. It may also be reasonable to perceive nuclearpower developers’ public opinion surveys as a form of commercial advertisementwhich intends to promote public acceptance of their products by persuasion. On theother hand, such kind of interactions of nuclear power market players with thesociety make them numb to the public opinions because under the protection ofscience and technology as a form of privileged knowledge, cultural or socialcriticisms to this technology are treated as less proved ideas compared to thescientific evidences and technological guarantees. Even the prestigious “publicintellectuals” found themselves feeble in changing the directions of nuclear powerdevelopment initiatives both at the local level and at the national level.
Design engineers are situated at the far end of this contractual responsibility chain.Nuclear safety regulations, technical standards together with company norms areturned into criterions that are used to evaluate their performances. Terms andconditions in the contracts are further translated into their tasks and every dayroutines. Rather it is to say that the definition of CGN design engineers’ scope ofwork emerged scientifically or technologically from the demarcations of disciplinesor area of expertise, than to say that the overly specialized division of labor inCGN’s engineering design is generated from a clear cut of borderingresponsibilities. This leads to the two major problems of engineering designpractices identified in Chapter 5: first, the difficulty of cross disciplinary internalcommunications – excessive meetings and multiple reporting; second, a lack ofexperience and sensitivity of technical changes and site variations among CGNdesigners – unfamiliar with technical standards, no sufficient experience inhandling site variances, and a habit of relying on duplications of verified results.
These problems of engineering design in CGN can be perceived as the problems ofthe system rather than individual designers’ problems. In addition, these problemsgenerate a cognitive differentiation between the perceptions of good nuclear powerplant’s engineering designs from a company perspective and designers’ ownrecognitions of what a good designer can do. The company has launched variousschemes of improving engineering design systematically, but the designers still findtoo much of their time is wasted on non-technical related affairs. In this respect,would it be proper to say that these company schemes are all failed attempts?
From a commercial perspective, the answer is not definite. In spite of theknowledge management system which is designed and implemented to make thesearching and utilization of knowledge more convenient, a technical configurationmanagement system is transplanted from AREVA to CGN for the purpose oftracing of technical modifications and changes among CGN’s on-going projects.(Wan et al., 2013) CGN’s approaches of improving engineering design areimmersed into its established quality assurance, quality control, and projectmanagement systems. However, the evaluation of the effectiveness of these
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management systems is largely unaccomplished partly due to the difficulty ofestablishing a mathematical model to quantify real life engineering design practicesand partly due to the fact that in order to obtain sufficient statistical confidencessuch an evaluation has to be performed after the projects’ final accounting.Although an online evaluation of such systems is possible, its interim conclusioncan never be definitive enough from a statistical point of view. Therefore, CGN isrunning these systems on a hypothetical forecast of their cost saving or revenueincreasing potentials.
In general, the company idealized engineering design as a production process, withan ultimate goal of increasing profits. Its approaches of improving engineeringdesign are based on reducing uncertainties and eliminating unpredictable results.On top of this, in fact, social or human factors in engineering design are treated asuncertainties and interferences. As long as procedures, flows, and organizationalstructures can regulate human activities, they should be favored approaches ofensuring good results. Perhaps, such a de-humanized engineering design is what thecompany considers as a good design.
From the outset, CGN engineers’ wants of becoming more technically competentengineers with less non-technical disturbance in their everyday lives can beconsidered as in line with the company’s intention. This impression can beinterpreted as the consequence of the dominant commercial culture that isinculcated into the engineers’ individual habits. This can be reflected by thepositive perceptions to technical innovations both at the company level and thepersonal level.
However, innovation, in terms of the development of new types of nuclear powerplants, such as the HL1000 plants, is also a production process. Compared to theengineering designs in the CPR1000 projects, the procedures, tools, andmanagement systems used in the HL1000 designs are no different. The onlydifference between the CPR1000 and HL1000 designs is the organization. In theHL1000 design, a specific permanent design team is formed rather than the matrixstyle of design organizations used in the CPR1000 designs. That is to say that thedesigner is solely employed by the HL1000 project instead of the previoussimultaneous involvements in multiple projects. Admittedly, this slight differencecannot indicate a fundamental change of CGN’s engineering design in its R&Dproject. It is exactly the same that in the HL1000 project designers are required tobe precise, time bonded and economically realistic.
From my point of view, the differentiation between the company’s ideal type of agood design and the engineers’ perceptions of good practices cannot be resolved bythis impressionistic similarity because the fundamental differences between the twocan be found in the different perceptions on engineers’ identity. For the companyengineers are modeled to be instruments, which produce outputs from inputs. The
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aim of the company is to make the production efficient. In contrast, engineers try tobe more useful not just in the sense of being more efficient but also becoming moreknowledgeable that indicates producing more useful knowledge. The definition ofidentity appears to be more social in the minds of engineers than in the models ofthe company. This leads to the tendency that engineers agrees more on theperception that engineering design is a social process rather than a program ofproducing documents.
6.2. COMPROMISES TO THE ORGANIZATION
In CGN, a seemingly trade-off of such conflicts is achieved by two ways. On onehand the company uses its financial power to channel engineers’ pursuit ofbecoming technically more competent people. On the other hand, in order to caterthat strong power engineers choose to adopt a compromise.
The company’s approach can be reflected by its human resource policy. In April2013 I was mandated to take an internal training course named “Achieving BestPerformance”. This course was among a series of courses under a self-developmentscheme which covered the entire CGN Group. This scheme started in 2009, notlong after I joined the Taishan Project Management Office in CNPEC. The schemewas generated from the consultancy advices of a human resource consultancy firmnamed Development Dimensions International (DDI) to CGN. My personalunderstanding of this scheme is that it serves as a managerial tool to channelemployees’ self-development by indicating what kinds of skills and personalcharacteristics are considered as important by the company. A series of internalpublications and tutorial courses have been developed to facilitate itsimplementation, and the scheme has been turned into a management system. Everyemployee, engineers and managers, is required to take part in some courses to helpthe person to develop those enlisted abilities and skills. A quarterly report to thesupervisor of engineers’ progresses is mandatory.
It is a typical performance assessment system, and at the end of each yeareverybody in CGN will get a grade A, B, C or D. These grades will be used todecide engineers’ promotions in the following year. But it seems to me paradoxicalthat this evaluation of engineers’ performances is based on the supervisor’simpressionistic measurements of how the abilities are manifested instead of a moredirect accounting of how much work is done. This paradox can be explained by theintention of adopting this scheme in the sense that the aim is to strengthen engineers’attachment to the company and its culture. In a negative tone, this approach limitsindividual pursuits of becoming good engineers because it filters thosecharacteristics that the company considers as unnecessary.
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Chapter 4 is an example of how CGN engineers compromise to the company. Thiskind of compromises can also be reflected by the proposals of improvingengineering design provided by the interviewees.
Table 6-1 Proposals of Improving Engineering Design
Name Problems of Designs Proposals toImprove Background
Mr. G
 OverlySpecializedDivision of Labor; Too Many Non-technical Tasks.
 JobRotations; MappingUnknownKnowledge; Learningplus Doing.
 Learning fromthe West in aTechnologyTransferProject.
Mr. L
 Lack ofStandardizedFormat ofEngineeringDesign(Appendix, D) Lack of Trans-disciplinaryMobility.
 Learning byComparingandEvaluation; Being MoreSpecialized.
 StudyingVerifiedDesigns.
Mrs.’s
 ExperienceComes fromDetails; Civil EngineeringDesign should beSite Oriented.
 Learning byDoing; Working onSite.
 More than 20yearsinvolvement inDifferent CivilEngineeringProjects.
Mr. W
 Less Knowledgeand Sensitivity tothe State of theArt of theIndustry.
 GainingShop floorExperienceorEmployingManufacturer turnedDesigner.
 Communicatingwith IndustrialManufacturers.
Mr. F  Less Competentof GeneratingTechnicalInnovations.
 CompanySupportedResearchandDevelopments.
 Practices inIntellectualPropertyTrades.
Table 6-1 is highly identical to the list of the existed actions of design capacitybuilding attached in Appendix A. The similarity can be expressed in the followingthree aspects:
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First, proposals that require less external resources can be included in the companyscheme. Such as the knowledge mapping activities which are achieved by voluntaryparticipation at no cost at all.
Second, immediate results instead of long term efforts without apparent outcomesare more appreciated. Mr. G and Mr. L utilized their learnings directly toengineering modifications. As a result they enjoyed a chance of getting moretraining in the technology transfer project, and gained some advantage in theirpromotions. Due to the fact that Mr. W and Mrs. S’s proposals are in fact long terminvestment, they can be replaced by market alternatives, in terms of recruiting readyexpertise directly from the market.
Third, CGN favors outcomes that have potential market values instead of justtechnologically novel. This indicates that Mr. L’s participation in the 3D-printingstudy group can only be a kind of hobby at this moment. As long as this technologyis not readily to be used to the manufacturing of nuclear power plants’ equipment itwill be extremely difficult for him to attract company funding to support hispersonal research interests. It also explains why Mr. F’s proposal of emphasizing ontechnology innovations can only be realized when it is almost certain that certaininnovations can be implemented in the foreseeable future such as the HL1000project. The company’s opinions toward technology innovations during its normaloperation periods are quite reluctant.
The effects of a culture filter seem to be evident in the company. Conceptually thisfilter represents a selective function similar to Grimson’s (2009) findings about thesocial sections of technology. In CGN the mechanism of selection is reduced tomarket variability. This means the filter of the commercial culture would phase outthose economically irrelevant signals to a main discourse so that these signals cannever be influential to the established culture.
Regarding to the three meanings of engineering, in CGN; the economic meaningoverwhelms the scientific and human meanings. However its filtering effects on thehuman meaning seem to be stronger than the scientific meaning. The scientificmeaning can find its places in organizational culture by making a compromise. Infact it is a kick back strategy also used by the company in the issue of thepopularization of nuclear power related scientific knowledge. Engineers use thisstrategy to ask for more company investment in their pursuits of more scientificknowledge. However, the human meaning is completely screened out. Not only thatthe company misuse this meaning to advertise its products, but also the engineersthink that it is irrelevant to their pursuits. Work and life are clearly divided.Becoming good engineers becomes a pursuit that can only be discussed in theworking context.
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Even though engineers want to be treated more human by the company, they are notexpressing it in their proposals to the company. Some complains about the burdensof multiple reporting and lack of cross-disciplinary corporation are expressed ineconomic terms – in the name of wasting time which indicates a higher cost ofproduction – needless to say, to raise critiques from an environmental perspectiveor a social justice perspective on nuclear power technology. In this regard, tochange this “clean” company to a green company never appears to be even a topicof the company’s reform policies. Therefore, becoming green engineers cannot relyon the company.
6.3. TO THINK OUTSIDE THE BLACK-BOX
In this thesis, it is indicated that turning green is a path to become a good engineer.Now, I want to make this argument more clear because I think it is an urgentproblem that Chinese engineers need to solve even from an economic perspective.
In May 2015 I visited the AREVA Tower in Paris for perhaps the last projectmeeting between AREVA NP and CGN on the transfer of EPR technology. Theestimation of the closure of this contract which is stipulated to be effective for 20years is that AREVA is going to be dismantled. This is completely out of theexpectation of CGN that its mentor in nuclear power industry is going to disappearin the market from a legal point of view.
In recent years, AREVA has suffered from huge cost overruns in its two projects inFinland and in France, bad investments in uranium mines and a general slump indemands for new nuclear reactors after the Fukushima disaster in Japan four yearsago. After years of losses, AREVA is currently in the midst of a major cost-cuttingeffort and planning to reduce its global payroll by cutting 5,000 or 6,000 jobs. As aresult EDF is possibly taking over some of AREVA’s assets to maintain thelivelihood of nuclear power technology in France. (New York Times, Accessed,June 4, 2015) I witnessed some vivid counteractions responding to EDF’s takingover of AREVA. I saw union leaders giving out booklets and papers at the entranceof the canteen to express their disagreements of such a deal. I was told by mycounterpart in AREVA that in a few days a strike was going to happen.
All these lead me to think: Is AREVA a victim of his own hubris? Will CGN be oneday like AREVA? Is this the last lesson that AREVA teaches CGN? Will CGNengineers be turned into anti-nuclear power activists when they are in danger oflosing their jobs?
The AREVA case means to me that willing or not sustainable development hasbecome a theme of the future of engineering. This theme reflects a balanceddevelopment of the scientific, economic and human meanings of engineering.Perhaps we have learned enough from AREVA on how to combine the first two
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meanings. But the development of the third meaning is something we cannot learnfrom AREVA. Precisely, it is not something that can be learned in the organization.It is something that we need to learn outside the black-box.
Being green means the engineers take their social responsibility. In a company likeCGN keeping the business as usual has been interpreted as a fulfillment of thatresponsibility. But the AREVA case tells us that this interpretation is wrong. Thereal opportunities of a “sustainable development” of a business is perhaps abalanced development in the sense that making the advancement of engineeringresponsible. (Jamison, 2013) In respect to individual engineers, it requires engineersto take their social responsibilities as social men rather than organizational men.This change means that engineers shall combine their lives with their work, in thesense that to think more about other social members rather than themselves. In thischange we may need to reshape our perceptions of science and technology in orderto understand the authentic meaning of our social responsibilities.
For contemporary Chinese engineers, I think, we are now in a better situation thanour modernist predecessors because our cultural heritage to assist us to reshape ourvisions is not completely barren. Mr. Ye’s book inspires me that we may reshapeour social identity as intellectuals. In fact, we can be better than him, if we fill thisold identity with both some old and new meanings. To do this, a new reading of ourcultural heritage is required.
In a book named zhi shi fen zi de li shi yu wei lai (Xu, 2011) literally translated intoEnglish as The History and Future of Chinese Intellectuals, Professor Xu Zhuoyun23portrayed the historical changes of Chinese intellectuals especially in itsmodernization process. As he briefed that in pre-modern China, Chineseintellectuals were nurtured to serve as government officials – the title can also beinterpreted as public servants. When Western science and technology has taken theplace of Chinese learning as privileged knowledge, it seems that the notion ofintellectuals has also changed. As he put it “specialists take the place ofintellectuals”. (Xu 2011, p. 12) According to Xu, this transformation is afundamental redefinition of knowledgeable persons in China. This tremendouschange explained why Chinese intellectuals become bewildered about their roles insociety. But as it is to Xu, in fact, Chinese contemporary intellectuals shall go backinto their historical heritages to find their responses to these changes.
Over the years, Chinese intellectuals established four ideal types of their socialroles. The first type can be seen as philosophy oriented, in the sense thatintellectuals shall try to provide to the members of the society with rationality. The
23 Xu Zhuoyun, Professor Emeritus University of Pittsburgh, Hu Shi’ student in NationalTaiwan University.
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
175
second type is service oriented. With the power of knowledge, Chinese intellectualsshall serve the people, and establish, to a certain extent, a leadership. The third typeof intellectuals devotes their lives on the impartment of knowledge as suchknowledge can be passed down through generations. The fourth type, compared tothe above categories, seems more ideal. This type of intellectuals devotes their livesto change the society. Sometimes they point out a direction of progression thatpeople has never imagined. While mostly, they criticize actions and behaviorswhich are wrong. (Xu, 2011)
Certainly, Chinese intellectuals can choose to be one of a kind, and in any casebeing one kind of these ideal intellectuals is not easy. But, Confucius, perhaps themost significant figure in the shaping of Chinese culture thought that a perfectintellectual shall be a hybrid of all these types24. In this respect, it is quite obviousfor me, that the traditional culture supports a combination of knowledge masteringand making. This corresponds to a balanced self-development in this thesis.
In addition to these contemporary readings of the Chinese canons, some lateinterpretations of the Confucian works are highly relevant to replace our utilitarianperceptions of science and technology. A famous neo-Confucian scholar in theMing Dynasty (1368-1644), Wang Yangming25, in his writings, expressed hisdistinction of good and evil. “Those who and which thrive lives are good, whilethose bring about death are evil.” (Qian, 2010) In my opinion, this is the criterionthat every Chinese engineer should keep in mind above any type of engineeringcodes, and regulations because with this distinction in mind, engineers may knowwhat should be learned from the society and what should be made for the society.
6.4. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
I would like to draw my conclusion of this thesis in a deductive and concise mannerwhich may be more convincing to my engineering colleagues in China.
How to be a good engineer?
My answer is: First you have to be a social man.
24 The Great Learning, The Four Books: The Basic Teachings of the Later ConfucianTradition, Daniel K. Gardner, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. (2007)
25 Wang Yangming (1472 – 1529) was a Chinese idealist Neo-Confucian philosopher duringthe Ming dynasty. After Zhu Xi, he is commonly regarded as the most important Neo-Confucian thinker, with interpretations of Confucianism that denied the rationalist dualism ofthe orthodox philosophy of Zhu Xi. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wang_Yangming,(Accessed, December 15, 2015)
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This answer comes from my observations of what’s wrong in reality in contrast tothe theoretical framework of this thesis.
Figure 6-1 what’s wrong in reality?
The solid lines in this diagram represent the theoretical depictions of theinteractions between engineers and the culture. It has been argued or proved in thisthesis that in order to make the evolution of engineering in a responsible way suchinteractions shall shape a circulation. The critical relationship is the line thatconnects engineers with the civil society.
The reality that I have observed is that this line doesn’t exist. Either it stops at theborder of the black-box representing the company as it can be expressed by thedotted line in red, or it curves and points to the theories of engineering as it isexpressed by the curved dotted line in blue. The red dotted line corresponds to thephenomenon of changing the organizational culture inside the system. It failed topenetrate the black-box due to the strong power of the culture filtering. The bluedotted line corresponds to those renegades such as Professor He Zuoxiu, whoadopts an escape strategy to change the culture. Normally they choose to influencethe culture by contributing to the theory of science and technology, and in thatsense they are not engineers anymore. That is why this path is tortuous.
The problem here dotted lines cannot manifest engineers’ direct contributions to thesociety and to the culture because their work is simply done for the company and inthe case that I have observed is that such contributions to the society is highlycontroversial. The circulation is impaired by such a failure of penetration. Theescape from the organization is considered as less useful to promote the circulationof interactions because when the renegades escape, they belong to another culturaldomain while the circulation cannot be maintained with an empty element.
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So the solution is that the red line has to penetrate through the black-box as it ispredicted by the theory.
How?
The answer is: It needs a hybrid imagination which starts from reflections ofexperiences.
At the end of this thesis, I want to express some of my hopes. Once I was a studentof engineering in a Chinese engineering university, just like most of my colleaguesin this company. From a retrospective, we have been trained to be qualifiedorganizational men. As I can remember, we were imparted with the progressiveimage of science and technology by the Chinese version of the theory of science.After our graduation we consider ourselves as social elites, because we know howto make things that will enrich our country, our people, and ourselves. We mayhave the wit to work with others, but we may not know enough to live with others.To some extent, I am taught by Aalborg University, and spent many years to get asense of feeling that a character of hubris exist in me. In reality, I find that Chineseengineering schools have not changed in their ways of educating engineeringstudents on the relationship of science technology and the society. In this respect, Ifeel it a great pity because if engineers do not know the meaning of a better liferather than a richer life, how can they help to build a better life for others? I hopethis can be learned in the universities in the future. If that is not going to be the case,I hope they can learn it from the society by themselves because that is what a goodengineer can do.
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Appendix B. Interview with Mr. G
Mr. G is the newly appointed technical manager of our NITT project representingCGN. He is the fifth NITT technical manager. Compared to his predecessors he isthe youngest. The reason that I want to interview Mr. G is that I have heard of himas a system design engineer before he is switched to a managerial position.
Mr. G started our conversation by describing his perceptions of design work andcareer development. He traced back to what he called “the knowledge foundations”established in his university educations.
He was educated to the master’s level majored in Nuclear Power engineering fromChina’s most prestigious engineering university Tsinghua University.
He entered Tsinghua in 1997, after that he spent almost 7 years in that university,the first four yeas till 2001 was a standard 4 year training leading to a Bachelor’sdegree, and another almost 3 years post-graduate study leading to a Master’s degree.In 2004 he was employed by CGN.
Mr. G made a strong connection of his education to his career development. Hethought that what he did in CGN and his engineering education perfectly matched.He made several examples of how his bachelor’s education was programmed toillustrate this connection. First he gave an example of his study visit to theuniversity’s experimental nuclear reactors, and later his industrial visit to Qin ShanNuclear Power Plant. Second, he portrayed how he accomplished his bachelor’sthesis by making a sort of visual demonstration of a nuclear power plant system.
He made the following statement to describe his postgraduate education: “Themaster’s study is even more specific than the bachelor’s study.”
“ In my master’s years, I participated in a joint R&D project between CGN andTsinghua. That was the reason why in my second year as a postgraduate student, Icame to Daya Bay. The topic of my master’s study was a heat exchange study on apiece of equipment in the conventional island. My task was one part of a biggerresearch project on the heat exchange system of the entire plant. After I havefinished my task here in Daya Bay, I went back to Tsinghua to defend my thesis,and got the degree.”
“ In 2004, after I graduated from Tsinghua, I was employed by CGN in anorganization named the Technology Center of CGN Group at that time.”
“CNPEC was established in the year 2003 and at that time the Technology Centerwas an independent entity in the CGN group for the purpose of providing technical
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consultancy services to new-built plants and technical upgrade of the existingunits.”
“Later when CGN decided to set up its design institute, people employed in theTechnology Center were distributed to the divisions of this newly establisheddesign institute namely CNPDC. Therefore, the Technology Center became thepredecessor of CNPDC’s Nuclear Island System Design Division and the RectorEngineering Design Division. The conventional island design division was at thebeginning a joint group consisting of some engineers dispatched from the GEDI(Guangdong Electricity Design Institute) and some engineers majored inconventional island engineering who originally worked in CGN. Such anarrangement of the conventional island design team was in fact a consequence ofCGN’s investment to GEDI. It was in 2005, when the Ling Ao Phase II projectstarted.”
“ In late 2005, I was dispatched to Japan for a joint R&D project, for severalmonths, and after that task I came back and involved in the design for the HongyanRiver Project.”
In the Hongyan River Project, which was a CPR1000 nuclear power plant after thebreak through gained in the Ling Ao Phase II project, Mr. G was positioned in theNuclear Island Engineering Division (NID) of CNPDC. At that time CNPDC wasplaced under CNPEC in order to shape a lump sum contractor.
“ It was in the Hongyan River Project, I first learned what is indeed engineeringdesign for a nuclear power plant. Scientific Knowledge does not equal to thecapability of engineering design.”
“In the months in Japan, I became aware of what is R&D.”
“From 2006 to 2008, before I was dispatched to JDO in France, specifically in theengineering design for Hongyan Rivier Project, our design job was in fact aduplication job. From my perspective, this kind of job has nothing to do withengineering design. We don’t even fully understand what engineering designmeans.”
“Just now I told you that from the emergence of our team - nuclear island systemengineering division - we are a group of no engineering design experience. Most ofus, have not worked in a design institute before we perform the design for HongyanRiver Project. We are consisted of the people who are fresh graduates, and someengineers who once worked in the Ling Ao Phase I and Phase II’s engineeringdesign management, but not really design. More appropriately it is design review.
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In the Ling Ao Phase I Project, those people attempted to do some engineeringresearch, but not a systematic design for a plant.”
“Only after the establishment of CNPDC, CGN has formed its own organizationto perform a systematic design for nuclear island systems and the conventionalisland system.”
Mr. G was the first batch of the engineers dispatched to AREVA in 2008 when theTaishan EPR project started. His held a dual position in the JDO. On one hand heserved as the assistant Technical Manager to the Chinese presentative in JDO, andon the other hand, he worked in the design group in AREVA’s system design team.“We dispatched 40 system design engineers to AREVA’s French and Germandesign teams. In the years from 2008 to 2011 approximately 60 system designengineers were dispatched in total.”
“Before 2008 I really did not know what can be called engineering design and itsrole in the entire engineering project. I did not even know what tools andknowledge are critical for the design of a nuclear island system. As a summery I amnot clear of the importance of engineering design.”
“So from this experience I learned something. Regarding to building engineeringdesign capacity, I think management is very important, because capacity buildingmust have some strategic guidance. When CGN negotiated with AREVA andWestinghouse about the EPR and AP1000 technology transfer, the JDO wasincluded as a major theme of such technology transfer project. In this respect, outtop management has realized what capacity building is, so that CGN intentionallyand systematically dispatch people to the AREVA’s design system to learn fromthem. As a consequence, those who participated got some in depth understanding ofwhat is engineering design and what is engineering design process, and even whatis engineering design management. The JDO covered a wide range of ourengineering disciplines.”
“Each job descriptions about the JDO positions depicted what was the role of thedesigner, and his or her corresponding capability. The organization of JDO requireddetailed planning. At that time CGN’s experts concretized such a planning. This iscritical. The 180 designers dispatched to JDO were the seeds planted to AREVA’sland. Later these seeds took roots. After that, we were transplanted back to the landof CGN. Now we are still nurtured by CGN, but some are given more care whileothers may receive less attention.”
“My two years in JDO, can be termed as a capacity building by means of learningby doing. Capacity building can be achieved by practicing, not just for the sake of
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learning without doing. You know in our language, xue xi can be interpreted aslearning and practicing or exercising.”
Mr. G then quoted some Confucius’ words about learning and doing to express hisunderstanding of capacity building. “xue er shi xi zhi, bu yi yue hu” - “Studying istough, while practicing is happy.” “Studying the knowledge is tough but when youuse the knowledge to solve problems it turns out to be happy. When you practiceyou may gain some feeling, and such feelings reflect enhancement of your skills.”
“My position was very important in the JDO. Firstly, I was in charge of the RCPsystem. It means the entire nuclear steam generation and heat exchange system, notjust the Reactor Coolant Pump. It includes the steam generator, the pressurizer, thepiping and the pumps. And some control units. Secondly, I also took someresponsibility of design management. Therefore, there were a lot of discussionsabout my tasks in the negotiation of the contract.”
“AREVA and CGN hold different understandings of equipment and the systemdesign. So I performed both system design and some equipment design. In thisrespect, I am a little bit of a hybrid. For a system designer, I make SDM (SystemDesign manuals), issuing calculation notes and also sizing catalogues. Taking sizingfor example, my understanding for sizing is more profound than Mr. A’s (atechnical manager of NITT on the AREVA side). His understanding of sizing issuperficial. My understanding of sizing includes the sizing parameters in thefunctional requirements and the mechanical sizing in detailed equipmentspecifications. Mr. A’s perception stays at the level of manufacturing specification.The clarification of sizing requires a lot of calculations before it can be issued to themanufacturer. A system designer is a synthetic person. According to what I haveheard from EDF, the grown-up of a system engineer takes 10 years’ time. Thisperson is required to shift from varieties of positions. In the end, this person canfinally be placed to the position of system synthesis. So when I did my job as thedesigner of the RCP system, I became quite aware of the safety issues of the nuclearpower plant, the reactor engineering, the digital control engineering and theequipment. I needed to interact - setting up interfaces - with them voluntarily. So asa system designer, my design is a design of the process and at the same time, I dosome job which should be done by the digital control people. This kind of jobshifting or synthesis in CGN is relatively blank, because we normally think asystem designer should not tap into the digital control field etc.”
“Digital control is not just making instruments. Its logical analysis requires thesystem designer to draw a logic diagram to express its logical relationships. Thesystem designer has to know and express the operational conditions. Thisknowledge is in the minds of a system designer.”
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“ I spent nine months, to deal with these matters related to digital control and Ispent another four months in the general layout team in AREVA as the deputytechnical manager of nuclear island layout design. In that four months, I was alsolearning by doing. In the end I got a better understand of the process, not the designprocess but the understanding of operation. The most impressive thing that I havelearned is that I find the expression in design is quite important. Each phase of theprocess requires an effective expression. Interfaces are manifested in theseexpressions, so that the results of the different disciplines can be synthesized tocreate a system. I had a clear understanding of this, as the deputy technical manager.It is the RCS (Reactor Coolant System, here equal to RCP system) designer, whocan be familiar with so many disciplines, rather than only one area. For example,the equipment designer may only concern about pumps or valves while I need toknow all of them.”
“The process of working on the layout design is tough, because in AREVA doingis more loaded than studying. Learning combines studying and practicing inAREVA. But this sort of learning is not comprehensively tutored in the sense thatsomeone will come and help you to do the work.”
“I overcame this difficulty by myself. Basic technical knowledge is very importantfor my own capacity building. I search on the internet of the design manuals from avariety of engineering disciplines. At that time, I found that there were plenty ofrelated design manuals which could serve as the references of nuclear powerengineering design, such as the hydrodynamic testing and calculation models andthe related pressure vessel design in the chemical engineering. The most amazingthing that I found was that in AREVA almost all the system engineers kept thesereferences handy. But in CGN we do not have such a systematic reserve of all these.All these manuals are heritages of the western people including Russians, while inour university education, although we know the basic principles, we are not taughtin such details of how to use them in an industrial setting. These manuals are thevaluable knowledge of industrial application.”
“The JDO provided me with a platform, in terms of a design system, that made merealized what a system designer need to do. But after knowing that, I need to buildup my own capacity in order to fulfill that job. In AREVA’ you are freer to sourceinformation from various channels, but what is more important is that thepredecessors in AREVA have already made plenty of accumulations in the sensethat the library in AREVA is better established.”
I discussed some topics in the interview with Mr. M to Mr. G. I said that from Mr.M’s point of view we are now facing a similar situation to AREVA’s in the 1970swhen they entered into a technology transfer contract with the Westinghouse. Mr.M told me that CGN is in a better situation in terms of knowledge accumulation
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compared to them at that time. Mr. G made a joke saying: “Sure. Because we buythe technology after them, and we have done it twice.” Here he meant that beforethe NITT for EPR technology transfer there was technology transfer contract calledTT95.
Mr. G said: “I feel that the old engineers in AREVA are more willing to help us,because they can understand our hopes and desires of mastering the technology. Inthe past they have similar experiences when they were learn from the Westinghouse.But the younger engineers in AREVA are not so supportive. Someone has evenmade it bluntly that if AREVA teach CGN all the technical secrets, how would theymake a living? So in the JDO our engineers played a competitive role with theFrench peers. Some CGN engineers are asked to do some pure labor work, orboring jobs, not technically important tasks.”
I said: “That is not what we want to do”
Mr. G replied: “Definitely not. Sometime fierce arguments appeared in the workplace in JDO.”
“ But under that situation, in our Chinese team, we made some efforts toaccumulate knowledge. We exchanged what we learned from our jobs, in regularmanner, in our internal meetings. We recorded what we learned in reports, indocuments. We organized seminars every week in our dorms.”
I asked: “When did you return?”
Mr. G answered: “I got a new position in the NID in 2010 and therefore I cameback.”
“My job changed a lot when I came back from JDO. I mainly focus on doing inCNPDC, not learning. I was asked to participate in a number of on-goingengineering projects, as you can imagine not just the Taishan Project, and someR&D tasks. But I was given a higher position, so my views for engineering designchanged. In that respect, I need to say that I have learned something anyway.”
“In AREVA I mainly concentrated on the basic design of the Taishan Project, butwhen I returned back to NID (Nuclear Island Design Division), I faced a lot ofproblems derived from the detailed designs of several projects. Still there weresome problems related to the construction and commissioning of the on-goingprojects and also some problems of equipment manufacturing. As a system designerI need to make analysis of whether some non-conformances of the manufacturing tothe design would impair the functional requirements of the system. In these threeyears, I gained more detailed experience on solving site related engineeringproblems. After the Fukushima accident, I encountered engineering problems that
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aimed to the improvements of the already built units such as the add-up of a highpositioned water reserve for Ling Ao Phase II units. I felt that what I accumulatedin JDO, the methodological knowledge and the understanding of the design process,helped me a lot in the problem-solving of these improvement designs and other siterelated detailed design issues.”
“After I came back as the chief engineer, I am in the position to organize capacitybuilding for my fellow engineers. I think that I have a clearer picture of what kindof capacity is required in my team. So I organized a cross disciplinary capacitybuilding across different branches in my division. I identified capacities accordingto my own standard and motivated people who were willing and suitable toparticipate. My standard derives from my experience gained in AREVA. Icompared the stereotype of a system engineer in AREVA to ours, and found outwhat is missing in our organization. Then I intentionally triggered some sort of avoluntary capacity building campaign. This attempt lasted for 3 years, from 2011 to2014 before I left NID.”
“Our duplicative engineering design can be regarded as an OEM activity. In thatdesign, we just need to make sure that the result of AREVA’s original designs arecompletely copied. But in order to do some original work of our own, we need tocarry out some capacity building. Later in our projects, we have made somechanges of the equipment which means new problems. AREVA cannot always helpus in such matters. These problems push us to solve problems on our own.”
“ In the post Fukushima era, we have decided to add up some new non-activesafety systems to the new build and old plants. This is done entirely on our own.We believe it only us who did this. But in order to realize these improvements, inaddition to design, testing is required. We have a lot of pressure on the developmentof these technical improvements.”
“It is a very broad concept when you asked me about the design process. I thinktwo key points are permeated in the design process: first the functional analysis andsecond, safety analysis of the entire system. The first phase of a design is to clarifythe functional requirements of the system, and then the system engineer can start toassemble a system with pieces of equipment such as the heat exchangers, pumpsand their accompanying electrical instruments. After that the detailed designs canbe distributed to the disciplines such as civil structure design, equipment design,electronic design, air condition and ventilation design etc.”
I said: “Here the interfaces come.”
Mr. G. Said: “The system designer works as the synthesizer. The system designerneeds to use the appropriate engineering language to make the engineers from
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different disciplines working together. For example we need to justify that thefeasibility and compatibility of requirements rose from the rector engineeringcalculations and then to interpret them to the follow-up disciplines. These tasks aredone in the basic design.”
I asked Mr. G about the R&D activities and non-nuclear power projects in the NID.
He said: “The high position water reserve project is the first big R&D project headsby CNPDC. It is a demonstration project sponsored by a governmental agency. InNID the R&D projects are nuclear related, unlike the conventional island divisionwhich may be able to get some projects related to solar or wind power, ourknowledge and expertise restrict our scope of work. In the NID we once got somenon-nuclear related projects such as the radioactive material containment design forpetrol chemical companies.”
I then asked him whether the experience gained in these projects would benefitcapacity building.
He said: “Those engineering projects do not reflect the feature of nuclear powerengineering design. Civil engineers working in CNPDC may use their expertise innuclear projects also in other engineering projects. But engineering design capacitybuilding in CNPDC requires a focus. Nuclear technology can be used in thechemical engineering, because petrochemical engineering is also an engineering ofa reaction process.”
I asked: “who are more restricted? I mean in CGN, what I have seen, thoseequipment designers and civil engineers seem to be more restricted.”
“Yes, I would not deny that. But as I said this is based on the trainings that I havereceived. I think it consists of some knowledge of the reactor vessel and someknowledge about the safety analysis. As far as I know people in AREVA are notsystem designers from the beginning. There is no discipline called nuclear islandsystem design. I know someone in AREVA who is a engineering physicist. Whenhe entered AREVA, the organization, the system pushed him to accomplish thework. AREVA provided him with necessary methods and guidance to fit in his joband shaped him to be a system designer. I heard that it cost him 2 to 3 years toaccomplish this transformation. But I think we cannot accomplish this in CGN.”
I asked: “Do you think it is because that AREVA has a broader definition of thescope of the work to an employee while we have too narrow definitions to ourengineers?”
“ I think it is a matter of the system, of cultural difference. Their technologydevelopment is standing up on their predecessors’ shoulders. They keep
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systematically their experiences and knowledge. Scientific, technological andmethodological knowledge are all well documented, and looking into theirindustrial codes and regulations, they are more consummate than ours.”
“ In addition, their methodological documents are much more detailed than ours.For example when I first entered the JDO, I received a manual on how to write aproper internal email. The manual has 5 pages. When I first arrived, I sent emailswithout titles, this was deemed as extremely inappropriate in AREVA, but quitenormal in our company. I was amazed to receive the manual on how to write anemail including how to make the title and how to organize the content. This is anexample about how detailed their methodological documents look like.”
“I felt ashamed that I was not good to act properly. This indicates what we need todo in our own capacity building for engineering design.”
“This is what I mean a proper methodological guidance to nurture new engineersto make progress on the past experiences. As such systematic improvements oftechnology can be achieved.”
The above is the record of my interview in the first day. It stopped by a phone callasking me to perform another task related to the NITT project meeting. Thisinterview was done from 6pm to 7pm April 15, 2014.
On April 16, 2014 I found another interval in the NITT project meeting to continuethe unfinished talks.
I first asked him to describe his daily activities in a normal day in CNPDC to makesome connections between what we have discussed the day before and the newdiscussions.
“Previously before I went to France, I was a senior designer in the division. Mytask was mainly to give reviews of the documents. Another part of my job was toattend different meetings. I got orders from my superiors from the meetings and Icoordinated among different groups and divisions to clarify their scopes andintentions. After the meeting I brought the orders back to the team, and startedmaking new documents.”
“ In France designers attend fewer meetings. Every day I calculate, makedocuments. I call to my colleagues as a kind of normal communication, but, veryfew meetings. I cannot make assignments for other people. I simply do my own job.So I have more time to think and to do some concrete work.”
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“In China, normally we rely on meetings to solve problems. It takes up to 50% ofmy working hours. Here as you know, we are either the coordinator or beingcoordinated.”
“After I came back and was appointed as a chief engineer, most of my time wasused on attending meetings. In average I attend more than one meeting per day. Thenumbers of emails once increased to 300 per day at the maximum.”
I asked: “What are the contents of the emails?”
Mr. G answered: “Some of the emails are for information only, but some are tasks.”
“ In my busiest days, on the post-Fukushima project, as I mentioned yesterday, Ireceived about more than 100 emails for this topic. But I had no time to reply.”
Mr. G then asked me how many emails that I have per day. I said: “About 30 to 50on average.”
He then said: “Now working as the NITT technical manager, I receive only about20 emails every day on this topic. That is good.”
I turned the topic of commenting on our situations to a new topic of whether R&Dscan be perceived as a form of engineering design.
Mr. G said: “No, they are different. R&D needs us to look into the future, whilewhat we call engineering design here means an application of what we have alreadyknown. It needs to be practical. Engineering design requires some skills to makesure that what is designed can be implemented. But R&D, as I see, is theoretical,aiming to provide some sort of an alternative of problem solving. R&D cannot relyon experience, but engineering design must rely on the knowledge and experiencesthat we are certain. Engineering design must rely on verified experiences.”
“As I see, ACPR1000 is an engineering R&D. It is a partial innovation.”
I asked: “Do you thinking innovative R&D project is a good mechanism of capacitybuilding?”
Mr. G answered: “No. On the contrary, I think only CNPDC are equipped with abetter engineering design capacity, the better chance CNPDC are likely to succeedin innovative engineering R&D. R&D is not an engineering design capacity.Engineering design aims to make a project successful after a testing based on thealready established methods. If the project is successful, it means the ability to
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make applications of the knowledge is acquired. On this basis, some attempts ofmaking changes to what is known can be carried out.”
“R&D cannot be the final destination of capacity building in CNPDC. CNPDC,from its establishment, is a design institute not a research institute, not CNPRI.R&D allows failure while engineering design does not allow that possibility. In fact,I think our CNPRI is doing some R&D jobs for technology localization. Their workis based on AREVA’s design. They perform some verifications according toChinese industrial regulations and technical codes. Therefore it is a transplantationof technology from France to China.”
“ The difference between CNPRI and CNPDC can be expressed from adisciplinary perspective in the sense that CNPRI focuses on reactor vessels andnuclear fuel assemblies while CNPDC focuses on the entire plant. CNPRI alsoprovides operation and maintenance services such as testing and sample analysissuch as equipment qualification and experimental verification by scientific methods.It is not what CNPDC should do. In some sense CNPRI is an organization similar toEDF’s research institute and the French CEA’s basic research units. Makingcomputer programs for scientific calculation is a part of their job. AREVA is anend-user of these services. CNPEC and CNPDC shall act like AREVA by leavingthese R&D tasks to CNPRI.”
I said: “I see capacity building actions in CNPEC and CNPDC rather scattered. Alot of actions can be regarded as for capacity building. What do you think is the bestway to channel capacity building in CGN?”
“I think it must be an action both on the top and at the bottom. For example theNITT contract is the company’s strategic plan. But the signature of the contractbrings about a question of how it can be implemented. Those who really need theimprovement of capacities are those who work at the fronts. When theseprerequisites are met, a question comes: how to make engineers participatevoluntarily. First they shall find out what kind of capacity are lacking, and thenmake some efforts to overcome these shortages. In the divisions of CNPDC suchkind of identification of capacity shortages has been carrying out for years. Thosewho stand at the fronts know what they need but perhaps their leaders are not quitesure. Some of our divisions make clear goals of capacity building but somedivisions are blur on this matter. Therefore, the capacity building actions varied andscattered in CNPDC.”
“ I think we need a plan which is clear and feasible for capacity building. Butcurrently we don’t have it.”
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At the end of our discussion Mr. G once again emphasized the importance ofmethodology.
He said: “Methodologies need to be accumulated, need to be taught, bypredecessors, tested and verified. In those ways followers can use thesemethodologies to make different results. But the situation is that the averageworking experience of CGN employees is quite short. Therefore, we lackexperiences. We lack methodologies.”
I said: “CNPDC has issued a lot of design manuals which can be regarded asmethodological documents. Are these design manuals issued by translatingAREVA’s files?”
“No. We need to make a lot of things by ourselves, because they contain a lot ofexperiences which are gained in China over the years of localization. They requireverifications, without verifications such manuals are useless. Right or wrong cannotbe judged without verifications. Methodology is the same. When it is applied indifferent situations the results may be different.”
Finally I had some discussions with Mr. G about the management of engineeringdesign capacity building in CGN.
First we made a consensus that in order to avoid repetition – in terms of humanresource and financial inputs – we need to make our project experience documentedso that the followers will not start from the beginning again.
Second, we shared a view that capacity building cannot be turned into a sort of amanagement system. In that situation these actions will be rendered into superficialjobs in the sense that they become a work of making documents and recordsregardless of knowledge accumulation. The number of documents cannot measurethe content and usefulness of knowledge.
Mr. G made his final point on capacity building: “Now we have so many interfaceswhen we are doing design. It is in fact a result of the division of labor and therequirement of expertise shaping. At the beginning we don’t have so many people.Therefore, many types of jobs have to be done by one single person, but in that casethe quality performances varied. But when the division of labor becomes narrowedjobs seem to be narrowed as well. At this moment we need to combine some overlynarrowed jobs, and in this combination process the transfer of knowledge becomevery important. This may be a solution to the problem of interfaces. The obligationof knowledge transfer is what I have experienced in AREVA. When a technicaldocument was issued I was required to upload a series of supporting document onto the server, such as the calculation notes, the references, and the questionsidentified from the review process and their solutions etc. This is what I call a
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knowledge transfer inside an organization. It will keep the knowledge remain in theorganization rather than keep making old knowledge.”
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Appendix C. Interview with Mr. M
On April 14, 2014 I interviewed Mr. M in my car on the way to a restaurant wheredecided to have a dinner together after a whole day meeting.
This interview was not taped. It served as my initial attempts of asking for hisopinions on CGN’s engineering design capacity building, in order to make a formalinterview with him. I kept the notes in one of my notebooks after the dinner in orderto record what I heard from him. The formal interview took place on April 15, 2014.The interview on April 15, 2014 was tapped.
Mr. M has been working in AREVA for 38 years, and now is serving as the NITTproject manager - my counterpart on the AREVA side. Back in the Framaton years,he participated in the technology transfer between Westinghouse and Framaton,when the French started to develop their own nuclear power technology under theAmerican support. He acted as a nuclear island system designer at that time. In thelate 1980s he participated in the Daya Bay Project and in the 1990s the Ling AoPhase 1 Project. Since 1995, he acted as the technology transfer manager on theAREVA side for the implementation of a series of technology transfer contractsbetween AREVA and CGN, including the most recent NITT dedicated for thetransfer of the French third generation of pressurized water nuclear powertechnology (EPR technology) to CGN. Before 1995 he was first trained as nuclearisland system engineer in France, when nuclear power technology was a rather newengineering discipline in France back in the 1960s and 70s. He got the job offerfrom Framaton even before he graduated from his last academic program. He wasemployed as a system design engineer and later was sent to Westinghouse in orderto learn nuclear power engineering as a part of the technology transfer project.
As he could remember the development of nuclear power technology in France as itwas in the America and also later in China, derived from a political determinationof transforming the nuclear scientific research from the military ends to civil use.
He made some points as we talked on the road on April 14, 2014.
First, he said that engineering design for a nuclear power plant is very specific. Hedid not explain what he meant by specific, but I deduced what he meant. A Nuclearpower plant is a construction project of an infrastructure, therefore, due togeological, and climate features of the site, each nuclear power plant even namedunder the same trade mark, such as EPR or AP1000, is not exactly the same. Theminor differences represented in the design are normally called designmodifications to the reference plant or the prototype design.
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Due to the specific nature of the engineering design for a nuclear power plant, itmeans that even under a technology transfer contract, the licensee of the contractwill have to solve some engineering problems in the design process by itself. Thelicensor may be able to give advice but the work has to be done by the designer ofthe particular plant itself. This is the experience, from his point of view, share byboth Framaton and CGN.
Thus, as Mr. M pointed out, the “judgment” and the “construction” of engineeringdesign capacity shall be based on the performances of the design work, in otherwords the real projects.
However, after emphasizing the importance of the specific nature in engineeringdesign, he quickly mentioned another point, in his original terms, “in order toimprove engineering design, it is also important to find a partner so that the partnercan provide alternatives of solutions on the specific problems”. “We are obliged tohelp you, as we entered into the TT contract.” he said. This statement indicates thatAREVA is now the partner of CGN’s engineering design and its capacity building.In this respect, engineers’ cooperation on problem-solving can be founded on acommercial basis.
Knowledge played an important role in engineering design. Mr. M emphasized thatCGN should keep the knowledgeable person stable in the organization in order tomaintain its capacity and to enhance it. He later explained what he meant by stable:
“First, those who are technically trained by AREVA shall be kept constant to dotechnical jobs when they return back to China, in CGN, rather than some othertypes of jobs such as managerial and administrative tasks.”
“Second, those who are knowledgeable shall not be money making oriented”. Onone hand, the company need to provide the engineers with better payment, on theother hand, the people themselves shall not sell their knowledge for a better price interms of finding another job when they realize that they are technically morecapable. Instead they shall persist on using their knowledge for the sake of furthertechnology improvement in CGN. He later admitted that this was a complicatedquestion.
In the dinner we were making some casual talks.
One of my superior asked Mr. A (one of Mr. M’s colleagues) a question, afterknowing that Mr. A is good hand ball player and now still playing in a semi-professional hand ball club in France.
“Do you earn money from the club?” asked my supervisor.
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“Yes. But a little. We get some trophies when we won.” answered Mr. A.
“Since you are a good player, you should get paid to play.” said my superior.
After this discussion about the professionalization of sports players, we knew thatin fact Mr. M is a good bridge player with some kind of a ranking.
Mr. M played for fun as he admitted and Mr. A made similar expressions in thecourse of the dinner.
One question appeared in my mind: “Are people getting engineering knowledgeonly for the sake of money, in China?”
I did not raise this question on the table, but I could guess that all the people mighthave shared the same question mark at that moment because, I saw my superior feltreluctant to explain the current situation of Chinese professionalization of sports.
After the dinner I drove Mr. M back to the “Expert Village” in Daya Bay. TheVillage was built in the 1980s when the Day Bay Project was under construction. Itis used to accommodate the French engineers. Now, it is turned to be a hotel, forshort term visitors. On the road, I made the appointment of a formal interview withMr. M and he gave me the last suggestion of engineering design capacity buildingat that night.
He started his statement by making a sound with his figures: “Capacity does notcome like this. It needs the accumulation of experience, and engineers need time togrow up.”
The formal interview with Mr. M was performed on April 15, at noon, when wefinished the morning section of the NITT meeting.
I started our talk by giving some general summary of our discussions the day before,and then led the theme of discussions to the development of CGN’s engineeringdesign capacity from a historical perspective.
I first brought up the topic of TT95 - an older technology transfer contract - whichis also headed by Mr. M. The contract was signed in the 1990s when CGN startedto build its Ling Ao Phase I and Phase II power plants.
However, Mr. M thought that TT95 was not a good example of engineering designcapacity building via the TT. He indicated that the EPR NITT was a better exampleof engineering design capacity building via the TT contract.
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He said: “TT95 is just training, that means, you have the right to ask what you want.But if you don’t ask, you seldom get anything. The contract has been signed fornine years, and just one year before the contract is about to finish you start to raisequestions. Because you find that oh, I signed the contract, and I don’t have anything,and now I want to exercise it anyway. That is why you asked but limited. After thatyou said OK, we have to extend this contract for 10 more years. But you know inany case it was just to answer the question you raised. What we need to supply inthe TT 95 are mainly some documents. And it is also very limited. We transferredone code or something like that. But it has nothing to do with the Taishan TT,where we have a scope of supply anyway - the lump sum scope, the additionalscope through Work Orders. But in TT 95 it is only a Work Order scope. You don’tget anything if you don’t ask questions in the TT95. So for me TT95 is not a goodexample of TT. It is not an actual transfer of technology. It is very limitedcompared to the Taishan TT.”
Then I wanted to direct the discussion to a broader topic not just the TTs. Therefore,I asked: “Can you give me your opinions about how CGN grow from Daya Bay toits current status? about engineering design” I thought Mr. M as a witness of CGN’sdevelopment, and I told him this. Therefore, I wanted him to tell me what hewitnessed.
“ For Daya bay, I remember, the capacity, you tried to get some knowledgethrough the review of the documentation of the NIEP contract. Since we have aformal review of the documentation that means according to the contract there werea lot of technical documents that were transmitted to you for review and forapproval.”
“That means we send the documents to you and your engineering raise questionsofficially. We are obliged to answer you and until you don’t say no. The documentsthat we sent to you, either you don’t have any comments, and you put Acc thatmeans Accepted or you say, accepted with comments and you send the commentsto us. We provide the answer and until you don’t think it is not clear for you we stillcontinue the answer.”
“ I would say that through the contractual review process of documents. You getsome basic knowledge about our design. Because the contract was write down likethis, people you know, people in your team foresee this process of document reviewwould bring in some knowledge. For example the procurement files of the mainequipment and some basic studies for core design. We were subjected to answeryour comments. Until you accepted these documents, this process continued. Iwould say that this is the first step to acquire knowledge through this process.”
A BOOK OF CHANGES IN ENGINEERING
APP 22
“ That was the first step to acquire competency from our design. First step.Important.”
“After that, what happened?” I asked.
“What happened was that we provided some training for you, but that was limitedcompared to the NIEP. You pushed the localization of activities. That was veryimportant for the Chinese industry maybe. But I would say that you want the designactivities to provide jobs for the Chinese companies. So we are obliged to performlocalization.”
“Even in Daya Bay?” I asked.
“Maybe in Daya Bay it was very limited. Some piece of equipment I don’tremember. What we experienced in Daya Bay was the failure of the C23 Companyin the erection of the nuclear island equipment. EM2 was always in our design butall the other EM packages were for the C23 Company and, in fact, they failure. Thatcaused a big problem in China, at that time. It was ANP got another contract, anadditional contract that performed these EM activities on behalf of the C23Company.”
“I don’t know this; I have not read it from our records.” I said.
“You have to remember this. Such kind of failures had impressed your leaders.That is why for the others, your decided from the beginning, you require technicalassistance from us. We send people in your team. All the commissioning activities,which seemed that you were responsible for, you asked for key people from ANP tobe included in your team. That was the first wide corporation and trust that we bothstarted. And it was because of this integration of ANP into the technical assistancein your team first in the commissioning of the Daya Bay plant and the later entireLing Ao Phase I Project which was a big success. These people once participated inDaya Bay and Ling Ao Phase I are now almost retired and thank to the trust of ANP,it was a success.”
“ From Ling Ao Phase 1, I am sure that you were responsible for thecommissioning. Even for the erection not for the EM2, EM2 was always the scopeof AREVA. But all the other EM packages you were responsible for and obviouslythere were a lot of ANP people in your team, and that create you know a goodcorporation between our two companies. All these people when they are talkingabout AREVA they always say that they remember very well. Move back to thetopic of design, all the people integrated in your team raised the level of your team.And now you can manage by yourself.”
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I then, switched the topic to the design of Ling Ao Phase II project, in which thedesign even though was largely a duplication of AREVA’s original design withlimited modifications, changes, was done for the first time by Chinese designers.
Mr. M made his comments on the design of Ling Ao Phase II as such:
“We know that the design was not entirely a copy, with your own changes, butwhat I feel is that you lack a basic design, while it is true that you have the detaileddesign.”
Then I asked him about the differences between the basic design and the detaileddesign.
“I would say in term of the detailed design is, for example, the drawings of civilwork and the flow diagrams of the system and something like that. But even in thedetailed design, you just have the outputs which are needed to the design of civilworks that could be use on the site, and the system design manual etc. But youdon’t have the inputs which are ahead of these contractual documents. Such as themethodological documents, which are about the basic design documents. But evenin AREVA, there is no such basis design document.”
“You mean even for EPR design?” I asked.
“No, for Daya Bay, the methodology is created for the EPR, before that it was inthe brain of some people. That is why yesterday, I said that if you have somecapable people please kept them in the company. Because, for a very long timemore than 20 years, AREVA we don’t have methodological documents. It was inthe brains of some people, but by chance or not by chance, we kept all those peoplein the company, most of them. You know what I mean?”
“Yes, you mean the knowledge remained in your company.” I said.
“Yes. That is why it is important for the future of your company, to work out somemethodological documents for the new tasks that can be done.”
“Thanks to the TT negotiation, it was discussed in 2003 when AP1000 and EPRwere in the bidding process. AP1000 and EPR were in competition, AREVApromised a lot of methodological documents which does not exist by then. And nowthanks to the contract, we are now obliged to work out them through the NITT.”
“All the input data, the input deck, for example the FSAR (Final Safety AnalysisReport), all the data to reach to the result you don’t have for Daya Bay and Ling Ao.So that is the reason why for Ling Ao Phase II when I discussed with the NPIC (a
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sub-contractor of the design) manager of core physics. He was very concerned thatthey had to duplicate but they did not performed the studies. Now thanks to theNITT, no problem, you will have all the things.”
“That means we can do the same kind of things as you did.” I said.
“For the duplication principle now you will have all the things. But if you have allthe things you can think, how AREVA do like this and that. You will learn a lot.When you have all the things, you can think why all the data are worked out, andyou learn a lot.”
“What do you think of the JDO?” I asked.
“JDO is a good thing. The best way to learn is to doing some job within a certaintime because now you are obliged to work.”
Then we discussed about an example of the JDO trained engineer, Mr. G. Mr. Mthought that he was well trained and became more aware of the things than theprevious engineering manager of NITT.
“That is why I say to you the best way to learn is to be obliged to do the job. He (adesigner) was involved in such a detailed design job. But to do a detailed designyou have always a basic question about the reason why. And obviously when youdo detailed design you learn something about the basic and conceptual design. SoJDO is a good thing.”
Mr. M said “I now need to make an inquiry. Where are all these people? The NIEPpeople (on the AREVA side) told me that some people who were trained in the JDOare now not working for the EPR project. You miss a lot of things by doing like this.These people will forget something, or they might leave the company in the worstsituation. But after five or six years they move back to the design work they willhave lost some knowledge. You have to keep these competent people in a growingcurve in term of the load of work. In this case they will get better and better. That isalso a project management concern. To choose the good guys and put them againand again on the technical positions.”
“Well, people can change the things they do, but I believe that they are the peoplewho like it. I have experience when I entered ANP in the 1976. A guy met me onthe first day, and said to me hi, and me too. This guy was kept in the technicaldepartment, and now he is an expert. He always likes technical job. If by chanceyou met some guy who likes technical things, please put them technical. Don’tmake them a manager or something. But obviously it also has something to do withthe benefits and make them feel that their job is important.”
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I then told Mr. M that it was quite common in CGN that our engineers felt technicaljobs normal, and after several years of working they might feel tired.
“That is a problem of the management. You cannot make the people who alwaysdo the same thing. You have to make a bit change. And you have to make themresponsible for more and more important tasks. Obviously, if you make people tomake drawings and system design manuals, say for two years, people will say I amfeed up. You have to think about the career development of your technical engineer.Not let me always sit on the very limited piece of job. When you select smartpeople, you need to let them increase the scope. Let them in transverse activities.That is important, otherwise you will keep nobody. To have a specialist to do litterthings, that is a problem. That may be a problem of thinking about the work in yourcompany.”
I want to find some solutions of this problem, by asking Mr. M how ANP is solvingit. I find this problem varies obviously in different companies. From my interviews;it seemed that my company is not solving it effectively. It seems that careerdevelopment for engineers in our company is to become managers, rather thankeeps in the track of the technical team, even though the company claims to makeenough space for technical engineers. Then I asked Mr. M a straight forwardquestion: “Do you think that AREVA is doing better in this matter and how?”
Mr. M made the following statement: “We have rankings in our engineering teams,level 1 and level 2 leading to a specialist status. And we consider the mobility ofpeople by promoting them from one kind of engineering to another or fromengineering to purchasing based on their own willingness. Their personalwillingness is well concerned. Now in our company, the human resource in mycompany may think that if people change job in every three years it is a good thing.Personally, I don’t think so, but now it very open to make changes on the peopleaccording to their wants. The people have to take themselves in charge. They haveto know what they want to do. But people have to feel that their concerns arerecognized by the management. Now we evaluate people every month, every year,or maybe every two years, if they are considered as very promising people, thehuman resource tries to propose these people specific possibilities.”
“We don’t have such a proposal scheme. We are waiting to be chosen.” I said.
“We have but in the evaluation you have to prove that you are a very capableperson. Our evaluation is based on the feelings of the direct manager of the guy.The manager have a lot of guy and he have to make an evaluation of the guy at leastonce a year. The evaluation is done in two parts: one for the salary and one for thecapability. We have a matrix to rank people with A B C and this result has someconnections with the salary, and it is reported to the human resource. If the guyraises a quest of changing a job, the human resource can propose opportunities. But
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anyway the basis for this is that people should take themselves in charge, they haveto decide what they want to do. ”
I asked Mr. M about CGN’s outreach of businesses to other realms of engineeringprojects, and its effect on the engineering design capacity building.
Mr. M answered: “I think such kind of outreach is based on the fact that you haveknown the key factors in the processes. For nuclear engineering it’s theorganization of the process of how to do something. The basic for projectmanagement is how to organize the processes, for example the necessity of makesome channel exchange, interface exchange, and how to work out the interface. Ifyou have such kind of thinking of doing one kind of activities this basic principle oforganization can be adapted to other activities. For me through my experience, thekey is to have a good organization of the work, methodological documents to havetools, for example IMS (information management system) project procedures.Those are the keys which imply a lot people’s skills.”
“When we were doing Daya Bay and Ling Ao, all the people were working in thesame tower, the AREVA Tower, including Sofinel (AREVA’s Design Institute). Soit was easy to communicate; now it is too scattered. We have people working inGermany, and people in France, and even in France we had many offices. Sofinel isnot in Paris. Can you imagine?”
“And the split of work, who is in charge of this and that, when you do it like thatyou multiply interfaces by 10 by 100. If you cannot manage the interfaces you willfail. You will be in delay. From my own experience, for me, but it is off-record, thedelay of the EPR is the result of the interfaces. Too many people working together,and too much split of the work. There is a lack of organization and procedure ofhow things to be done. That is my personal feeling. That is why for themanagement, a good organization should have sound basic procedures. If you solvethese fundamental topics you will be able to succeed.”
I raised a question about the national feature of the split of work in engineeringdesign in China and in France and its effect on engineering design capacity building.Because the difference of the split of work will be manifested as the difference ofthe scope of design, for example something that CGN thought as the design work iswhat AREVA termed manufacturing.
“ Frankly speaking for the equipment in AREVA, there are some equipmentengineers who work out specifications and general drawings. They foresee thegeneral design of the equipment. But for the detailed design, we have themanufacturers in the factory who develop their own knowledge about how to dosomething about welding, the material and performing test. The basic knowledge
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and detailed knowledge of our manufacturers is very important and sometimes, theyreflect their opinions on the general design in terms of suggestions. They foreseethe materials because we have experiences also in order to promote modification.They provide a lot of modifications for prolonging the duration of the equipmentand also they reduce the cost. So I think we have the chance in AREVA to have thiscomplementary design knowledge for the equipment. Obviously in the AREVAtower we don’t manage in the detail of all the things which are involved in themanufacturing of the equipment. For us it’s a good thing, because I think ourmanufacturing now is very efficient and very good.”
“We don’t have a factory in CGN as the manufacturer of the equipment. So howcan we claim to have some improvements of the design of the system withoutknowing the advancement of the equipment? That is the question in my mind.” Isaid.
“ Yes, yes that is what we can avoid in AREVA. When you decide animprovement of the design, you may failure due to the lack of manufacturingknowledge.” said Mr. M.
“Obviously, in our factory there is some testing, to test the possibility of achievingthe design. For me it is difficult to perform equipment design if you don’t have anyexperience of manufacturing. It is a risk to require something which is not quitefeasible.”
“What you have just said is also some sort of a consensus in CGN. Now our mainequipment design engineers are sitting in their office making drawings and doingcalculations. These are fine but it is also a concern of how to give our engineersmore experiences on the manufacturing.” I said.
“Yes, but those activities do not equal to make a good design of the equipment. Itis just the justification I think. Seriously for me, most of the improvements, that istypical in Daya Bay, Ling Ao phase I and Ling Ao phase II, you are always makingimprovements on the Steam Generator. If you look into the detail, it was thanks toour factory. Ah yes. It is difficult to be equipment designer if you don’t have a dailyexperience of the manufacturing yourself.”
At last Mr. M made an example of the Toyota motor to illustrate the improvementof design based on the manufacturing practices.
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Appendix D. Interview with Mr. L
Mr. L is a young man who was educated to be a mechanical engineer in theuniversity. He was employed by CGN in the year 2007 when he was just graduatedfrom the University with a bachelor’s degree. Now he is taking a part time study inmechanical engineering for his Master’s degree. Mr. L first job was in Shanghai, inone of CNPDC’s subsidiaries. Then he shifted from Shanghai to Shenzhen wherethe headquarter locates.
I knew him in the year 2008 when he worked as a part-time coordinator of NITTthe technology transfer in his division - main equipment design. He was appointedto a technical leader of the design of pressure vessel internals in the year 2009.Their object of design is some mechanical parts inside the reactor pressure vessel.These mechanical parts will support the reactor vessel and help the control of thereaction. Mechanically the internals has a strong connection with the fuel rod, andconsist of the inside structure of the reactor vessel. He thought the appointment tobe a promotion. Over the years he keeps working with me on the NITT technologytransfer.
I gave him an interview asking him about his daily engineering design work, andhis perceptions of engineering design capacity building.
I recorded the discussion with a tape recorder, but something happened to thebattery of the tape recorder. So only half of our conversations were tapped. Therecording of the other half of our discussion had to be done by my notes. Therefore,the second part of this interview is rendered into some kind of a transcript of myown words on what he said.
Mr. L is quite supportive to my studies on engineering design capacity building. Ionce organized a group interview in his division. He actually helped me to organizethat group interview and being an informant in the questionnaire surveys that Ideveloped in the early stage of this PhD research. It is from those general studies ofthe overall picture of engineering design in CGN and on the people’s perceptionsabout capacity building I found it quite necessary to give him a face to face,interview.
I started this interview by asking his understandings of the “nuclear power plantsystem” because I found that not every designer had a picture of the system in mindin their daily work, or their understandings of the system might be partial, in thesense that the mechanical designers regarded the system as an assembly ofmachines. The system designers treat system as heat and hydronic exchangeprocesses.
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This would impact their interpretations of their own scope of work, and importantlyon what engineering design capacity means to them.
The first sentence Mr. L made in this conversation was:
“Nuclear power plant is a complicated system.”
Then I asked him what consists of the nuclear power plant system.
“The nuclear power plant system consists of its sub-systems, we call units. Everyunit has to perform its functions so that the entity can be made. The entity is thesystem.”
“What did you do as a designer in CGN in a typical day of work?” I asked.
“ I think my normal day of work can be described as consisted of some sort ofchaotic events. Considering the time that I spend on using different computersoftware, the outlook email is the most frequently used software. I spend half of myday using it to communicate and to coordinate. Maybe it is because that now I am agroup leader. So I have many things to handle with every day. Some of my groupmembers are now working in the factory solving some site problems. I also have tolead some R&D projects and certainly some real design activities for the on-goingprojects. In addition the NITT project in my team. I also have to play somemanagement roles - managing people in my group. I feel that I have less and lesstime to perform real technical work.”
“What are the real technical work refers to?” I asked.
“My understanding of real technical work is performing some technical analysisand do some research. But now I feel like that I am doing an engineeringmanagement work and going far from the real design. But it does not mean that it isnot good. I hope that I can develop the capabilities of my fellow group members, sothat they can play my part as I used to play. Some of my peers are very keen ondoing technical work. If I do too many tasks by myself, I will be too tired, and it isalso not good for my group members. They need opportunities. So I think I amquite open to give them more tasks. In this respect, I have less and less concretetechnical jobs to do in my daily work.”
In the office, we heard the music started to play. It was a piece of music for a kindof a physical exercise break, of which we were getting used to since we started oureducation in the primary school. This music is played in every Chinese primaryschools, middle schools and universities. In the university it is the sign of a morningexercise, but here in CGN, it offers a voluntary break in the afternoon.
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Mr. L closed the door; it looked as if he would not want to have a break in thisconversation.
“Every day the first thing for me is to give a review of what has been done in theprevious day, and check whether somethings needs me to report and follow up. Istart to dispatch work to my group members immediately after this review. Anotherimportant task for me is to coordinate. Such coordination takes a large amount ofmy time, because we cannot solve every problem on our own. We first need to beclear of our scope and the scopes of others.”
“When I find there are some tasks that we cannot do in the group, I need to findsomeone in CNPDC to do them. When someone would not accept the jobs, I needto report to my superior. When the division leader cannot push the agreement, Ineed to find the chief engineer of a project to allocate this job. This takes up to 50%of my hours. Therefore, a lot of my time is used in writing reports and sendingemails which I think is some sort of a coordination and management work.”
“Another part of my work is to motivate my group members. I assign the work inthe group, and when the work is finished those who accomplished it require somecompliments. They need some feedback. In my position, I can not only act as aninformation or work hub, I need to provide some guidance to my peers. As such itwill facilitate communication.”
“The rest of my time is used on what I call real technical work.”
“For me, designs can be classified into several categories. First the R&D relatedjobs, such as the design tasks in the ACPR 1000 (now HL1000) project. In detail,we get some input and based on our scope of work, we work out some calculations,and perform some verification. In the end we lead to some conclusions and theseconclusions serve as the input for follow up engineering disciplines. Or theconclusions may support the next phase of our own design such as the detaileddesign, in terms of making manufacturing drawings and assembly drawings.”
“ The second part of our job is to support manufacturing factories, in case themanufacturer raises some questions which require further interpretation. Somequestions derive from the misunderstandings of our drawings and some from thenon-conformance report (NCR) discovered by our surveillance people. NCR refersto the inconsistency of the manufacturing with the design documents; it normallyrepresents a manufacturing problem but not a fatal mistake. Testing and evaluationare required by the designer to decide whether this non-conformance can beaccepted according to the technical standard and the functional requirements.”
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The recording stopped here. It was before the start of the next interview Idiscovered this problem. Therefore, the following part of the interview is presentedaccording to my notes.
“The third part of the technical work refers to some supporting work to the siteproblems which happen in erection and installation. Some equipment may bescratched during such activities. Therefore we need to send our engineers to the siteto evaluate whether such slight damage would impair the function of thismechanical part, and do some testing on whether it causes risks to its duration etc.”
After hearing Mr. L described the technical work he is involved every day, I feelthat it is in fact a mechanic perception of nuclear safety.
Then I asked some questions in order to make him clarify his perceptions of theknowledge used in his job.
The first question I asked was “How to define a good design from his disciplinaryperspective?” and the second was “Will the knowledge about the system be usefulto improve the design of main equipment?”
His answer to the first question was quite clear:
“ In my view, our job is to design good products, in terms of good seismicresistance feature, and long term duration in operational circumstances. Therefore,we focus on the materials, and their mechanical properties and their fatigue analysis.In order to ensure the stability and completeness of the equipment we focus on thestructural effects of our machines. We cannot make mistakes because if ourproducts fail, it will have a big problem. Unlike the system designers and the safetyanalysis people who calculate safety risks on a probability study, we cannot rely onprobability study. So risk does not mean anything to us. Our job is to make sure thatour products will still be able to function even in the most severe accidents.”
Mr. L compared the design of the AP1000 reactor vessel to the EPR, and said: “Ithink EPR has a better reactor vessel. AP1000’s reactor vessel is rather old. AP1000may be advanced in its safety systems but when we look at the design of the reactorvessel it has nothing radically innovative. What I can say here is that the EPRreactor vessel has solved more mechanical problems in its design than the AP1000.”
In fact he answered the two questions at the same time.
Mr. L also made his point on the rotation of jobs among different disciplines.
“ I don’t think the rotation of jobs is going to be helpful for engineering designcapacity building. Capacity building needs to have a purpose. If after a round of
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rotation I am still appointed as the equipment designer, I will think it is a waste ofmy time. Because, the system knowledge only serves as the background of ourdesign, we can learn it by ourselves. We don’t need in-depth knowledge of thesystem unless we find understanding the input data difficult. I think it is better tohave a narrow split of work in our company so that people can focus. The methodsand tools used in other disciplines can be very different. In equipment design wedon’t need their methods and tools.”
Mr. L is quite a straightforward person He made some comments to the engineeringdesign capacity building management issues in the previous focus group interviewthat I performed in the previous year.
I asked him how he was appointed as the group leader because I felt him quite aleadership oriented person. At the same time he also seemed to be disciplinaryoriented in terms of knowing how to develop his own expertise and career. I wascurious about how such a technical people was chose to a group leader which mightreflect some ideal type of “personal capacity building” in CGN.
“The promotion to the group leader is a surprise for me. Because at the time whenI was promoted, I had only been working in CNPDC for 3 years. Normally, in ourdivision the promotion to a group leader is based on the following criterions:Experience, in terms of how many years the person has been working in CNPDC,and education background (major and degree). If these criterions were constant Iwould never be chosen. My advantage is that every time when I receive a task, I tryto think about the expectations of my superior. And he once told me that every timewhen I accomplished the work, in most cases, the result was beyond hisexpectations.”
“Does it mean that your products are better than the others?” I asked.
“Not the quality of design but the quality of work in general.” He answered.
He did not make further interpretations on what the quality of work he meant, butfrom his later words I might be able to conjecture.
I asked him some questions which I found interesting from the discussions in theprevious interviews - the question about interfaces. I asked Mr. L about how theinterface is defined in their work. He gave me a physical example:
The bolt used to fix a piece of equipment is an interface. In the nuclear power plantconstruction the bolt is often embedded in the concrete. The screw cap is somethingthat is used in the installation work. We, as the equipment designers, need toconsider the fix of a machine. Selecting both the bolt and the screw cap is in ourscope. When we choose the bolt, this data becomes the input for the civil work
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engineers and they have to express it in their civil work drawings. The control ofthe positional deviation of the bolt is in the scope of the civil engineers, but we areresponsible for the physical liability of the bolt. The positional information aboutthe bolt becomes input data for the following erection work.
I asked Mr. L the question which was pointed out by Mr. G about better ways tointerpret system design results to engineers in different disciplines.
Mr. L said: “As I see that we have a formality problem in our drawings. Each grouphas its own style, the fonts, the method of making notes etc. Putting these drawingstogether, people will question whether they are made out by one company exceptthe logo. AREVA is doing quite good in this, their styles and formalities ofdrawings are identical. They have a specific drawing team, but we don’t have one.Our drawings are made in the groups. But the diversity of styles and formats willnot cause problems because we are facing with different manufacturers. Themanufacturer for one machine does not need to read drawings for the other piecesof equipment. But I still think that the format and style should be identical.”
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Appendix E. Interview with Mrs. S
Mrs. S is a 45 years old female civil structural engineer. She was educated in theSouth East University in Nanjing China. Her university is one of the well-recognized universities of engineering especially in Architecture and Civilengineering. She was educated to the bachelor’s level. She has 22 years of workingexperience always in civil engineering design. At the beginning she worked in herhome town after her graduate from the South East University in a mineral miningengineering design institute for seven years. In the late 1990s and early 2000s shethought southern China would provide her with more promising career developmentopportunities. She decided to move to Shenzhen with her husband a mechanicalengineer also a graduate from the South East University. She joined ARUP - a well-known civil engineering design and consultancy firm - in its greater China branchin Shenzhen. She mainly worked on normal civil engineering projects before sheswitched to CNPDC in 2008 when CNPDC started to form its civil engineeringdesign division. She was employed by CNPDC as a specialist in civil engineeringdesign.
I worked with Mrs. S in the Joint Design Team which was consisted of AREVA’ssubcontractors in civil engineering detailed design IOSIS and CNPDC. The basiccivil engineering design for Taishan nuclear power plant was done by AREVA. ButAREVA lacked the personnel and the expertise in its detailed design. Such kind ofsteel structure design and the drafting of its reinforcement drawings have to besubcontracted to other suppliers. In this case, CGN pushed AREVA to makeCNPDC a localized civil engineering design sub-supplier. As a consequence, theJDT was formed by IOSIS and CNPDC engineers.
In 2010, Mrs. S was appointed as the technical manager of JDT and I was appointedby chance as the commercial manager of this task.
The major design tasks in JDT were to transfer the basic design from AREVA intoshop drawings which are going to be used on site in Taishan. The basic design wasrendered in sets of calculation notes and some handmade rough drawing. They arebasically some general ideas of the steel structures. The drawings have to be madeaccording to the Chinese technical standards, thus some changes of the calculationsand the formality, and even the choice of materials have to be adjusted accordingly.JDT’s drawings had to be sent to AREVA for final approval because AREVA asthe basic designer had to take the technical responsibility.
The JDT detailed design tasks have been completed, in 2013. The JDT wasdismissed. After that due to her successful and fruitful work she was promoted to bea branch leader (higher than the group leader) in his division.
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This interview with Mrs. S was done in April 25th, 2014. She let me use her officeto perform the interview with Mr. L. I arrived at 2 pm. Mrs. S was in anothermeeting. Mr. L happened to be free. So the interview with Mr. L took place earlierthan Mrs. S. In fact, Mr. L was in waiting for an evaluation meeting for his ownsmall R&D project encouraged by CNPDC as a self-development project. Thecompany provides funding for these R&D projects. On that day, it was somethinglike a defense of Mr. L’s R&D report.
My interview with Mrs. S took place at around 3 o’clock, when Mr. L had to finishhis talk because he received a phone call from somebody who told him that itreached to his turn to defend his report. I also experienced similar situations inCNPEC. Such kinds of evaluations of the young engineers’ small R&D projectswere a form of peer review in the CGN system.
I started the interview with Mrs. S by asking her to give a comparative review ofher daily work in her previous design job and the job in CNPDC.
“ In my previous job in the civil engineering design companies, my tasks werelargely technical. Although I need to work with different technical disciplines andattending the meetings organized by the owners of the projects, these meetings tookonly a small part of my time. About 80% of my time was used in my technical tasks,such as calculations and making drawings.”
“Could you specify your technical tasks?” I asked.
“I make plans and blueprints for the building structures, and verify their validity.Based on the comments from other disciplines - my colleagues - I need to makemodifications on my plans and blueprints. These are what I call the technical tasks.I calculate based on numerical analysis; I issue drawings and reports. These tasksdirectly reflect my own perceptions on engineering design.”
“Ok, I understand, these were the designs you did in your previous job.” I said.
“Yes, from a sequential perspective, I first make an initial general plan, and then Iperform calculation, after that I make drawings with affiliated reports. I seldomperform the so-called managerial tasks. If there are any, these tasks refer to organizetechnical discussions among different disciplines. ”
“When I joined CNPDC, at the beginning, I felt a tremendous change on my everyday activities. I even cannot make a clear illustration of what I did every day, at thebeginning.”
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“Well I can now depict what I need to do every day.” I said to Mrs. S. At thatmoment I felt the same about the change of jobs here in CNPEC from my previousjob.
“Before I was appointed the director of this branch, as you know, I worked in theJDT as the chief engineer, the technical manager. But it is a project organizationserved for the sole purpose of one single project, the Taishan project. It was not atypical working day in CNPDC, a typical day for a CNPDC design engineerconsists of different activities for different projects, and fulfilling a lot ofadministrative orders. All these activities are simultaneous, thus the day looks like achaos. JDT’s job compared to the typical day of a normal CNPDC engineer’s ismore focused. It was a specific task.”
“Now my days are filled up with different technical tasks for different on-goingprojects, some R&D projects, and some specific meetings such as the qualityassurance meetings etc. The situation that one engineer participates in two or threetasks at the same time is quite normal. In general too many meetings take up myhours. These meetings can be classified into technical meetings with relateddisciplines, progress report meetings to my superiors - to the divisions - and to theproject organizations etc.”
“The time that I used to study technical standards, performing calculations andparticipating in technical discussions with my colleagues becomes less and less.”
“So, how can I make a summary of my job?” murmured Mrs. S.
“Another part of my job is to reply emails and writing reports. I feel that most ofmy time is used on either attending some meetings, or preparing for those meetings.As far as I know, a lot of our engineers live and work like this.”
“So it seemed that a lot of people are performing managerial jobs.” I added.
“Yes, now my position becomes quite unique, in the sense that no matter what theissues are, I am obliged to take part a meeting for whatever it is about, technical orabout people.”
“Do you think it is due to the fact that there is an over split up of our jobs inCNPEC and CNPDC, that leads to too much meetings?” I asked.
Mrs. S answered: “I think it is a feature of nuclear power engineering, because itinvolves too many people and too many disciplines for just one purpose. For normalcivil engineering projects, less engineering disciplines are required. There is a huge
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cost of communication induced by such a huge number of interfaces. This is atypical feature of nuclear power engineering.”
“Do you think that you are now having an abundant knowledge about nuclearpower plant’s systems?” I asked.
“No.”
“But still, you can do your job.” I added.
Mrs. S answered: “I kind of know something about the nuclear power plant system.But I certainly don’t know all.”
“I have a feeling that nuclear power plants for you are just buildings, in terms ofconcrete and steel structures.” I added.
Mrs. S answered: “Not exactly, we need to know some basic parameters of thesystem for example the seismic classification of equipment. And we also have toknow some data from the operational conditions. We need to perform ourcalculation and simulation according to the definition of accidents, such as the basicdesign accidents, or severe accidents etc. We have to get a feeling of what is anormal accident and what is a vital accident. Technical standards used in the designof the structure vary upon these conditions. However, the design for a nuclearpower plant can be referenced to some normal civil engineering standards. Innuclear power plant design, we need to know the calculation methods stipulated inthe technical standard for different accidents, and the verification methods.Otherwise, our calculation cannot be done.”
“We need to know the cause of the problem, and then we can start to performanalysis. Hence we can find solutions for the problem. This knowledge has somerelationship with the system design.”
“ Another reason that we, civil engineers, need to know something about thesystem, is the civil engineering design to prevent system broken down in theairplane collide scenario. We need to know which part of the system needs to beprotected. These parts cannot be impaired in case of an airplane collide. Especially,those parts that will cause a stop of the reaction, and the heat release, and the partsthat protect the used nuclear fuel. The protection of these parts of the system iscritical for our design. We need to know the principles of the system design, inorder to conceive the protection strategy, so that the consequence can be avoided.The nuclear power plant’s redundancy layout is important for us, because, as longas we make sure that at least one complete train of the safety system is not impaired,our goal is achieved. This has something to do with the system design and the
A BOOK OF CHANGES IN ENGINEERING
APP 38
layout of the entire plant. But when it comes to the details of the hydro-thermodynamics and the heat exchange, it is out of our scope. Anyway we know thelogic of the system design.”
Then I turned the topic to the so-called engineering design in a “forwarded”direction in contrast to the reverse engineering, which became a new focus oftransforming the fashion of engineering design in CNPDC.
Mr. S said: “Now engineering design in a “forwarded” direction becomes animportant mind set in CNPDC. In my own words, such kind of design means adesign process from a concept to a structure, from making plans, to the calculationof the operation conditions, and hence to the structure. We have to understand theabove mentioned principles before we perform this sort of design. Previously, inCNPDC, we started with a result. We know that the result is a good and verifiedresult. Therefore, even if the designers cannot construct the plan and understand theprinciples, an acceptable will come at the beginning. But now in the mode of a“forwarded” direction, we need to start from the concept.”
“Have you experienced a period of making duplications of the drawings?” I asked
“When I came, I started from the detailed design of the EPR, thus I did notexperience. As far as I know in the later CPR1000 designs, some improvementsemerged and these improvements were in fact some engineering design in thenormal direction, because in these designs the logics of the original design neededto be re-constructed, so that the changes could be substituted according to the logicof the original design.”
“For the intermediate design documents, we are now trying to construct our designmethodological documentations, especially when we face improvements,modifications, and design changes. I think that now we have gone through thedesign duplication designs. We now have a complete process of a normal design.But if this new project is not to be finished we cannot claim that we have acquiredthe capacity to perform a nuclear power plant design. Corporation between theinterfaces is very complicated in this sort of “real” design. The corporation betweenthe disciplines will experience a process first at the general level then into thedetails.”
“From the studies of engineering design, we see a relatively clear demarcation ofthe design phases such as the conceptual design, the basic design, and the detaileddesign. But just now you told me that in real life engineering design in CNPDCsuch phases are not clearly split apart.” I said.
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Mr. S said: “Yes, for example we need to exchange data in the PDMS system. At acertain design stage we need to make some input data into the system indicating thestatus of design. Thus the configuration management in the PDMS is quiteimportant to reflect the overall status of design. We need a real project to figure outhow this configuration management of design can actually work. It is not just thatwe learn this configuration management concept from AREVA in a course and wesuddenly find that we are capable of doing that. ”
“When you retrace the experience in JDT, do you think such kind of workingtogether with IOSIS was beneficiary to our designers?” I asked.
“ Yes, it is good for our capacity enhancement. When we work together withIOSIS, it is the first time that we make a real design which leads to the issuance ofshop drawings. Thus, in our new R&D project, I am not worried about making shopdrawings by our own engineers. I believe we have already acquired such kind ofcapability, and now it is only a matter of how to diffuse the knowledge of thesecapable people to the entire branch. We have already known the process of makingshop drawings and the tools.”
“Is that to say that knowing the process, the methods, and the tools mean you haveacquired the capacity?” I asked.
Mrs. S answered: “Yes, but only one person knows these do not represent thecapacity of the entire team. The team must know all these and that represents thesuccess of capacity building.”
“You also have experience in the so-called joint design. What is the differencebetween the French organization of design and our organization of design? I gotsome reflections. They told me that due to the fact that our definition of disciplinesis too narrow, our project communication and coordination becomes complicated.What do you think of this opinion?” I asked.
Mrs. S answered: “As far as I know, the French style of engineering designorganization has more integrated arrangements than ours. For example they have anintegrated layout team; therefore all the interfaces about the equipment andbuildings are dealt within this team. But in our organization such layout team isdispersed in different divisions. Therefore, when we discuss problems about thelayout, each layout engineer represent the interests of their own divisions. Thus, forme to minimize conflicts in the interfaces, the organization structure becomes themost important factor. We need to consider which organizational structure providesthe best efficiency.”
“In that case, it will reduce the amount of time spent in the coordination?” I asked.
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“ Yes. For example in our ACPR1000+ research and development project, wesolve such problems not at an integrated higher level like the French people. Wesolve these problems at a lower level, between the divisions, that reduced ourefficiency. We need a decision making at a higher level of engineering, and thisindicates the competency of the leader of such a layout team. He or she must be anexperience team leader. Now in our organization, even at the lower level, thereexists the same problem. Who is going to make a decision when all the participantsseem to make sense?”
“No decisions?” I asked.
Mrs. S answered: “No, no decisions from a single person. Therefore we must relyon the so-called collective decision making. Collective decision making is notalways effective and efficient.”
Mrs. S picked up her phone, to answer one of her colleague.
She continued: “I think the feature of nuclear power engineering is that too manydisciplines are involved. So communications and coordination are necessary. Weare a state owned enterprise; therefore we need to make a lot of reports, multiplelevel of reporting. We are redundant in terms of management. The matrix ofmanagement is a two sided coin; it has both the good side, and the bad side. Boththe project and the administrative management influence the design, one more trainof management. This is our company’s feature. Experience is also very important inthe decision making. If experience is lacking, asking a big group of people to takepart in one meeting is a waste of time.”
“How many percent of your time is spent on what you called technical tasksversus the managerial routines?” I asked.
Mrs. S answered: “30% on technical tasks and 70% on managerial routines.”
“What is this 30% consisted of?” I asked.
Mrs. S answered: “Technical discussions or meetings to perform collectivedecisions.”
“Meetings again?” I asked.
Mrs. S answered: “Yes, plenty, every day we receive plenty of technical questionsfrom the site. Just before I came to have this interview with you I was in a meetingabout the sizing of the holes on the concrete walls.”
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“ There is another feature of our company, the administrative manager and theengineering manager is positioned on the single person. Everybody is involved inboth the technical and the managerial discussions.”
“ If the managerial and the technical job are separated, will that also causeredundancy?” I asked.
Mrs. S answered: “In fact, I prefer the engineering people solve technical problems,leaving the managerial people solving human resource and other problems aboutthe people. There are plenty of problems about people.”
I picked up a drawing on the table and ask her whether she is signing thesedrawings as approval.
Mrs. S said: “I am not signing now. I need to read it. I sometimes need to give someserious thoughts and comments on it. Otherwise, I will not know how to evaluatemy staff. How difficult a problem the person is handling. What kinds ofcompetencies are reflected from the solutions. Through the reading of the drawingsI will be able to make my judgment of my staff’s capabilities, technically. If I leavethese technical jobs to the chief engineer, I cannot manage my people. I cannotdistinguish their talents.”
At that moment, it appeared in my mind that Mrs. S seemed to have a cleardefinition in mind that management equals to solving problems about people, whilethose problems which have nothing to do with people or what can be dehumanizedshall all be treated as technical.
Therefore, I asked her to clarify of what is design management, which is also aword that we often use in our organization, but nobody really knows what it reallymeans.
She gave me an example on the making of a drawing production plan, saying thatthe control of scheduling and input data and the reduction of the mistakes served asthe key factors of making such a plan. The making of the plan itself, is a designmanagement activity in which efficiency matters. Regularity, the prediction ofproductivity and the real production rates are also mattered.
I feel that, in fact project management is a kind of technology in CNPEC.
And then I would like to know from her the entire civil engineering design in anuclear power plant. Therefore, I asked her about the split of the civil engineeringdesign work in her division. The division consists of serval branches, namely, thenuclear island building structure design branch, the conventional island building
A BOOK OF CHANGES IN ENGINEERING
APP 42
structure design branch, the geological study branch, the overall architecture designand site planning branch.
Among these branches, as Mrs. S thought, her branch is the most important.
As she said: “In our design, we need to comply with the nuclear industry standards.But in the structure design for the conventional island, normal civil engineeringstandards are enough. The nuclear power industry standards are technical higherdemanding, on the resistance of vibration etc.”
I asked her further about the relationships and difference between civil engineeringdesign for nuclear island buildings and the normal civil engineering buildings bymaking a question as the following: “Do you think your previous education andwork experience before CNPDC are useful in your design of the nuclear islandbuildings?”
“Yes, sure.” She said, “The essence of design is always the same.”
“What is the essence of design?” I asked.
“The essence is the analysis of the load-carrying capability, and the properties ofthe materials, the concrete and the steel. When we figure out the stress and loaddistribution of the structure, we can work it out. Force and the properties ofmaterials are the essential elements of design.”
I then asked Mrs. S a question on whether she met some problems of theinterpretation of the drawings to her engineering partners. She said: “No.” But thisanswer contradicted with our later discussions about what is engineering designexperience.
After this topic, we had a break and my recorder was running out of power. Thusthe following description of interviews is made according to my notes.
Since Mrs. S has said many times about the importance of engineering designexperiences in performing a good design. This reminded me to ask her whatexperience is, because in other interviews the word experience seemed empty forme.
Also I got confused about one question: We signed the technology transfer contractwith AREVA, and AREVA committed to transfer us all the methodologicaldocuments. If all the knowledge about the methods and the result of the design istransferred why would our engineers still complain that AREVA is hidingsomething from us?
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Is there something more than knowledge that is important to improve our design?
I asked Mrs. S a straightforward question: “What is experience?”
She did not answer me directly, but she gave me some examples which representeda lack of experience in the design.
The first example is the sizing problem that she discussed in the meeting beforecame back to her office to attend my interview.
She said: “This problem derives from the so called ‘habits’ of our design. Normallythe sizing of the holes on the floor plates is regular in our previous designs. Itdepends on the sizing of the bolt which would be fastened into the hole in order tosustain the weight of a pipe and the cables inside it. No one has questioned thesizing and its impact on the load carrying capacity on the floor slab. Because weknow the sizing of the holes is small so that it won’t bring about a problem. But thistime we intend to put more cables inside the pipe thus the hole is required to belarger, and now someone raises the question on the load carrying capacity issue,whether such a larger sizing of the hole will impact on the stability of the floor slab.If we have not calculated the case of large sizing, we need to start the calculationfrom the beginning, which is a time consuming job for this tiny problem. But ifsomeone have the experience, the decision is easier to be made.”
The second example is a problem of when to start a detailed design of a steelstructure inside a room in the nuclear island building. In the basic design of thenuclear island building such designs for internal steel structures shall remain blank,it is until the layout designers and the equipment designers who finally decide thesize and weight of the equipment and the layout designer give the initial drawingsof the room, the civil engineers start to perform the steel structure design in order tosupport the equipment and make its maintenance feasible. Previously when CNPDCwas doing some sort of duplication designs, such problems of when to start thedetailed design never happened. It is now in the R&D project that it becomes aquestion because neither the equipment designer nor the layout designer can at anearly stage provide the input data required by the civil structure engineers, becausethe equipment design is not finished yet due to the lack of feedback from themanufacturer. The machine is not a regular machine which is already manufactured,but requires the manufacturer to make some modifications of the design in order tofinally decide its shape and size without jeopardizing the required functions. In sucha case, it brings in a chain of problems. Even though the basic design can be doneby providing some functional requirements, without a detailed design, theconstruction cannot be performed.
The third example is in fact a mistake happened in the reading of the civilengineering shop drawings. In Taishan project, on the steel structure detailed design
A BOOK OF CHANGES IN ENGINEERING
APP 44
drawings some oval circles were drawn. Such oval marking is intended to tell theconstructor to make exactly oval holes on the steel beam. When these holes arefilled with bolts, the stress of such connections can be released. But what happenedon Taishan site was that in one steel structure, all the holes were made into perfectlyround holes, thus the stress of the beams and the bolts cannot be released as it wasintended. The constructor said that they misunderstood the oval marks as thetolerance of the round shape. Since they could make a perfect round shape, such anoval shape on the drawings shall be disregarded. In fact, if some words can beadded to the oval marks such a misinterpretation of the drawings can be avoided.But unfortunately there were no such words on the drawings indicating that theholes shall be made intentionally oval not a tolerance. Mrs. Sheng said:“Experienced designers would add words on because they must have experiencedsimilar events. But it is hard to say if it is a mistake of the designer or not.”
I learned these cases, on Mrs. S computer when she showed me pictures from thesite.
At last, she concluded: “Experience comes from details. Knowing the scientificprinciples and the knowledge do not equal to a good design. A good design comesfrom practices and the learnings from mistakes”
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Appendix F. Interview with Mr. W
Interviewer: “So shall we begin now? I would like to ask you some questions aboutengineering design capacity building. From the procurement and projectmanagement perspectives, could you identify some important factors of engineeringdesign?”
Mr. W: “Well, engineering design capacity is first expressed in engineer’s syntheticabilities of systems and equipment. In both system and equipment designs, thedesigners will raise some requirements on the specific equipment to be procured. Inreal life work, we often witness some deviations from the design requirements, inthe sense that the equipment on the market cannot meet the technical specificationsof our design. In case such a deviation occurs, we need sound engineering designabilities so that we can find out how to deal with it. For instance if the manufacturercannot build such an equipment or have to work under a tight time limit to providethe required product, it seems from a project management point of view a highdemanding requirement which will cause problem on project progress.”
“The problem is when the equipment ready in the market cannot meet the designrequirements, how can our engineers deal with this problem. If our designer lackedsuch an ability of dealing with these deviations, we have to ask the manufacturer toabolish its already built equipment or we need to change the sub-supplier. If this istrue, from a scheduling control point of view, it will be an unexpected loss of theentire project.”
“ This is a type of engineering design capacity, and this capacity is in fact acomprehensive awareness of the market. The designer has to realize that if theirrequirements exceeded the state-of-the-art of production technics in the market. Thedesigner also has to know if their requirements indicate very limited supplierswhich can qualify. This kind of capacity is very essential for us. We are not reallydoing high-tech products; we are indeed in need of those already industrialized andstandard products. You cannot make each piece of equipment used in the nuclearpower plant a product out of a R&D process. This is not only true in our domesticmarket but also in the global market. If even the European advanced supplierscannot provide ready products that meet the design requirement, I would say thatthe design is not good at all. In that case the designer totally disregards the reality.As a summary of this point, I would say that the designer must have enoughinformation about manufacturing technics in the market. The design should not be arequirement that cannot be met.”
“Another aspect of engineering design capacity that I would like to point out hereis the understanding of industrial standard. The major industrialized countriesadopted different industrial standards. The Europeans use their standard. And even
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within Europe, the French adopts its own nuclear power industry standard RCCMwhile the Germans use their KTA. The good thing is that in Europe there is ageneral manufacturing standard. In China, we have the GB standard and theAmericans have their ASME. In such a globalized and diversified situation,considering nuclear power engineering design and its follow-up procurement bycompetitive bidding, if the standard is chosen to be only one without alternatives,the choices for procurement become very limited. This will lead to a limitednumber of potential sub-suppliers from which we can finally choose one. A lot ofbidders are rejected because they are not familiar with the required standard ofmanufacturing. If the designers can understand all these standards the situation willbe better. Industrial standard for me is a set of rules and procedures. It does notdirectly relate to the quality and functionality of the product. But if the designer isnot familiar with the standard, he or she cannot make a judgment on the product,and its impact to the system.”
Interviewer: “As far as I know, in China, we don’t have a set of nuclear powerindustry standard up till now. Do you know that?”
Mr. W: “No, we don’t have. Americans have ASME. In China we don’t have anindependent nuclear power industrial requirement (standard), instead of the generalGB standard.”
Interviewer: “As I read from our civil engineers’ designs, the choice of industrialstandard on nuclear power plant’s concrete structures was an appropriation from thedam construction standard. In the standard, two requirements are listed, with onerequires the endurance of 50 years, the other higher one required the endurance of100 years. Since the designed operation of a nuclear power plant is 60 years, wehave to adopt the 100 years standard.
Mr. W: “Yes, right.”
Interviewer: “What is the situation in nuclear power plant equipment design?”
Mr. W: “As far as I know, in nuclear power industry we have to follow the GBgeneral standard, and adopt the high standard instead of the low standard. But wedon’t have an independent system of the nuclear power industry. For example in thedesign of pressurized containers, the GB standard is the only thing we can refer to.It will bring some problem in our self-reliance manufacturing attempts. Due to thedifference of standards, some technical and functional requirements have to beverified by asking the supplier to perform additional tests. In that case, we canprove that our designs and products can comply with the French RCCM standardfor example. This is a bottleneck for our self-reliance manufacturing of theequipment with a French origin.
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Interviewer: “Ok, I also discussed this question about standard with anothercolleague of ours. Just now what you said were largely from a procurementperspective. Since design is placed ahead of procurement in our projects’engineering sequence, what do you think the designers do? Specifically what kindof problems have they solved in our projects?”
Mr. W: “The designers directly limit the choices of procurement and predict therange of the price we are going to pay for each piece of equipment. Highdemanding requirements indicate fewer potential suppliers. Therefore, the price isgoing to be higher. In some cases, the supplier will be required to carry out someR&D activities before manufacturing. This will cause some unexpected prolongingof manufacturing. R&D is not something that we can predict. From my experiencein our EPR project, we witnessed many times that due to our R&D requirement andadditional testing and verification requirements, many machines and containers,valves, etc. had to put into tests again and again, and this had great impacts on ourscheduling control. At this point, I think, if our design is more reasonable in thesense that the design is more correlated with the current state-of-the-art of themanufacturing, it will on one hand, reduce our cost, our time, and on the other handraise our competitiveness.”
“Nuclear power plant’s engineering design is a systematic design. The essence ofthis type of design is its systematic synthetic feature. Due to the fact that someequipment cannot meet its original functional requirements, a large scale of designmodifications, adjustments have to be performed. This causes a lot of reworks. Wehave to abolish some already placed orders, or make additional orders to purchasemore adjacent pieces of equipment, or change manufacturing factories etc. Itbrought about great pressures on our budget and scheduling etc. Design is acritically determinative factor. It is said that if the design is good, other work turnedto be an easy routine. Designers are those who give orders; if they give a false orderother people will walk along the wrong direction which deviates from the ultimatetriumph.”
Interviewer: “Let us move back to our previous question about deviations. Whatkinds of methods are available at the hands of the designers to deal with theseproblems? any specific examples?”
Mr. W: “One method often used is to make a technical compromise in terms of asubstitution. Nuclear power plants are designed to work properly for 60 years butthere is some equipment which cannot last that long, say 30 years. For exampleaccording to our fatigue analysis some of the valves cannot reach to a service of 60years. We have requirements not only for the valves’ years of service but also theirsizing and weight etc. In fact, to prolong the valve’s service, the easiest approach isto make the shell thicker but this will increase its weight and larger its size. Due tothe sizing and weight limits, some valves must be lighter or smaller. In this case a
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compromise is needed. With a thinner shell, the years of service can only beensured, say 30 years. As a consequence, the designer has to consider itssubstitution in the in-service inspections. That is to say two values are needed tofulfill the plant’s operation for 60 years. One new valve will replace the old 30years after the plant’s commercial operation. However, we must admit that there arealways some problems which cannot be solved by this approach, in these situationsthe designer have to find other solutions.”
At this point of the interview, Mr. W received an urgent call from one of ourcolleagues when he was just about to say something about another approach ofproblem-solving in engineering design. The interview had to be stopped for a while.
When he came back from his phone call, Mr. W continued: “Another kind ofsubstitution happens when a different material can be chosen. But it is very difficultin our self-reliant manufacturing because using another material means to substitutean industrial standard. The RCCM material is very rare in China, because normallythe metallurgy industry in China follows GB standard. That is to say additional testson the physical property of a piece of metal produced in China have to be donebefore it can be justified as equivalent to the RCCM standard. Chemicalcomponents analysis is also required. As a summary we have to show an evidencethat this piece of metal complies with all the specifications listed in the RCCMstandard before it can be put into manufacturing. It is abnormal for a standardizedmanufacturing process because a normal process does not require testing as long asthe manufacturer knows the grade and the brand of the metal, such as GB Q235Bcarbon steel. It is a huge amount of work when these tests have to be performedbecause building a machine requires dozens of materials. When the entire machineis design to be built in compliance with the RCCM standard, the manufacturer hasto prove all the materials originated from the GB standard are all equivalent toRCCM. The biggest problem here is that the solution of these problems has nosense of universality, in the sense that if this supplier has performed such tests andthen the other suppliers can be waived from the same tests. It is completely a caseby case problem.”
Interviewer: “How can we improve our engineering designs, since you have alreadyidentified their shortcomings?”
Mr. W: “I think improving engineering design, is a step-by-step process. At thecurrent stage, we may not have very good approaches to make a quick change.”
I reminded Mr. W to focus on improving engineering design, because I am afraidthat he was going to shift our topic to how to improve supplier’s manufacturing.
Mr. W: “I got a feeling that CGN engineers largely performed system design andlacked equipment design knowledge. The system designer focuses on flows and
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fluid mechanic. They seldom concern about structures, fatigues and materials. Sofrom a CGN perspective, we need to nurture good equipment designers. On quickapproach is to recruit designers with manufacturing experiences into CNPDC, or weneed to tighten our corporation with our suppliers. As such the designers will getsome first-hand senses on whether their requirements can be achieved in real lifemanufacturing. Now our designers do not have such senses, they often draft a planfirst and then wait for manufacturers’ feedbacks and corrections.”
“ I think in order to improve equipment designer’s work, they must be equippedwith more knowledge, and now, from my perspective, they are not equipped withenough knowledge. I have to admit that it is very difficult. We focus on systemdesign and that is our core competency. So when you ask me how to improve ourdesign, I would say that to work with our equipment suppliers and do someconcrete detailed design work is very important. In fact the self-reliance project is avery good opportunity for us. We can work with our sub-suppliers and carry outsome R&D together. This may be a short-cut to improve our design.”
Interviewer: “Is improving engineering design a personal concern or anorganizational matter?”
Mr. W: I think it is an organizational issue. From a personal perspective,engineering design capacity building relies on experience. But experience cannotemerge just from book learning. Without verifications and tests from a real lifeproject, knowledge seems to be useless. That is the reason why I considerengineering design capacity building as an organizational issue. Now, I feel thatCNPDC’s engineering design capacity is relatively theoretical in the sense that it isnot competent in dealing with the problems emerging in real manufacturingprocesses. So engineering design capacity building can be considered as systemengineering. If the company can provide enough projects, experiences of our designengineers can be generated from them.
Interviewer: “Now I would like to ask a question about NCR. What is a NCR?”
Mr. W: “NCR is a non-conformance report issued by the manufacturers in case theyidentify some deviations of their products from the technical documents whichstipulate the right procedures or specifications of their manufacturing activities.Therefore, these records need to be reported to the designers. This report includes adescription of the incident, and a detailed record on the handling of this occurrence.In fact this report is a record of a deviation of the physical equipment from itsdesigned intentions. In this report, testing data is also included especially when suchdata is shown not in the range stipulated by the design documents. NCR is a recordwhenever a non-conformance incident happened. If no NCR is issued, it means theequipment is manufactured 100% in compliance with our requirements. If in themanufacturing process a thickness tolerance is identified, for example the thickness
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is required to reach 5mms however after a gauging the real thickness is shown to be4.8mms, it is a question of whether this thickness will endure the maximumpressure required by our design. Then it is followed by a series of calculations andverifications on this tolerance, justifying whether it still permits this equipment tobe properly operated under such a pressure. All these measurements, calculations,verifications need a record. NCR is used to record flaws of the equipment, becauseeven if it is mitigated, it is still a potential risk. There records are important for thefuture operation and maintenance activities. If there is an accident occurs during anuclear power plant’s operation, these documents can be used to diagnose itscauses.”
Interviewer: “Are all these NCRs going to be transferred to the operator of thenuclear power plant and the owner of the plant?”
Mr. W: “In our classification, NCRs are categorized into 3 types. The first type iscalled the I-category, internal NCRs. These NCRs are those incidents discovered bythe manufacturers’ themselves. And these flaws can be mitigated or turned tonormal by normal machine work, such as polishing a surface etc.”
“The second type is called the E1 NCRs, external category 1 NCRs. These NCRsmean that if they are mitigated, the functional requirements in the design can still bemet. That is to say, for example, according to our calculation, thickness in 4.8mmcan still ensure this equipment to endure the maximum pressure, that means itsfunctionality is not impaired, and then this kind of flaws fell into the E1 category ofNCRs. E1 NCRs are obliged to report to the designer but it does not lead to acompromise acceptance to this equipment. Acceptance of the equipment does notneed permission from the owner of the plant. The only work the designers need todo when an E1 NCR occurs is to report that a review has been done and verify whathas been recorded is true.”
“E2 category NCRs mean that these flaws can never be mitigated. That is to saythe owner of the plant has to accept the equipment with a compromise. But such acompromise shall also fulfill a set of prerequisites. First, the designer has to committhat the functional requirements in the design exceed the real operational conditions.Therefore, even with such flaws the design margin can still ensure operationalsafety. Second, through modifying other parts of the system or adjusting operationalprocedures, no incidents that may impair the intrinsic safety will occur. In any case,an acceptance with a compromise of the E2 NCRs means that the designrequirements exceed the safety margin, therefore the equipment is still consideredas workable.”
“Let me give you an example for example the fatigue analysis. Sorry I confusedthe fatigue analysis which is a study with a manufacturing activity.”
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“ For example, the casting flanges. In our standard, small holes should not bedetected in the casting flanges. But nobody can guarantee that there are no tinyholes in any casting pieces. When these holes cannot be filled with wielding, wehave to accept these flanges with holes because we know they that will not damagethe nuclear power plant.”
Interviewer: “Who make these compromises as acceptance decisions? Is that thedesigner?”
Mr. W: “Yes the designers issue a report to the owner, presenting their analysis andsuggest the owner to accept. All the E1 and E2 NCRs must be attached to theequipment manufacturing completion report except the I-category NCRs. A list ofthe I-category NCRs is enough. E1 and E2 NCRs will be used by the end-user toperform their equipment management.”
Interviewer: “Just now what you told me was all about the deviations from themanufacturing side. The design changes from manufacturing feedbacks. There isanother type of design changes which derive from the design side, for instance dueto some system modifications, equipment design will also change accordingly. Arethese changes called DEN (Design Evolution Note) in our organization? What is aNAR?”
Mr. W: “It is called a DEN. NAR is just a process. It is a commercial process, dueto the fact that technical changes will impact procurement in terms of price andbudget. NAR is in fact a notification of commercial changes on the purchasingcontract.”
Interviewer: “What is the full name of NAR?”
Mr. W: “N is notification. A means acknowledgement. R means report. So NAR isalso a report of record. Yes it is a report.”
Interviewer: “It seemed to me that designers are responsible for all these changes.They have to solve or at least acknowledge these changes.”
Mr. W: “Yes, sure. The designers have to ensure the functional requirements of thenuclear power plant being met in their designs. They don’t care about the realmanufacturing technics used on the manufacturing shop-floors. They appreciatetesting reports, which tell whether the functional requirements can be met.
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Appendix G. Interview with Mr. F
I interviewed Mr. F when we finished our small project on the study of theknowledge structures of engineering designers which we thought might help toimprove their engineering design. The study on CGN designers’ knowledge derivedfrom our understanding that knowledge – both technical and social – serves as thefoundation of engineering design. This perception is shared by both CGN’sengineers and the management. Therefore our study is granted and sponsored by acompany research program dedicated to bring about some visionary suggestionsabout CNPEC’s reform. When we finished the project and handed in our researchreport to the top management we decided to sit down and take some review of whatwe have done. In addition, I found it a good opportunity for me interview to Mr. Ffor my PhD research on the human side of nuclear power engineering in CGN.
I started the interview with a question asking him about his job tasks and theirrelationships with engineering designs in CNPEC and CNPDC.
Interviewer: “How can you describe your job and its relationship with engineeringdesign?”
Mr. F: “My job is definitely related to engineering design in CGN. Where shall Istart? my current job or my previous job?”
Interviewer: “I want you to give an overall review of your jobs in CGN.”
Mr. F: “Since I joined CGN in 2006 my job has always been related to ourengineering design. But it doesn’t mean that I personally perform engineeringdesign. I have always been playing a supportive role to our designers. I am acontract engineer dedicated to technical assistance contracts. That is to say, Ipurchase supporting services and documents from prominent foreign nuclear powerengineering companies to help our designers to solve problems or review their work.Previously our design could be described as duplications plus modifications;therefore we need numerous references. In this respect, my job has been closelyrelated to our design activities.”
“Now I am in another oversea nuclear power engineering project, and still is acontract engineer. My job is still to support our design.”
Interviewer: “Why do we have to purchase these supporting services? Is it becauseof the reason that we meet some problems that we are not be able to solve byourselves or that we just need someone else to review our work?”
Mr. F: “Both.”
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Interviewer: “What type of the two services is more frequently procured?
Mr. F: “It is hard to say. From my own experience, in the preliminary studies phase,the major services required are reviewing, but in the project construction phase,more problem-solving requests are raised by our designers. In general, I think thesetwo kinds of requests are evenly distributed.”
My interview with Mr. F had to be postponed for about one hour because hereceived a phone call from his superior asking him to carry on an urgent task.
Interviewer: “Let us continue our interview. Just now we were almost finished withthe first question about your work and its relationship to engineering design. Myunderstanding of this relationship is that in fact you buy in some knowledge,expertise, and skills to our company and such knowledge and expertise can be usedto solve our own problems or help us to identify if there are some mistakes in ourwork. I would like you to say something more about your current work.”
Mr. F: “I am now a commercial manager for a big project even though it is still inits preliminary planning stage. I am involved in the project’s licensing process. Inthis stage, I am also asked to source supporting services related to the modificationsof the software we are using, the P6 system. It is the tool that we are using tomanager our designs.”
Interviewer: “P6 means Primavera 6 – the widely used project managementsoftware?”
Mr. F: “Yes. So it is to some extent supportive to engineering design, since youknow the PSAR (preliminary safety analysis report) includes a wide range ofchapters, almost all included, and it is one of the important activities of engineeringdesign in CGN.”
Interviewer: “Yes, I know, the PSAR is done by the CNPDC people in their overallengineering design division. Can you describe your daily routine?”
Mr. F: “My daily routines include making telephone calls, writing some reports,answering emails, preparing power point slides etc. and meetings. These are mydaily activities, but if you ask me about the content of my job, I can only give you asummary as: now I am performing the commercial related jobs for a nuclear powerplant project. My tasks are largely those planning jobs. This is a highly condensedsummary which can be specified into serval smaller tasks such as the making of aLump Sum contract (EPC – engineering procurement construction) and itsconsortium contracts if any for instance. I also perform some analytical jobs such asI am now studying how we can achieve a better mechanism to balance commercial
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interests among the different parties involved in our new built power plant projects.This is very important in the drafting of a consortium contract.”
Interviewer: “Do you think that you have been involved in a decision makingprocess?”
Mr. F: “I am supportive to make a final decision. You should think like that.”
Interviewer: “Have you ever got a feeling that your commercial work is to a greatextent similar to engineering design as a form of decision making?”
Mr. F: “Sorry, I am not catching your point.”
Interviewer: “Let me explain. I got a feeling that our analytical reasoningapproaches are quite similar to that of the designers. For example we usequantitative models etc. and evaluating their work quantitatively. In this respect, Ifeel that we are much alike. We provide different choices and the decision is in factderived from these choices or alternatives.”
Mr. Li: “We are exactly doing like this. For example the choices of our consortiummembers, or partners in the project, are in fact based on our data analysis on theircompetencies such as their revenues and profits. There are a lot of things that weconsider from a quantitative perspective.”
Interviewer: “But I think there are some other jobs which cannot be treatedquantitatively, for example the licensing?”
Mr. F: “The licensing? It depends.”
Interviewer: “Since you are now involved in an oversea project, a CGN’sinvestment project, what is the difference between the licensing process in Chinaand the country in which the new power plant is about to be built?”
Mr. F: “The most important factor in the licensing process in an oversea project isthe acknowledgment of design qualifications. But it is sort of a state levelinternational problem. Now the Chinese government and the Romanian governmentare planning to sign a mutual acceptance agreement on the two countries’engineering qualifications, as such the licensing process can actually go on.”
“But let us move back to the question about quantitative reasoning. It is hard tosay that which task can be solved solely by quantitative reasoning but from as far asI am concerned commercial or planning jobs in CGN are relied on scientificmanagement. For example our project management is founded on scientificmanagement principles, the 9 areas of controls. Our company’s management is
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constructed by its management systems, which are based on rational reasoning. Sodoes the management of engineering design. It needs a system to organize our workso that it can operate smoothly. I think the engineering design management systemshall be more rigid.”
Interviewer: “You said that our job is less rigid. Is it indicating that our workcontain more social factors?”
Mr. F: “Right. From my perspective the designers have to be precise, while for anegotiator, approximation and compromise are always needed for example thechoice of governing laws for a contract. Each party favors that the contract shall bestipulated by the laws of its own country, but if everyone insists on their ownwishes there will never be a contract. So the trade-off is to stipulate the contract ona third country’s law. We encounter more social factors than the designers.”
Interviewer: “Can you compare the difference between your experiences in CGNwith your previous experiences?”
Mr. F: “Before I joined CGN, I worked for IBM. My work in IBM was customerservice, but unlike what you might image, I seldom contact with people in that job.They uploaded their requests or questions onto a system, and what I did wasanswering them through this system. I did not have direct communications withthem not in a face to face manner, but I did provide my service. After joining CGN,I think that my job has changed a lot. But in some sense I am still performingcustomer service in an indirect manner, you know. I now treat the designers as myclients, and I fulfill their requests face to face.”
Interviewer: “Can you describe your personal transitions in CNPEC. I knew youwere previously in the service contract branch under the PBE, but now yourposition is in the planning and development branch. What is the difference?”
Mr. F: “I transferred from the service contract branch to my current position in thisyear. Before this change I was in the service contract branch for 7 years from 2006to 2013. This transformation of position is accompanied by some changes to thescope of my work. I used to source for services not only for project purposes butalso for some general tasks, such as you know, our capacity building ormanagement improvement and some supporting services for our R&D.”
Interviewer: “Are you mainly dealing with the TT95, the Liang Ao Phase II PLP,and the NITT contracts, in the service contract branch?”
Mr. F: “Not just that, what you mentioned are those corporations with prominentcompanies, AREVA, EDF, Westinghouse and Bacthel, etc. But there were alsosome cases with smaller companies in terms of prestige in the nuclear power
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industry, such as the SHALL. This company was once our equipment supplier. Itsproduct is too specialized in its own area; we need to cooperate with it to make aprogress on one of our R&D project in the realm of electrical engineering.”
“Now my job has changed. I am not doing service contracts anymore. It remindsme another meaning of the word contract which can be used as a verb. Now my jobis to some extent in a preliminary phase of a nuclear power plant project. My job isto get a contract for CNPEC and CNPDC together as a lump sum supplier. I amcontracting with a hope to get a contract for CNPEC and CNPDC. Marketdevelopment people are ahead of my job because before my involvement into acontract negotiation we need to make sure that there is an opportunity. These peoplein the international or domestic market development departments are those whobring in new opportunities. My involvement is behind this phase, when a memo ofunderstanding regarding to the entrance into a market has been opened. But anyway,I am now in a very early stage of an international nuclear power plant project. Ineed to prepare bidding documents which are based on our feasibility studies. I feelthat now my vision is broadened. If I am not in a different position my vision willbe too narrowed.”
Interviewer: “I think I am familiar with you, we once worked together on the NITTand also a lot of other things. But I feel that there is something that we have seldomtalked about in our company, for example our environmental consciousness. So Iwould like to ask you some questions about your opinions on our company’senvironmental consciousness and on your personal environmental concerns.”
“Just now you mentioned that before a new project there is a market developmentphase, and I think that a nuclear power plant is an environmentally sensitive project.So my first question is what do you think of our company’s environmental concernsin general?”
Mr. F: “I will answer this question in two aspects. On one hand environmentalconcerns can be reflected by our company’s organizational culture. On the otherhand, I would like to say something about our engineers’ personal environmentalawareness and activities in a general manner.”
“From the company perspective, I think our company emphasizes environmentalprotection. It is a clean energy supplier. When you think about clean energy, that isenvironmental protection. As you know, we are not only developing nuclear powerbut also wind power, hydro power, solar power etc. But please be minded that wenever construct coal or petroleum powered plants. Coal and petroleum power is farfrom the notion of environmental protection. Building clean energy facilities is ourcompany’s vision. In this respect, I would rather say that our company put a greateffort in environmental protection. This can be reflected by our products. But as abusiness company we are not that deep green. I think our prorogation of
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environmental protection is performed in a relatively unperceivable manner. We area clean energy provider, and we change the culture by our work.”
“In CGN we recruit educated people. From my personal observations I think thatmost of us are environmentally awakened.”
“From my personal perspective, I print on both sides of the paper. I use the printedpaper as my draft paper. I seldom waste paper. I buy a fuel saving car and I care alot about the disposal of my wastes. I think these are common environmental habits.But if you ask me about some advanced activities of environmental protection, Iwould say that I do not pay a greater concern on this matter. I merge environmentalactivities into my life. I do things that I can do. I go as far as I can to protect theenvironment.”
Interviewer: “Nuclear power compared to solar energy, wind energy, is not thatenvironmental friendly. What do you think of this topic?”
Mr. F: “The question has two sides. I understand that the essence of nuclear powerengineering is its safety culture. I also know that perhaps the general public’s imageof nuclear power is influenced by its negative consequences of the reportedaccidents. As far as I know the risk of nuclear power to impair the naturalenvironment is the radioactive release. But using uranium to produce electricity canalso be regarded as an environmental friendly technology. Compared to coal andpetroleum power, nuclear power uses very small amount of fuel. The major concernis whether we can control the risk. This kind of control is achieved by our scientificdesign, and regulated operation. If we can make sure that no accident is going tohappen, then nuclear power is a very good sauce of power. Compared to theconventional ways of electricity production, nuclear power does not require amassive scale of mining.”
Interviewer: “Are you a science streamed or an art streamed student in your highschool?”
Mr. Li: “I think the most severe environmental impact of a nuclear power plant isnot reflected by its commercial operation but by its decommissioning. The landused to construct the plant cannot be used for other purposes. It becomes a deadconcrete dome. And this status will last for a very long time, 100 years maybe. Theland will be a waste land. This is the only bad thing I can point out on nuclearpower technology. For other matters, I think that, as long as we can controlradioactive releases, nuclear power technology in general will benefit our society.By the way, I am an art streamed high school student.”
Interviewer: “Did you ever participate in some environmental protectionorganizations?”
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Mr. F: “No. but I did participate in some volunteer activities. For example, when Iwas a student we volunteered to clean the streets. I think you must share the sameexperience with me. It is not an organization but it is certainly an activity. I didparticipate; I can only say it like this.”
Interviewer: “Let us move our topics back to engineering design. What kind ofdesign do you think is a good design? On the other hand, what do you think islacking in our design in order to reach this goal?”
Mr. F: “If you take engineering design for a nuclear power plant as consisted of aseries of system designs including its subsystems, the result of designs aremanifested by its drawings and calculation notes, reports etc. But if you takeengineering design as a design for a project, it will have a broader meaning.Because, installation, commissioning, and operation all required some designs. Inthis respect, all these designs are manifested by our final product, the plant whichwe deliver to the owner.”
“ So for a system design, I think its results shall be amenable to scientificverifications, and they shall also be in compliance to laws and regulations. But itshould also have some human concerns. For instance ergonomics, that is to say thedesigned object should be easier for human operation.”
Interviewer: “I would like to interrupt you at this point, because I feel that this typeof ergonomics designs is in fact guided by a principle to avoid human errors. Whatdo you think of this tendency?”
Mr. F: “It has both its pros and cons. Machines are not always reliable. Operationrequires human inspections. In this respect, automation reduced human input in theoperation of the system but it increases human inspections of its process.Automation makes the nuclear power plant safer but it doesn’t mean that our humaninputs are reduced. On the contrary such inputs may be increased instead. Digitalcontrol machines replaced human operators; they might raise the nuclear powerplant’s safety to a higher level. Such replacement is accompanied by a higherequipment cost. So from a cost and benefit perspective, it is not a straightforwardgain without any lose.”
“As a short summary of my perceptions of a good engineering design, it shallmeet a series of requirements. Specifically the requirements set up by the owner, bythe regulations and laws and our own procedures, the requirements of the futureoperators, the requirement of constructors etc. In all, the design should be easilyunderstood, and be able to be adopted.”
Interviewer: “What are the shortcomings of our designs from your perspective?”
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Mr. F: “What we are lacking in our design from my personal perspectives is that wehave not established a set of matured design methodology. I think our engineers arecapable and we have not seen any apparent flaws in our company’s policy.”
Interviewer: “Are you suggesting that we have never done a real completedengineering design for a nuclear power plant by ourselves?”
Mr. F: “Almost. I am questioning our approach of design. Because I feel that we arealways performing a duplication of others’ design with our limited modifications.The EPR and the AP1000 are not our products. Our real products are thosemodifications. In this respect, the HL 1000 may be considered as our product butcertainly CPR1000 is not that kind of a product. At least in the development of theHL1000, we go through its R&D, not just duplications or modifications. We startfrom the origin. If engineering design is defined to be duplications andmodifications, I tend to think that our designs are workable in a realistic sensetaking into the consideration of scheduling. But I still think engineering designshould be something more creative. The HL1000’s R&D may be an example forthat kind of engineering design.”
Interviewer: “How can we improve our design? What is the driving force of makingimprovements to our design?”
Mr. F: “I think this is an easy question. What is the driving force of our entirecompany? Profits. I have never questioned our engineers’ capability of doing agood job compared with those who I know in AREVA or in EDF. But what we arelacking is an experience, an experience that starts from the beginning of a completeengineering design. Our design is fragmented therefore we need more time toaccumulate. Certainly our company should provide more opportunities forengineers to learn by working with in a real project. But the most important thing isthat the company should provide some direct stimulates such as financial awards toour engineers to encourage their participation. Or company could consider suchstimulates in terms of honor.”
I think the managerial aspect is also very important. We need to reduce the waste ofour energy in the interfaces. We need to reduce disputes over trifles among ourdepartments and engineering disciplines. To do this a more scientific approach ofmanagement should be relied on. I hope under a better management scheme,engineers can focus, or spend more time, on real design activities or learning, ratherthan wasting their time on handling trivial things which are in fact not engineeringdesign. However, I think improving our management can only serve a supportiverole. The most important thing is that engineers spend more time on realengineering design. As such the result will be different.
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Good management may stimulate creative thinking among our engineers. Just now Iam trying to say that even though hard working is important, but it doesn’t meanthat creative thinking can be naturally generated through hard working. Creativethinking is important for a better design.
Interviewer: “What do you think of our own small project? Will it bring somechanges to our engineering design?”
Mr. F: “I think it has some modest pushing effects on changing our designs. Oursmall knowledge management project has clarified and probably visualized ourdesign engineers’ knowledge reserves. It made a connection of knowledge to theirhands-on jobs. So, I think it will facilitate our engineers to get a betterunderstanding of their work. But I would say that our project has its limitations,because it gives me a feeling that it is too narrowed, which can only be adapted tothe existing knowledge management system. I mean too simplified. I always feelthat we have missed a lot of things in the final report that we have submitted to thetop-management.
By the end of interview, I had some discussions with Mr. F about our small project,which lasted for about 3 minutes. Both of us tended to think that the process of theproject was in fact an attempt of performing a cross-disciplinary communicationamong CNPDC’s and CNPEC’s divisions and branches. In our research process wefound that engineers in CNPDC’s divisions were not quite aware of what otherengineers think and what others know. Communication through the interfaces issimplified to information exchange. In this respect, we think our small project hasfostered some cross-disciplinary communication. Now, at least, some of them havegot a rough picture of what others think and know.
But we left a question unsolved after our discussion. The question is “what wereour own motives of performing this small project? Did we do it for fame or money?”
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